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ABSTRACT 
The internet in South Africa provides significant benefits to users involved in electronic 
commerce. Manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers and consumers enjoy the great convenience 
of doing business online. While electronic commerce transactions have great benefits, they 
also come with great risks and ultimately disadvantages. The increase in e-commerce in 
South Africa is proportional to the increase in privacy concerns, thus the legislature has 
passed legislation to deal with these informational security issues. Is the legislation 
addressing privacy concerns in e-commerce sufficient in dealing with these privacy 
concerns? What are the legal consequences of doing business online in relation to 
informational privacy?  
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DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS 
1. Data – Means electronic representations of information in any form. 
2. Data Message – Is data generated, sent, received or stored by electronic means and 
includes (a) voice, where the voice is used in an automated transaction; and (b) a 
stored record. 
3. Electronic Commerce – Is the buying and selling of goods and services, or the 
transmitting of funds or data, over an electronic network, primarily the internet.  
4. Legal Framework – A set of documents that include the Constitution, legislation, 
regulations, and contracts. How these documents relate to one another. 
5. Online – Controlled by or connected to the internet through a computer or related 
device. 
6. Tort – A wrongful act (infringement of a right) other than the breach of a contract for 
which relief may be obtained in the form of damages or an injunction. 











According to global standards, electronic commerce (hereafter referred to as e-commerce) is 
still developing in South Africa.1 The introduction of e-commerce has by great and wide 
strides changed the way in which companies, individuals and organizations conduct 
business.2  The internet has bequeathed organizations with opportunities to improve their 
business processes, target and expand new markets, create business strategies and increase 
customer satisfaction.3  
The introduction of e-commerce in the Republic of South Africa took place more than a 
decade ago and to date, due to the increase in online transactions, new legal challenges have 
arisen.4  As a result of the increase in online transactions, the Republic of South Africa 
introduced among other legislation, the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 
(hereafter referred to as ECTA).5 The ECTA came into force on 30 August 2002 to govern 
electronic transactions.6 
Although the introduction of e-commerce (also referred to hereinafter as e-business or e-
tailing) is an evolution that has been a major step up from the traditional way of doing 
business, it has also brought about adverse legal consequences on issues of security, 
confidentiality and consumer trust as well as on privacy protection for consumers in data 
                                                          
1 South Africa Department of Communications ‘Discussion Paper on Electronic Commerce’ (1999) 1. 
2 N M Din & M Z Jamaluddin ‘Building a trusted environment for e-business: Malaysian perspective’ (2003) (1) 
Journal of ICT 34. 
3 B J Corbitt … et al ‘Trust and e-commerce: A study of consumer perceptions’ (2003) 2 (1) Electronic 
Commerce Research and Application 203. Din & Jamaluddin ibid. 
4 I J Lloyd Information Technology Law 7 ed (2014) 11. South Africa Department of Communications ‘A Green 
Paper on Electronic Commerce for South Africa’ (2000) 15. 
5 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002. 
6 ibid. 
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transmission.7 E-business information must be protected in storage and in transit over the 
computer telecommunications networks.8 
1.2. The Rationale for the Study and Key Questions to be Answered by the Research 
The e-commerce industry is rapidly expanding and the technology enabling e-business has 
matured significantly.9 The benefits derived from e-commerce are numerous, and some of 
these include the fact that it is an expedient means of contracting, as it saves time and energy 
and that it is easily accessible. 10  The proliferation in the number of online retailers is 
indicative of society’s acceptance of e-commerce.11 Benefits also come with inherent risks 
such as cybercrimes, revenue loss through tax avoidance.12 In the end the aim is to transform 
the way e-business is conducted.13 
 Despite its capacity to transform business operations, e-commerce is still faced with a lot of 
legal challenges.14 Security is one of the most challenging problems faced by customers who 
wish to trade in the e-commerce world.15 The problem results from the vulnerabilities of the 
internet upon which e-commerce is based. The vulnerabilities of the internet may inhibit 
customers from participating in e-commerce if they feel that the level of risk is 
unacceptable.16  
The current legal framework does not address all the different legal challenges relating to e-
                                                          
7 South Africa Department of Communications ‘A Green Paper on Electronic Commerce for South Africa’ 
(2000) 15. 
8 See Note 2 above. 
9 See Note 1 above. 
10 B Suh & I Han ‘The impact of customer trust and perception of security control on the acceptance of 
electronic commerce’ (2003) 7 (3) International Journal of Electronic Commerce 135. 
11 ibid 136. 
12 ibid. 
13 ibid. 
14 See Note 7 above at 24. 
15 See Note 10 above. 
16 ibid. 
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commerce transactions.17 Therefore a need exists to formulate a new legal framework and/or 
to improve the current legal framework for those business transactions that are concluded 
electronically.18  
From a policy perspective such a legal framework would have to address all the different 
factors and challenges that are associated with using an information and communication 
technology platform for a business transaction to be legally valid.19  
The rationale of this dissertation is to assess the legal framework around e-commerce and to 
see how far it helps in dealing with challenges that arise from that type of transaction. The 
dissertation will more specifically focus on the legal framework of e-commerce particularly 
on issues relating to privacy and data protection.  
This dissertation will attempt to examine the efforts made by South Africa in dealing with 
information protection issues. This examination will be done by conducting a critical analysis 
of South Africa’s laws that govern information protection in e-commerce transactions. The 
dissertation will also seek to identify intermissions in that legislation relating to information 
protection. 
This dissertation will also, to a large extent focus on consumer protection. More emphasis 
will be given on this in the following chapters. A brief analysis of the ECTA will suffice for 
one to say that the ECTA has certain provisions that deal specifically with consumer 
protection in electronic transactions.20 
 
                                                          
17 ibid. 
18 ibid.  
19 ibid. 
20 See Chapter VII of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002. 
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The question of why privacy is important has been addressed in a number of ways. As a 
matter of fact, privacy concerns are deeply rooted in history dating as far back as the times of 
the Roman-Dutch law.21 Grayling, one of the foremost contemporary philosophers in the 
United Kingdom has made observations that highlight the human rights background on which 
privacy is based. According to Grayling: 
“No human rights convention is complete without an article that defends 
privacy, for the excellent reason that privacy is an indispensable adjunct of 
the minimum that individuals require for a chance to build good lives. One 
aspect of its importance is that it gives people a measure of control over the 
front they offer to others, and the amount of information that others have 
about them, concerning matters that are personal, intimate, eccentric or 
constitutive of the individual’s inner life…. But the foremost reason for 
privacy is that it is crucial for personal autonomy and psychological 
wellbeing. Even lovers require a degree of privacy from each other, for the 
lack of a reserve selfhood is almost the same as not having a self at all.”22  
Blecher has suggested that the Roman law did not lack the necessary means to protect 
individual privacy, although it might have lacked the need to do so.23 The issue of privacy is 
not only a concern in South Africa. Bygone times explain that the experience of European 
countries with the threat posed by the large-scale collection of personal information led to 
their recognition of this phenomenon as a human rights issue.24  
                                                          
21 J Neethling … et al Law of Personality 2 ed (2005) 42, 45 and 46. 
22 A C Grayling Liberty in the Age of Terror: A Defence of Civil Liberties and Enlightenment Values (2009) 
110. 
23 ibid 
24 A Roos ‘Data protection: Explaining the international backdrop and evaluating the current South African 
position’ (2008) 11 (4) South African Law Journal 400. 
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The right to privacy in South Africa was recognized and protected as a personality interest 
under the common law.25  The Constituional Court in Bernstein v Bester pointed out that 
there is an interconnection between common law and the right to privacy under the 
Constitution as the right to privacy is expressly protected as a fundamental right. 26 
Furthermore; the Constitutional Court also emphasized the interdependency between the 
common law and the constitutional right to privacy.27  
On the grounds that the right to privacy is expressly protected as a fundamental right under 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, it is imperative to note that section 2 clearly 
states that the Constitution is the supreme law of South Africa and any law or conduct 
inconsistent with it is invalid. 28  Additionally, entrenched within the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa is the Bill of Rights chapter 2,29 which is applicable to all law, 
including the common law relating to the right to privacy and it binds not only the organs of 
the state,30 but also, if applicable, natural and juristic persons.31 
Another reason for this study emanates from the fact that computers are now able to store 
vast amounts of information in the form of raw data, relatively easily, cheaply and for almost 
indefinite period. 32  The development of new telecommunications technology, linking 
computers in networks, principally the internet, and enabling the transfer of information 
between computer systems, has lent impetus to the processing of information which is also 
referred to as data.33  
                                                          
25 See Note 21 above. 
26  Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC); 1996 (4) BCLR 449 (CC) at 787. See Section 14 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
27 Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC); 1996 (4) BCLR 449 (CC) at 787. 
28 See Section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
29 See Sections 7 to section 39 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
30 See Section 8 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
31 See Section 8 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
32 S Flaherty ‘Surveillance societies’ (1992) 2 (1) Hastings Law Journal 1321. 
33 ibid 1321. 
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Now, when they buy, consumers always have a certain degree of risk associated with privacy 
like profiling, traffic data, cookies and spam (unsolicited commercial e-mails). 34 
Consequently, one of the most important factors that help with the gaining of confidence and 
perception of risk for the consumer is the quality of information security.35 On this note, the 
consumer’s confidence may tend to be more important in e-commerce than in traditional 
commerce.36 
1.3. Research Questions  
The dissertation will attempt to answer the following questions:  
a) Has there been legislation designed or put forward by the South African legislature to 
address information security concerns in e-commerce transactions?  
b) To what extent does the South African e-commerce legislation impact on the 
legislature’s endeavour to curb privacy protection problems in e-commerce 
transactions? 
c) How are South African organizations and companies employing policy and legal 
prescriptions for the purposes of enhancing identifiable private information through 
information security?  
d) To what extent are companies (both public and private) or organizations (both public 
and private) in South Africa, integrating e-commerce privacy protection legal 
requirements in their policy formulation as well as their policy implementation? and 
lastly 
                                                          
34 See Note 10 above at 136. 
35 ibid. 
36 ibid. 
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e) Are there intermissions in those legislation that have been enacted to address 
information security problems especially privacy concerns in e-commerce? 
1.4. Aims and Objectives  
The aim of the dissertation is to analyse the ECTA and other relevant legislation dealing with 
electronic transactions. This dissertation will seek to identify intermissions in the legislation 
relating to information protection. The legislation relating to information protection include 
the Broadcasting Act 4 of 1999, Competition Act 89 of 1998, Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996, Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008, Copyright Act 98 of 1978, 
Electronic Communications Act 36 of 2006, Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001, Independent Communications Authority of South Africa 
Act 13 of 2000, Interim Constitution of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, Merchandise Marks 
Act 17 of 1941, National Credit Act 34 of 2005, Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 
1998, Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000, Protection of Personal Information 
Act 4 of 2013, Protection of Personal Information Bill B9 of 2009, Regulation of Interception 
of Communications and Provision of Communication-related Information Act 70 of 2002, 
Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related 
Information Amendment Act 48 of 2008, Statistics Act 66 of 1976 and the 
Telecommunications Act 103 of 1996. 
Therefore, the overall objectives are as follows: 
a) To define electronic commerce; 
b) To identify legal issues pertaining to privacy in e-commerce; 
c) To identify intermissions in legislation relating to data transmission; 
d) To investigate, examine and suggest any reforms to be made to the laws relating to 
information protection in e-commerce transactions; 
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e) To examine the legal and policy framework of the proposed law reforms;  
f) To make recommendations on how to improve the existing legal framework to suit the 
ever-changing technology in e-business. 
1.5. Methodology 
The research for this dissertation is going to be a desktop based one.  In pursuit of the 
aforementioned research objectives, this dissertation will take the form of a qualitative 
research methodology. Under this approach, the thesis will firstly conduct a descriptive 
analysis of the history of e-commerce and the legal framework around it in South Africa. 
Reference will be made to primary sources of law such as legislation and case law relevant to 
the topic. Secondary sources like journals, text books, and internet sources will also be 
consulted. Furthermore, the situation in other countries will also be analysed and conclusions 
will be drawn.  
E-commerce has so many advantages in our day to day business because it makes everything 
convenient for people.37  With all the advantages that e-commerce has for easy business 
transactions, literature on e-commerce legislation is still scant because it is a relatively a new 
area and as such there is meagre case law on the subject.38 
 This dissertation will also refer to articles which have documented the rise of e-commerce in 
South Africa and other developing countries. In addition, this dissertation will refer to 
published articles by leading South African academics which discuss the measures that have 
been put in place and analyse whether those measures have been successful in resolving the 
issues they were designed to deal with.  
                                                          
37 S Shahriari ... et al ‘E-commerce and it impacts on global trend and market’ (2015) 3 (4) International 
Journal of Research - Granthaalayah 49. 
38 D K Gangeshwer ‘E-Commerce or internet marketing: A business review from Indian context’ (2013) 6 (6) 
International Journal of u- and e- Service, Science and Technology 188. 
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 Reference  will  also  be  made  to certain  organizations  regulating  and dealing extensively 
with e-commerce  at  both  an  international  and  national level.  This dissertation is also 
going to take the form of a comparative study of different countries’ e-commerce law and 
foreign case law in order to get some insight into, and an understanding of the approach used 
by other countries in formulating a legal framework to cater for and deal with e-commerce 
transactions. 
Lastly an interpretive approach will be conducted to provide a better understanding of the rise 
of electronic commerce transactions in South Africa and the legal issues involved pertaining 
privacy. 
1.6. Structure of the Dissertation   
 Chapter one of this dissertation provides the background information relating to e-
commerce. In this chapter, the rationale of the dissertation is discussed. All the aims and the 
objectives of this dissertation are listed. The purpose for the analysis of the topic is set out, 
indicating the importance of the dissertation. All the main research questions are posed. 
These questions reveal the approach that the dissertation follows. 
Chapter two provides a descriptive background to what e-commerce is. It examines the 
various definitions of e-commerce that exist in the business world. The synonyms for e-
commerce are given. Chapter two of the dissertation sheds light on the types of e-commerce 
models that are used in South Africa. The South African regulatory legal framework relating 
to electronic transactions is discussed. All other relevant legislation that contributes to the 
discussion later on in the other following chapters is cited. Other aspects dealt with in this 
chapter are the four main issues in law that are related to electronic transactions in business. 
A discussion on the international legal perspective on e-commerce concludes the chapter.  
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Chapter three provides a comprehensive discussion on the data protection laws from an 
international stand point. The chapter critically analyses the European Union directive 
dealing with e-commerce. The chapter takes the discussion to consumer concerns in data 
transmissions. In this chapter the recognition of the right to privacy is discussed. The nature 
and scope of protection of personal information is examined to see how far this protection of 
personal information goes. What constitutes an infringement of the right to privacy is also 
considered and the chapter closes by focusing on the applicability of international law in e-
commerce formulation and application in South Africa.    
Chapter four focuses its attention on the South African law relating to data protection. The 
chapter specifically, looks at the ECTA. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 is also analysed in light of e-commerce law formulation and privacy. The chapter also 
discusses consumer privacy in Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013, the 
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008, the Electronic Communications Act 36 of 2006, the 
National Credit Act 34 of 2005 as well as the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 
2000 as they are the major statutes dealing with information and privacy protection.  
Chapter five concentrates on e-commerce in the United Kingdom and the influence it has 
exerted on the development of South African e-commerce law. This chapter seeks to explore 
e-commerce in South Africa in relation to the European Law which was already in place. An 
extensive discussion of the various privacy laws in the United Kingdom is undertaken. 
Various other legislation with privacy aspects in the United Kingdom is also discussed.  
Chapter six describes privacy and data protection in the United States of America. The 
chapter deals in length with laws governing privacy in the United States of America, 
particularly laws governing privacy and data protection in relation to e-commerce. The 
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chapter looks at privacy laws in various States of the United States of America as well as the 
Federal privacy laws.  
Chapter seven is the final chapter of the dissertation and it provides the conclusion and 
recommendations. This chapter is a summary of the information discussed in the previous 
chapters and it provides the conclusions of the findings made. In this chapter, the questions 
set out in chapter 1 of this dissertation are answered. The challenges facing the South African 
legislature are pointed out and the solutions are also proposed. This chapter provides a 
comparison between e-commerce as well as privacy and data protection laws in South Africa, 
the United Kingdom and the United States of America. This chapter identifies areas where 
South Africa is ahead of the United Kingdom and the United States of America in drafting 
and implementing e-commerce privacy protection laws and it also indicates areas where the 
South African e-commerce legislation still has to improve. The way forward is tabulated and 
the discussion on the rise of electronic commerce transactions in South Africa and the legal 
challenges pertaining to privacy is completed.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
2. THE DESCRIPTION AND BACKGROUND OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE   
2.1. Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief background to what e-commerce is. It is 
imperative to understand what e-commerce is before getting into the discussion of its 
regulatory framework. This discussion is not meant to exhaust all the definitions of e-
commerce, but inasmuch as e-commerce is not defined in the ECTA,1 it is essential to give a 
simple definition in order to understand the legal challenges facing this type of transaction.  
2.2. Electronic  Commerce Defined 
Since e-commerce is not defined by the ECTA, it does not have a well-accepted definition.2 
There are a number of widely accepted definitions that have been proffered by various 
organizations and international academic research associations.3 One of the organizations that 
defined e-commerce is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development which 
is also known as the OECD.4 The OECD is a unique forum where the governments of 34 
democracies with market economies work with each other, as well as with more than 70 non-





                                                          
1 S Papadopoulos ‘Online consumer protection’ in S Papadopoulos & S Snail (eds) Cyberlaw @ SA III: The Law 
of the Internet in South Africa 3 ed (2012) 65. 
2 ibid. 
3 ibid. 
4 ibid 64.  
5 OECD ‘What is the OECD? About the OECD’ available at 
https://usoecd.usmission.gov/mission/overview.html, accessed on 28 December 2016.  
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 According to the OECD, e-commerce is an: 
 “…electronic transaction which is the sale of goods or services between 
businesses, households, individuals, governments and other public or 
private organizations, conducted over computer mediated networks.”6   
The OCED termed this definition of e-commerce as the broad definition of e-commerce 
because the transaction can take place over the internet or any other electronic medium which 
is not necessarily the internet.7 The OECD also gave a narrow definition when it defined e-
commerce as an internet transaction and not an electronic transaction.8 According to the 
OECD,  
“…an internet transaction is the sale or purchase of goods or services, 
whether between businesses, households, individuals, governments, and 
other public or private organizations, conducted over the internet.”9  
In both the broad and the narrow definitions given by the OECD, the goods and services are 
ordered over those networks, but the payment and the ultimate delivery of the goods or 
services may be conducted on or off-line.10 
E-commerce can also be defined as the  
“…use of internet to facilitate, execute, and process business 
transactions.”11  
                                                          
6 Z Qin … et al E-Commerce Strategy 2 ed (2014) 2. OECD OECD Guide to Measuring the Information Society 
(2011) 72. OECD OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms (2008) 167. 
7 OECD OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms (2008) 167. 
8  S Grist ‘The definition dilemma of e-commerce’ in S A Becker (ed) Electronic Commerce: Concepts, 
Methodologies, Tools, and Applications (2008) 2094-2095. 
9  Grist ibid. M Stewart Encyclopaedia of Developing Regional Communities with Information and 
Communication Technology (2005) 154. 
10 OECD Measuring the Information Economy (2002) 89. E J Malecki & B Moriset The Digital Economy: 
Business Organization, Production Processes and Regional Developments (2007) 94. 
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It denotes the seamless application of information and communication technology from its 
point of origin to its endpoint along the entire value chain of business processes conducted 
electronically and designed to enable the accomplishment of business goals. It involves 
exchanges among customers, business partners, and vendors.12  
The fundamental role of e-commerce is similar to information technology (IT) in that both 
are tools for facilitating business transactions and communicating information to decision-
makers.13 However, there are significant differences in terms of technical and managerial 
issues encountered.14 Information technology mainly focuses on internal functions such as 
desktop support, data centre, and network operations. 15  On the other hand, e-commerce 
systems enable an interface between a firm and its customers, and provide another channel to 
market products and services.16 
Chaffey went beyond just defining e-commerce as a transaction which involves buying and 
selling of goods and services.17 He did not limit his definition to the buying and selling 
process, but his definition also entails pre-sale and post-sale activities across the chain.18 
In this dissertation, it is necessary to have a comprehensive definition of e-commerce. 
Electronic commerce is about doing business electronically and it is based on the electronic 
processing and transmission of data, including text, sound and video.19 It encompasses many 
diverse activities including electronic trading of goods and services, online delivery of digital 
content, electronic fund transfers, electronic share trading, electronic bills of lading, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
11 F Wijnhoven ‘The importance of information goods abstraction levels for information commerce process 
models’ (2002) 3 (2) Journal of Electronic Commerce Research 40. 
12 ibid.  
13 H Chong, ‘Validity of Delone and Mclean’s e-commerce model in B2C student loan industry’ (2010) 19 (1) 




17 D Chaffey E-Business and E-commerce Management: Strategy, Implementation and Practice 4 ed (2009) 5. 
See also R Kalakota & A Whinston Electronic Commerce: A Manager's Guide 3 ed (1997) 69. 
18 Kalakota & Whinston ibid. 
19 R Chakrabarti The Asian Manager's Handbook of E-commerce (2002) 33. 
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commercial auctions, collaborative design and engineering, online sourcing, public 
procurement, direct consumer marketing, and pre-sale as well as post-sale service.20 
According to Manzoor, e-commerce refers to the use of electronic means and technologies to 
conduct commerce (sale, purchase, transfer, or exchange of products, services, and/or 
information), including within business, business-to-business, and business-to-consumer 
interactions.21 He concludes by also pointing out that delivery of the product or service may 
occur over or outside the internet.22  
The customer can sell items directly to other customers (for example, customer to customer 
like eBay online auction business that allows people to auction items they own to other 
people directly) or as a customer to business organization where online registrations can be 
performed for products consumers purchase, or as a customer to government organization 
where individual voters in the United States can contact their governmental representatives 
directly over the internet.23  
The business to customer organizations are now able through online registrations, to keep 
better track of their customers for purposes of product recalls and updates.24 The business to 
business organizations can transact product and material purchases, share design 




                                                          
20 ibid. 
21 A Manzoor E-Commerce: An Introduction (2010) 2. 
22 ibid 2. OECD Measuring the Information Economy (2002) 89. Malecki & Moriset The Digital Economy: 
Business Organization, Production Processes and Regional Developments (2007) 94. 
23 M J Schniederjans …et al E-Commerce Operations Management 2 ed (2013) 4.  
24 ibid 5. 
25 ibid. 
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2.3. Different Types of Electronic Commerce 
As alluded to above, e-commerce can be categorized into four major models. These 
categories are used to differentiate one e-commerce class from another. 26  These are the 
business to business (B2B), business to consumer (B2C), consumer to consumer (C2C) and 
consumer to business (C2B) models.27 While there are four major models of e-commerce, 
there are also other minor models of e-commerce.28 These are the business to administration 
(B2A) and the consumer-to-administration (C2A) among many others.29 This dissertation 
will seek to discuss only the four major models as it is not the main purpose of this document 
to discuss e-commerce categories. 
2.3.1. Business to Business (B2B) 
Business to business e-commerce (B2B) describes commercial transactions between 
businesses, such as between a manufacturer and a wholesaler, or between a wholesaler and a 
retailer.30 Contrasting terms are business to consumer (B2C) and business to government 
(B2G). 31  The volume of B2B transactions is much higher than the volume of B2C 
transactions.32 The primary reason for this is that in a typical supply chain there will be many 
B2B transactions involving sub components or raw materials, and only one B2C transaction, 
specifically the sale of the finished product to the end customer.33  
                                                          
26 C Schulze ‘Electronic commerce and civil jurisdiction, with special reference to consumer contracts’ (2006) 
18 (1) SA Mercantile Law Journal 32. 
27 Z Qin Introduction to E-commerce (2010) 24. 
28 ibid. 
29 ibid. 
30 S P van Zyl ‘Determining the place of supply or the place of use and consumption of imported services for 
Value-Added Tax purposes: Some lessons for South Africa from the European Union’ (2013) 25 (4) SA 
Mercantile Law Journal 535. 
31 ibid. 
32 R Nemat ‘Taking a look at different types of e-commerce’ (2011) 1 (2) World Applied Programming Journal 
100. 
33 van Zyl see note 30 above. Nemat ‘Taking a look at different types of e-commerce’ (2011) 1 (2) World 
Applied Programming Journal 104. 
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B2B e-commerce, which links businesses in the value chain to each other, enables all manner 
of commercial and administrative transactions to be conducted over private 
telecommunications circuits, or over the public internet, much more cheaply and timeously 
than before.34 B2B e-commerce is the widespread realization of Electronic Data Interchange 
(EDI), an effective application of Information Communications Technology (ICT) that has 
been in existence for many years, but still restricted to a few large companies because of its 
cost and proprietary nature.35 
For example, an automobile manufacturer makes several B2B transactions such as buying 
tires, glass for windscreens, and rubber hoses for its vehicles. The final transaction, a finished 
vehicle sold to the consumer, is a single B2C transaction. B2B is also used in the context of 
communication and collaboration.36 Many businesses are now using social media to connect 
with their consumers B2C; however, they are now using similar tools within the business so 
employees can connect with one another.37  
When communication is taking place amongst employees, this can be referred to as B2B 
communication.38  The term ‘business to business,’ was originally coined to describe the 
electronic communications between businesses or enterprises in order to distinguish it from 
the communications between businesses and consumers.39 It eventually came to be used in 
marketing as well, initially describing only industrial or capital goods marketing.40 Today it is 
widely used to describe all products and services used by enterprises.41 Many professional 
                                                          
34 P Esselaar and J Miller ‘Towards electronic commerce in Africa: A perspective from three country studies’ 
(2002) 2 (1) The Southern African Journal of Information and Communication 2.  
35 ibid. 
36 See Note 32 above. 
37 See Note 30 above. 
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institutions and the trade publications focus much more on B2C than B2B, although most 
sales and marketing personnel are in the B2B sector.42  
2.3.2. Business to Consumer (B2C) 
Business to consumer (B2C), sometimes also called ‘Business to Customer’, describes 
activities of businesses serving end consumers with products and/or services.43 An example 
of a B2C transaction would be a person buying a pair of shoes from a retailer. 44  The 
transactions that led to the shoes being available for purchase, is the purchase of the leather, 
laces, rubber, etc.45 However, the sale of the shoe from the shoemaker to the retailer would be 
considered a B2B transaction.46  
While the term e-commerce refers to all online transactions, B2C stands for ‘business to 
consumer’ and applies to any business or organization that sells its products or services to 
consumers over the internet for its own use.47 When most people think of B2C e-commerce, 
they think of Amazon, the online bookseller that launched its site in 1995 and quickly took on 
the nation's major retailers. 48  In addition to online retailers, B2C has grown to include 
services such as online banking, travel services, online auctions, health information and real 
estate sites.49  
                                                          
42 ibid. Nemat ‘Taking a look at different types of e-commerce’ (2011) 1 (2) World Applied Programming 
Journal 104. 
43 T Shumba ‘Towards an SADC community sales law: Lessons SADC may learn from the proposal for a 
Common European Sales Law (CESL)’ (2015) 27 (3) SA Mercantile Law Journal 488. 
44 ibid. 
45 ibid. 
46 See Note 34 above. 
47 See Note 30 above at 541-542. 
48 See Note 32 above. 
49 L Classen ‘E-commerce and value added tax’ in S Papadopoulos & S Snail (eds) Cyberlaw @ SA III: The 
Law of the Internet in South Africa 3 ed (2012) 115. 
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Peer to peer sites such as Craigslist also fall under the B2C category.50 B2C e-commerce 
involves direct business transactions between individual consumers and supplying 
companies, such as the purchase of books, or booking cinema tickets over the internet, 
whether within an African country, or between countries, or internationally.51 This is the most 
well-known type of e-commerce relationship, but nowhere near as economically important as 
the business to business e-commerce.52 
2.3.3. Consumer to Consumer (C2C) 
Consumer to consumer (C2C) or citizen to citizen electronic commerce involves the 
electronically-facilitated transactions between consumers through some third party. 53  A 
common example is the online auction, in which a consumer posts an item for sale and other 
consumers bid to purchase it; the third party generally charges a flat fee or commission.54 The 
sites are only intermediaries, just there to match consumers.55  
They do not have to check quality of the products being offered. C2C marketing is the 
creation of a product or service with the specific promotional strategy being for consumers to 
share that product or service with others as brand advocates based on the value of the 
product.56 The investment into conceptualizing and developing a top-of-the-line product or 
                                                          
50 Esselaar & Miller ‘Towards electronic commerce in Africa: A perspective from three country studies’ (2002) 
2 (1) The Southern African Journal of Information and Communication 2. Nemat ‘Taking a look at different 
types of e-commerce’ (2011) 1 (2) World Applied Programming Journal 103. 
51 Nemat ibid at 104. 
52 ibid. 
53  M Geist ‘When dot-coms die: The e-commerce challenge to Canada's bankruptcy law’ (2002) 37 (1) 
Canadian Business Law Journal 34. Nemat ‘Taking a look at different types of e-commerce’ (2011) 1 (2) World 
Applied Programming Journal 103. Esselaar & Miller ‘Towards electronic commerce in Africa: A perspective 
from three country studies’ (2002) 2 (1) The Southern African Journal of Information and Communication 2. 
54 Geist ibid. 
55 ibid. 
56 ibid. 
20 | P a g e  
 
service that consumers are actively looking for is equal to a B2C pre-launch product 
awareness marketing spends.57  
This type of e-commerce is expected to increase in the future because it cuts out the costs of 
using another company. 58  An example cited in Management Information Systems, is of 
someone having a garage sale to promote their sale via advertising transmitted to the GPS 
units of cars in the area.59 This would potentially reach a larger audience than just posting 
signs around the neighborhood.60 Since the economic downturn which commenced in 2008, 
C2C online commerce levels have increased dramatically.61 
2.3.4. Consumer to Business (C2B) 
Consumer to business (C2B) is an electronic commerce business model in which consumers 
(individuals/ customers) offer products and services to companies and the companies pay 
them.62 This business model is a complete reversal of traditional business models where 
companies offer goods and services to consumers.63 We can see this example in blogs or 
internet forums where the author offers a link back to an online business facilitating the 
purchase of some product like a book on Amazon.com, and the author might receive affiliate 
revenue from a successful sale.64  
2.4. The South African Regulatory Legal Framework 
The information and communication applications are of paramount concern to the banks in 
today’s business environment and the internet has become the major platform for all 
                                                          
57 Nemat see Note 53 above. 
58 Manzoor E-Commerce: An Introduction (2010) 2. 
59 ibid. 
60 ibid. 
61 ibid. Nemat ‘Taking a look at different types of e-commerce’ (2011) 1 (2) World Applied Programming 
Journal 100-104. 
62 See Note 58 above. 
63 ibid 3. 
64  Nemat see Note 61 above at 103. 
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financial, banking and commercial transactions in the present scenario.65 Statistics show that 
Africa is lagging behind in the adoption of e-commerce. 66  However, there is some e-
commerce activity in Africa, with South Africa, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia taking the 
lead.67 Most rural areas in Africa, where the majority of small and medium businesses are 
concentrated, have no internet facilities and thus are unable to engage in e-commerce 
activities.68 Most countries in Africa, except South Africa, have internet infrastructure only in 
their major cities.69 
Despite the slow diffusion of e-commerce in some countries because of the lack of internet 
facilities, these countries in general and South Africa in particular, face a different challenge 
altogether.70 The greatest challenge in South Africa’s e-commerce is its regulation.71  Issues 
emanating from e-commerce transactions include among many others, taxation, intellectual 
property rights, privacy, security and validity of contracts.72 
Like many other countries and governments, the South African government recognized the 
need for the formation of e-commerce policy and saw its role as an enabler, facilitator, 
educator and law enforcer to prevent internet crimes.73 It was essential that South Africa 
should develop a policy that is in harmony with international best practice so that it is not 
                                                          
65 G Worku ‘Electronic-banking in Ethiopia- Practices, opportunities and challenges’ (2003) 1 (2) Journal of 




69 ibid.  
70 S Papadopoulos ‘An introduction to cyberlaw’ in S Papadopoulos & S Snail (eds) Cyberlaw @ SA III: The 
Law of the Internet in South Africa 3 ed (2012) 3. C Cupido ‘Electronic communications regulation’ in S 
Papadopoulos & S Snail (eds) Cyberlaw @ SA III: The Law of the Internet in South Africa 3 ed (2012) 25-26. 
71 Papadopoulos ibid 3. 
72 Cupido see Note 70 above at 26. 
73 N Zantsi & M Eloff ‘Guide to South African law’ (2003) available at http://icsa.cs.up.ac.za/issa/2003/ 
Publications/001.doc/, accessed on 20 December 2016. 
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excluded from trading electronically with the global world. 74  South Africa therefore 
monitored developments and followed debates that were taking place around the world.75   
Legislation was then put in place in South Africa to protect consumers.76 The Consumer 
Protection Act (CPA) is one of the latest of these pieces of legislation dealing with consumer 
protection.77 The CPA provides for an overarching legislative and institutional framework for 
consumer protection and all other Acts of parliament providing for consumer protection must 
be read with the CPA to provide a common standard for consumer protection.78  
Issues of particular concern range from questions regarding consumer’s financial security, 
data protection, protection from unsolicited information, access to adequate information, and 
availability of effective and affordable redress mechanisms.79  To specifically address the 
electronic related commerce, the ECTA was enacted. 80 
The ECTA comprises 14 chapters with 95 sections, which address e-commerce issues such as 
e-government, consumer protection, privacy, cyber-crime, and liabilities of service providers, 
to mention a few.81 The objective of the ECTA is to facilitate electronic transactions by 
creating legal confidence around such transactions through helping customers to do electronic 
commerce transactions without any fear of their right to privacy being infringed upon.82 
                                                          
74 ibid. 
75 ibid. 
76 See, for instance, the National Credit Act, Act 34 of 2005; the Promotion of Access to Information Act, Act 2 
of 2000; the Competition Act, Act 89 of 1998 and the ECTA, 25 of 2002. 
77 Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. 
78 Cupido see note 70 above at 27. 
79 J Huffmann ‘Consumer protection in e-commerce: An examination and comparison of the regulations in the 
European Union, Germany and South Africa that have to be met in order to run internet services and in 
particular online-shops’ (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Cape Town, 2004) 4. 
80 See Note 5 above. 
81 ibid. 
82  Deloitte & Touche Legal ‘Electronic Communications & Transaction Bill 2002. (South Africa)’ (2002) 
available at http://www.doc.pwv.gov.za/, accessed on 20 December 2016. 
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The Broadcasting Act 4 of 1999 deals with broadcasting policy and regulation, as well as 
with the public broadcaster.83 The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa 
Act 13 of 2000 (ICASA Act) was created for the purposes of establishing an independent 
Authority which created a unified regulator for both broadcasting and telecommunications.84 
The ICASA Act and the ECTA both provide primarily for the regulation of the electronic 
communications sector.85  
The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related 
Information Amendment Act 48 of 2008 (RICA)86, deals with the circumstances under which 
electronic surveillance and interception are permitted, as well as related procedures and 
responsibilities.87 In August 2009, the Protection of Personal Information Bill B9 of 2009 
(PPI) was published.88 The PPI is now the Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 
(POPI) which came into force on 11 April 2014. It also promotes the protection of personal 
information by public and private bodies.89 
These amongst the other legislative reforms culminated in the enactment of the ECTA, which 
provides a legal framework for electronic transactions dealing with cryptography, cyber-
crime and the protection of privacy.90  
The ECTA places computer generated documents on the same footing as traditional paper 
evidence.91 The ECTA contains minimalist enabling provisions on contract formation and 
                                                          
83 Broadcasting Act 4 of 1999. 
84 Independent Communications Authority of South Africa Act 13 of 2000. 
85 Cupido see Note 70 above at 27. 
86 Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related Information 
Amendment Act 48 of 2008. 
87 Cupido see Note 70 above at 27. 
88 ibid. 
89 Personal Information Act 4 of 2013. 
90 Z N Jobodwana ‘E-commerce and mobile commerce in South Africa: Regulatory challenges’ (2009) 4 (4) 
Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 291. 
91 See Section 11 (1) and Section 12 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002. 
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seeks to remove legal barriers to e-commerce in South Africa, by providing for functionally 
equivalent rules for electronic contracting.92 
These legislative reforms resulted in the adoption of the Electronic Communications Act 36 
of 2006 (ECA).93 The ECA is the primary piece of legislation governing the substantive 
regulation of the electronic communications industry in South Africa.94 The ECA regulates 
the convergence of technologies in the ICT sector. 95  The ECA repealed the 
Telecommunications Act 103 of 1996,96 as well as some sections of the Broadcasting Act 4 
of 1999, 97  excluding sections dealing with the public broadcaster. 98  The ECA seeks to 
promote convergence in the broadcasting, broadcasting signal distribution and 
telecommunications sectors, and to provide the legal framework for convergence of these 
sectors.99 
Another very important piece of legislation to consider for the purposes of this dissertation is 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.100 The Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa states that:  
“…this Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct 
inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be 
fulfilled.”101  
Accordingly, the electronic communication and e-commerce industries are subject to the 
provisions of the Constitution. The two important provisions are Section 16 (1)102 which 
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includes the freedom of expression and section 14 (d)103 which provides for the right to 
privacy.104  
Legal impediments to the implementation of electronic commerce have to be removed from 
legislation.105 Certainty has to be achieved as to the application of the law to electronic 
commerce and business and consumer trust has to be enhanced.106 Costs and legislation need 
to be minimized. Legislation has to be applied to a wide range of transactions, facilitating 
both related and unrelated transactions.107 Regulatory burdens upon government and business 
must be minimized.108  Legislation also has to facilitate the cross-border recognition and 
enforcement of electronic transactions and signatures.109  
The ECTA addressed four main issues in law that are related to electronic transactions in 
business and these aspects are: 
 Formation and validity of contracts; 
 Jurisdictional aspects; 
 The role of electronic signatures; and  
 Protection of consumers. 
These four aspects will be discussed briefly below. For the purposes of this dissertation, only 
the fourth element will be the point of focus in the following chapters. 
2.4.1. Formation and Validity of E-Contracts 
An agreement is not without legal force and effect merely because it was concluded partly or 
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in whole by means of data messages.110 Section 11 of the ECTA recognizes the legal status of 
electronic data.111 Section 13 of the ECTA deals with digital signatures, and specifies that an 
electronic signature generally satisfies the legal requirement of a contract, unless it is 
otherwise specified.112  
The ECTA also further states that an agreement concluded between parties by means of data 
messages is concluded partly or in whole by means of data messages at the time when and 
again at the place where the acceptance of the offer was received by the offeror.113 
There are four different ways of e-contracting.114 The first and most important method of 
contracting on the internet is similar to a negotiation of one or more infrequent transactions 
by exchange of letters and documents.115 This is known as e-mail contract.116 In this method, 
the parties can exchange e-mails and even attachments setting out the terms and conditions of 
their contract in detail.117 This is quite similar to offer and acceptance between the parties.118 
The second method is known as contracting on the World Wide Web (www) and this way is 
similar to a mail order.119 In this method, one party maintains the website on which he 
advertises his goods and services.120 The prospective buyer accesses the website and then 
completes an electronic form, whereby he orders goods or services from the seller.121 
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The  third  way  is  where  the  parties  trade  under  the  framework  of  an  Electronic  Data 
Interchange Agreement. The EDI can be defined as computer to computer transmission of 
data in a standardized format. The EDI enables businesses to exchange documents over either 
the internet or their private networks.122 Private networks EDI is used by large businesses 
when buying goods but smaller businesses and individuals prefer to use the EDI as it reduces 
costs.123 This is the primary electronic commerce medium; it is only applicable and valid 
between the contracting businesses that have assented to it.124 
Despite the recognition of different  forms of expressing one’s intent to be  contractually  
bound  by  electronic  means,  uncertainty  still  exists as  to  whether  a click on an icon on 
the website of a vendor would constitute a legally recognizable act signifying ones intent to 
be  contractually bound as such where terms were unilaterally imposed.125  
2.4.2. Jurisdictional Aspects 
Online transactions may routinely involve several jurisdictions. For example, a person in state 
A may make a communication through a computer located in state B, received by a person in 
state C through a server located in state D, owned and operated by a company headquartered 
in state E, that results in shipment of physical goods from a source located in state F.126 The 
jurisdictional aspect covered by the ECTA is also not that unproblematic. Section 22 (2)127 of 
the ECTA provides that the place of the contract is the place where the acceptance of the 
offer is received. Section 23 (c)128 of the ECTA also states that a data message must be 
regarded as having been received at the addressee’s usual place of business or residence. In 
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an on-line contract then, through a computer network it will mean that an acceptance by a 
customer where the data message is sent to the dealer (assuming that he is the offeror), the 
place of the contract will be where the dealer is deemed to have received the message which, 
in terms of the ECTA is dealer’s usual business address.129 
In e-commerce, e-mail use has become prevalent. The ECTA now clarifies the position. The 
place of a contract will be where the contract was concluded by means of email, which is, the 
dealer’s (offeror’s) usual place of business.130 Where an offer is in writing and the acceptance 
is by means of email one can also assume that the place of the contract will be the usual place 
of business or residence of the offeror.131  
With mobile phones being web enabled, the World Wide Web can be reached by the users 
anywhere and at any time.132 Instead of the web page being viewed on the regular desktop, 
the WAP cell-phone can facilitate one surfing the web in the palm of his or her hand with 
facilities of telephone conferences, e-mail messaging and the convenience of conducting 
business in any country. The ECTA does not provide for this type of situation.133 
Furthermore, the basic principles of jurisdiction are essentially geography-based. As a result, 
jurisdictional principles are difficult to apply to the internet, which is a largely boundless 
medium.134 A website may be viewed from anywhere in the world; the actual location of 
computers is irrelevant to either the providers or recipients of the information; and there is no 
necessary connection between the internet address and a physical location.135  
In other words, legislation has not kept pace with the new technology and its 
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consequences.136 The controlling minds behind these events, however, necessarily remain at 
specific points in real space, a fact no doubt behind the European Union’s (EU) position that,  
“The Convention focuses on the substance of transactions, as opposed to 
their form”.137 
The conclusion drawn from this observation is that: 
 “…the rules of jurisdiction pre-date the personal computer age courts and 
regulators. The internet is a serious issue because the internet of today is a 
glimmer of what lies ahead”.138 
2.4.3. The Role of Electronic Signatures 
The movement from a traditional way of doing business to a one that is technology based also 
brought about some significant changes relating to how contracts will be signed. The ECTA 
has a provision for how an electronic contract should be signed.139 An “electronic signature” 
is defined as  
“…data attached to, incorporated in or logically associated with other data 
which is intended by the user to serve as a signature.”140 “…an electronic 
signature is not without legal force and effect merely on the grounds that it 
is in electronic form”141 
There exists a range of electronic authentication methods, of varying degrees of security and 
reliability, for a person to authenticate an electronic communication.142 The ECTA states that 
where the signature of a person is required by law and such law does not specify the type of 
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signature, that requirement in relation to a data message is met only if an advanced electronic 
signature is used.143  
The Act further states that an electronic signature is not without legal force and effect. A 
contract is not rendered invalid merely on the grounds that the signature in it is in its 
electronic form.144 These points were raised in Spring Forest Trading v Wilberry (Pty) Ltd t/a 
Ecowash & Another.145  
The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) stated that, an electronic signature as contemplated in 
section 13 (3), was defined in ECTA 'as data attached to, incorporated in, or logically 
associated with other data and which is intended by the user to serve as a signature'.146 Put 
simply, so long as the data in an email was intended by the user to serve as a signature and 
was logically connected with other data in the email, the requirement for an electronic 
signature was satisfied.147 
2.4.4. Protection of Consumers 
Providers of goods and services are obliged to make certain information available to 
consumers on websites where such goods or services are offered. 148  The particular 
information required includes: the merchant's full name and legal status; physical address and 
telephone number; security procedures, policies and any code of conduct that the merchant 
subscribes to; and the manner of payment and the full price of goods or services, including 
transport costs, taxes and any other fees or costs.149  
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The facelessness and anonymity of contracting parties and concerns about confidentiality and 
security of electronic transactions are some of the factors that prevent consumers from fully 
trusting and fully using e-commerce over the internet.150  
There are certain transactions that are excluded from the ambit of the legislation. Included in 
the list of excluded electronic transactions are: financial services, insurance and reinsurance 
operations, banking services and operations relating to dealings in securities; auctions; the 
supply of foodstuffs, beverages or other goods intended for everyday consumption; and; 
transactions where the price for the supply of goods or services is dependent upon 
fluctuations in the financial markets and which cannot be controlled by the supplier.151 
There has been a rapid increase in the use of e-commerce in South Africa; hence the need to 
develop legislation that would provide security to internet consumers and merchants.152 South 
African common law was not sufficiently addressing issues related to the security of 
electronic transactions.153 It is for the purpose of consumer protection then that the ECTA 
was drafted and adopted.154  
E-commerce has placed a greater focus on the consumer since the most important factor 
when conducting business is to satisfy the customer’s needs.155 Well-developed e-commerce 
websites offer an array of information on products and services.156 They allow customers to 
access any information any time and from anywhere.157 The most important features of an e-
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commerce experience for customers are security, information quality, and information 
quantity.158  
2.5. The International Legal Perspective on E-Commerce  
Paper documents have been the basis for rules on form and evidence of legal acts in most 
countries.159 As electronic records promise to displace most of the paper currently being used, 
lawmakers around the world are moving to adapt legal rules to modern technologies. These 
measures require adequate international harmonization to avoid the creation of barriers to 
international e-commerce through conflicting domestic standards.160  
Initially in the new age of technology and globalisation, there was legal uncertainty 
worldwide as to how or whether or not contracts concluded by electronic means could or 
should be recognized as valid and enforceable agreements.161 As a global organization, the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (hereafter UNCITRAL) was chosen 
to propose uniform private law standards for e-commerce.162 Several factors suggested that 
what were required were international solutions, rather than individual State initiatives.163  
Those factors included the transnational nature of e-commerce, and its disregard for 
traditional jurisdictional borders, together with the lack of domestic laws dealing with e-
commerce. 164  The conclusion in favour of international harmonization was the logical 
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approach for dealing with the legal implications of technological developments as a result of 
which, as it has been said, ‘markets are migrating from geographic space to cyberspace.’165  
The UNCITRAL was established by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1966 
with the general mandate to promote harmonization and unification of international trade law. 
In 1996 the United Nations created the model law on e-commerce which is known as the 
UNICTRAL Model Law on E-commerce.166 In 2001, the United Nations also created the 
UNICTRAL Model Law on E-Signatures. 167  The UNICTRAL currently has 60 Member 
States elected by the General Assembly. 168  Membership is structured so as to be 
representative of the world's various geographic regions and its principal economic and legal 
systems.169 
Members of the Commission are elected for terms of six years, the terms of half the members 
expiring every three years.170  In addition to Member States, all other states and invited 
international organizations may participate as observers in the work of the Commission.171 
The UNCITRAL has implemented its mandate by developing texts on a number of topics 
including sale of goods, arbitration and conciliation, carriage of goods by sea, banking and 
finance law, procurement, cross-border insolvency, and e-commerce.172 
2.5.1. The UNCITRAL Model Law: Background 
The decision by the UNCITRAL to formulate model legislation on electronic commerce was 
taken in response to the fact that in a number of countries the existing legislation governing 
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communication and storage of information is inadequate or out-dated because it does not 
contemplate the use of electronic commerce.173 The lack of legislation in many countries in 
dealing with E-commerce as a whole results in uncertainty as to the legal nature and validity 
of information presented in a form other than a traditional paper document.174  
Inadequate legislation at the national level will inevitably create obstacles to international 
trade.175 The purpose of Model law was to offer national legislators a set of internationally 
accepted rules as to how a number of such legal obstacles may be removed, and how a more 
secure legal environment may be created for what has become known as electronic 
commerce.176  
The UNCITRAL model law seeks to permit States to adapt their domestic legislation to 
developments in communications technology applicable to trade law without necessitating 
the wholesale removal of the paper-based requirements themselves or disturbing the legal 
concepts and approaches underlying those requirements.177 The Model law thus relies on a 
new approach known as the 'functional equivalent' approach which is based on an analysis of 
the purposes and functions of the traditional paper-based requirement with a view of 
determining how those purposes or functions could be fulfilled through electronic commerce 
techniques.178 
2.5.2. Global E-Commerce and Standardisation Issues 
Standardization is commonly defined in the literature as a strategy wherein marketers assume 
global homogeneous markets and in response offer standardized products and services using 
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a standardized marketing.179 Scholars in favour of the standardization approach argue that as 
technology develops and is globally dispersed, cultural distance is minimized, leading to 
convergence of national cultures into a homogenous global culture. Hence, there is little need 
to adopt a locally adaptive approach to the marketing.180 This is what led to the formation of 
the e-commerce model law.  
The advantages that are associated with standardization have been addressed in the existing 
literature from various perspectives.181 Most authors argue that the forces of technology and 
globalization are creating homogenized consumer markets and marketers should use 
standardized marketing to attract these global consumers. Additionally, standardization seems 
to be an economical strategy for marketers as it leads to leveraging the same template/product 
or service marketing mix configuration globally. This leads to economies of scale. By 
leveraging their home country site for all countries; multinational firms can significantly 
reduce localization expenses.182 
Standardization can also lead to the development of a single and unified brand and corporate 
identity worldwide. This can lead to better global recognition and can provide global 
competitive advantage. Standardization can lead to having a rationalized product line which 
comprises only a few core global brands instead of multiple localized brands and brand 
extensions in numerous countries.183  
This could potentially lead to better allocation of resources, higher efficiencies, homogenized 
marketing and higher profits. Hence, in the context of e-commerce, the cost and effort of 
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maintaining a single global website can be significantly less than maintaining several 
different multilingual sites due to lower resource allocation and marketing requirements.184  
Due to these standardization ideas, choice of a model law on e-commerce was the ultimate 
global agreement.185 The UNCITRAL focused its work on promoting the modernization of 
statutory requirements that existed under domestic law.186  The United Nations sought to 
harmonise all the e-commerce laws that existed at that time into one giant law that would 
drive e-commerce on a global scale.187  
2.5.3. Influence of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
When it was completed, the Model Law was a unique instrument in a legal landscape where 
there was no existing body of law, whether uniform international law or national law that 
comprehensively addressed the issues raised by e-commerce.188 As such, the UNCITRAL 
Model Law could be described as an instrument of 'preventive' or 'pre-emptive' 
harmonization: it led the process of development of law by providing universally acceptable 
solutions to the issues likely to arise, rather than being negotiated after practices and usage 
had already resulted in disparate laws and regulations.189 
The UNICITRAL Model Law is very much in use in the South African Courts. In  Jafta v 
Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife190 in which Jafta responded to an advert using a Short Message 
Service (SMS) and Electronic mail (e-mail), the court used the UNICITRAL Model Law to 
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determine if Jafta's communications constituted a valid acceptance of the offer or not and if 
an SMS is an appropriate mode of concluding a contract.191  
The court held that both Jafta's SMS and e-mail were valid acceptances. 192  First, the 
acceptances in both modes were clear, unequivocal and unambiguous as stated in Boerne v 
Harris193 and second, both acceptances corresponded with the offer.194  
The challenge was to bring together countries of divergent economic capabilities, legal 
heritage, and telecommunications infrastructures to develop common analyses of, and 
approaches to, new legal problems.195 That the challenge was successfully met can be gauged 
from the influence of the UNCITRAL Model Law on e-commerce legislation already 
adopted, or being developed, around the world.196  
2.6. To What Extent Can Foreign Law Assist South Africa’s Regulation of Online 
Electronic Transactions? 
E-commerce in South Africa is growing at a rate matched only by the growth experienced in 
the United States of America (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK).197  To ensure global 
compatibility with other international markets, the South African legislature largely modelled 
the South African data protection legislation on the comparative legislation enacted by these 
two nations (that is, the USA and the UK).198 
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The right to privacy is expressly guaranteed in a number of international and regional 
conventions. 199  Although the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights does not 
expressly recognize the right to privacy, it does however give reference to dignity.200  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR),201 the American Convention on 
Human Rights 1969 (ACHR),202 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
1976 (ICCPR)203 as well as many other international and regional treaties regard privacy as a 
fundamental human right.204 In most countries in the world, the right to privacy is also 
recognized and in nearly every country’s Constitution it is entrenched.205 In some countries 
where this right is not entrenched in the Constitution, it is found in other pieces of legislation 
of that country or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1976 (ICCPR) or 
the European Convention on Human Rights 1953 (ECHR)206 and it is adopted as binding 
law.207 
This dissertation will therefore (in chapter 5 and chapter 6) seek to identify points on which 
the foreign law dealing with the regulation of online electronic transactions came short in 
achieving the same, so that South Africa can avoid the same shortfalls. The comparison of the 
South African regulation of online electronic transactions with those of foreign countries will 
                                                          
199  D Banisar & S Davies ‘Global trends in privacy protection: An international survey of privacy, data 
protection, and surveillance laws and developments’ (1999) 18 (1) Journal of Computer & Information Law 3. 
200 See Article 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 1998. 
201 See Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) is a declaration adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948 at the 
Palais de Chaillot in Paris, France. 
202 See Article 9 of the American Convention on Human Rights 1969. 
203 See Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1976. The International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) a multilateral treaty adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 
16 December 1966, and in force since 23 March 1976.  
204 See Note 199 above. 
205 ibid. 
206 See Article 8 of The European Convention on Human Rights 1953. The European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) (formally the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) 
drafted by the Council of Europe in 1950 and adopted in 1953. 
207 See Note 199 above. 
39 | P a g e  
 
also help South Africa adopt useful regulations that have worked well in foreign jurisdictions 
and leave out those that didn’t. To this end, two foreign jurisdictions will be analysed. 
2.7. Conclusion 
This chapter defined e-commerce in its  broader definition as not just the buying, selling of 
goods & services but also servicing customers, collaborating with business partners, 
conducting e-learning & processing electronic transactions. It also pointed out the different 
types of e-commerce that exists in South Africa. This was a critical discussion because 
regulation set to deal with e-commerce must not just be sector specific, but must also address 
the very type of e-commerce being used by and business at any point.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
3. CONSUMER CONCERNS IN DATA TRANSMISSIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF 
INFORMATION PROTECTION 
3.1. Introduction 
In the early days of e-commerce in the developed economies, there was much commentary 
about supplier reliability (the major e-malls and brand names prevailed), privacy of 
information (credit card fraud was the topic of the day), and the "World Wide Web" as a 
result of slow telecommunication links.1  Those concerns have greatly diminished and e-
commerce has matured in the major developed nations, but this is far from the case in the 
developing world and especially Africa.2 
More specifically, due to the increase in electronic commerce and other electronic 
transactions, the information society has created and facilitated e-commerce whereby 
businesses and consumers conduct the majority of their everyday transactions via the 
internet.3 These transactions via the internet have data which must be protected.4   
Data protection is an aspect of safeguarding a person’s right to privacy. It provides for the 
legal protection of a person (the data subject) in instances where such a person’s personal 
particulars (i.e. information) are being processed by another person or institution (the data 
user). 5  Processing of information generally refers to the collecting, storing, using and 
communicating of information.6 
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In Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission, the main issue was whether the 
confidentiality considerations insulated the Judicial Service Commission's deliberations in 
which the court stated that confidentiality does not by itself confer privilege against 
disclosure.7 The main issues were that the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) was stifling the 
candour and rigour of the deliberations, deterring potential applicants, harming the dignity 
and privacy of candidates who applied with the expectation of confidentiality of the 
deliberations that would generally hamper effective judicial selection.8  
3.2. The Importance of the Right to Privacy in E-commerce 
Today’s transactions in e-commerce typically require the divulgence of large amounts of 
personal information and this necessary information includes credit card information and 
delivery details.9 The possession of such information gives e-business the opportunity to 
analyze it, discovering trends and increasing the efficiency of their business dealings.10  
There is a growing consensus that if the jumble of statutes, consumer pressure, and self-help 
is to be unified into meaningful privacy protection in the digital age, then we will have to do 
more than pass a law.11 The law in general and each of us in particular, will have to make 
some fundamental changes in the way we think of personal information and electronic 
communication.12 
Consumers typically had no idea as to the range of possible uses that possession of this 
information allowed for, and thus had no idea as to the possible violation of their privacy that 
could occur. However, in the last decade, consumer awareness of privacy is increasing, 
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403. 
10 ibid. 
11 E Aldermann & C Kennedy The Right to Privacy (1997) 332. 
12 ibid. 
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particularly among the internet users.13 They are beginning to demand that their privacy be 
respected by electronic commerce, which requires the legislation of e-commerce consumer 
rights protection.14 
The concept of privacy is highly interesting.15 Perhaps its most striking feature is the fact that 
there is no agreement upon what it actually is.16 A suitable definition of privacy has always 
been the topic of much debate in scholarly literature.17 Neethling describes privacy as a 
personality interest and in turn a personality interest as a non-patrimonial interest that cannot 
exist separately from the individual.18 
 The right of privacy19 in South Africa is protected by the Constitution.20 The recognition and 
protection of the right to privacy as a fundamental human right in the Constitution provides 
an indication of its importance.21 Privacy is a valuable and advanced aspect of personality 
and sociologists and psychologists agree that a person has a fundamental need for privacy.22 
In Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd 23  and Janit v Motor Industry Fund 
Administrators (Pty) Ltd,24 it was shown that over the years, the remedy for invasion of 
privacy in South Africa has even been extended to protect a juristic person’s confidential 
sphere. Section 8(4) of the Constitution states that a juristic person is entitled to the rights in 
the Bill of Rights to the extent required by the nature of the rights and the nature of the 
juristic person.25 In Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit,26 it was also pointed out 





17 J Neethling … et al Neethling’s Law of Personality 2 ed (2005) 18. 
18 ibid 14.  
19 See Section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
20 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996. 
21 See Note 17 above at 219-220. 
22 ibid 29. 
23 Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd 1993 (2) SA 451 (A) at 460G-I and 461-2. 
24 Janit v Motor Industry Fund Administrators (Pty) Ltd 1995 (4) SA 293 (A) at 60. 
25 See Section 8 (4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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that because juristic persons are not bearers of human dignity, their privacy rights may be 
attenuated.27  
The recognition of the right to privacy is deeply rooted in history. 28  Psychological and 
anthropological evidence suggest that every society, even the most primitive, adopts 
mechanisms and structures that allow individuals to resist encroachment from other 
individuals or groups.29 Since the right to privacy is deeply rooted in our history, it is also 
part of our common law. 30  Neethling also pointed out that the right to privacy is also 
entrenched in our common law.31 In Bernstein v Bester, as pointed out in chapter one of this 
dissertation, the Constitutional Court emphasized the interdependency between the common 
law and constitutional right to privacy.32 
In terms of the common law every person has personality rights such as the right to privacy, 
dignity, good name and bodily integrity as stated in Stoffberg v Elliot; 33  Lymbery v 
Jefferies;34 Lampert v Hefer35 and in Esterhuizen v Administrator, Transvaal.36  
Worldwide the internet has become a key instrument for communication and for exercising 
the right to freedom of expression in the form of writing, audio and video.37 The right to 
freedom of expression which is entrenched in section 16 of the Constitution38 includes not 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
26 Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) at para18. 
27 J Burchell ‘The legal protection of privacy in South Africa: A transplantable hybrid’ (2009) 13 (1) Electronic 
Journal of Comparative Law 8. 
28 A Roos ‘The law of data (privacy) protection: A comparative and theoretical study’ (unpublished LLD 
dissertation, University of South Africa 2003) 545.  
29 ibid 545. The South African Law Reform Commission ‘Discussion Paper: Privacy and Protection’ (2006) 3. 
30 The South African Law Reform Commission ‘Discussion Paper: Privacy and Protection’ (2006) 3. 
31  Neethling … et al Neethling’s Law of Personality 2 ed (2005) 51. The South African Law Reform 
Commission ‘Discussion Paper: Privacy and Protection’ (2006) 3. 
32 Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at 787.  
33 Stoffberg v Elliot 1923 CPD 148 at 149-150.  
34 Lymbery v Jefferies 1925 AD 236 at 240. 
35 Lampert v Hefer 1955 (2) SA 507 (A) at 508. 
36 Esterhuizen v Administrator, Transvaal 1957 (3) SA 710 (T) at 718-722. 
37 S Nel ‘Freedom of expression, anonymity and the internet’ in S Papadopoulos & S Snail (eds) Cyberlaw @ 
SA III: The Law of the Internet in South Africa 3 ed (2012) 251. 
38 See section 16 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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only the right to freedom of speech but also the right to receive information.39   
In National Media Ltd. v Bogoshi, it was stated that the freedom of expression is also 
encumbered with restrictions.40 In this case involving the publication of a series of allegedly 
defamatory articles in a newspaper, the City Press, the court decided that although the 
publisher had freedom of speech, the freedom was not absolute as it also came with some 
responsibilities.41 The court stated that there should be a balance between the freedom of 
expression and the right of dignity42 as also entrenched in the Constitution.43 This balance 
was also pointed out in Khumalo v Holomisa to be the right to privacy.44  
Put in another way, Neethling said, the constitutional right to privacy is like its common law 
contemporary, not an absolute right but may be limited in terms of our law of general 
application45 and has to be balanced with other rights entrenched in the Constitution and the 
task of balancing these opposing interests is a delicate one.46 
Section 14 of the Constitution reads as follows:  
“Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have – 
a) their person or home searched; 
b) their property searched; 
c) their possessions seized; or 
d) the privacy of their communications infringed.”47 
                                                          
39 See Note 37 above. 
40 National Media Ltd. v Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA) at para 24. 
41 ibid.  
42 See section 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
43 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
44 Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 (8) BCLR 771 at para 26. 
45 See section 36 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
46 The South African Law Reform Commission ‘Discussion Paper: Privacy and Protection’ (2006) 3. Neethling 
… et al Neethling’s Law of Personality 2 ed (2005) 273. 
47 See section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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This list, given in section 1448 is not exhaustive and may be extended to other methods of 
obtaining information or to making unauthorized disclosures.49 
According to Neethling, a person’s right to privacy includes a person having control over his 
or her personal affairs and being reasonably free from unsolicited intrusions.50 This right 
should be respected because consumer activities and the internet user’s personal information 
is readily available and visible on the internet and this type of information is a valuable 
commodity especially for people who market goods.51 This information is collected by way 
of technology such as cookies that track and collect relevant personal information as well as 
data.52  
Privacy is most often seen as a fundamental personality right deserving protection either as 
part of human dignity or, if not subsumed under dignity, nevertheless warranting 
independent, but similar, protection to other facets of personality rights like dignity or 
reputation. 53  The argument for recognizing privacy as an independent right really only 
acquires significance where the concept of impairment of dignity is given a narrow focus, 
linked to insulting behavior.54  
If however, dignity is given its true human rights sweep, ranging beyond mere prevention of 
insulting conduct, then privacy can rightly find its place as part of the fundamental right to 
human dignity.55 Aspects of individual autonomy are more appropriately located within this 
                                                          
48 ibid. 
49  Roos ‘The law of data (privacy) protection: A comparative and theoretical study’ (unpublished LLD 
dissertation, University of South Africa 2003) 563-564. 
50 Neethling … et al Neethling’s Law of Personality 2 ed (2005) 31. Snail & Papadopoulos ‘Privacy and data 
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52 ibid. 
53 Burchell ‘The legal protection of privacy in South Africa: A transplantable hybrid’ (2009) 13 (1) Electronic 
Journal of Comparative Law 3. Neethling … et al see Note 49 above at18. 
54 Burchell ibid.  
55 ibid.  
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broad concept of ‘dignity’ than under an artificially extended concept of ‘privacy’, as in the 
United States of America.56 
The view that privacy is an independent right was, however, not always held so and in a 
number of early South African criminal cases regarding the protection of privacy, the idea 
that dignitas, and consequently privacy, should be limited to dignity and accordingly that 
insult forms an element of this iniuria, was stated. 57  Even private law decisions after 
O’Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd 58  took a similar approach to the 
recognition of a right to privacy.59 
In Bernstein v Bester,60 the conclusion was therefore that, despite the decisions equating 
privacy with dignity (or honor), it can safely be accepted that the right to privacy is 
recognized by the common law as an independent right of personality and that it has been 
delimited as such within the dignitas concept.61  
The Constitution expressly recognizes right to privacy in sec 14,62 independent of the right to 
dignity in sec 10, 63  furthermore confirming the independent existence of the right to 
privacy.64 
In National Media Ltd v Jooste, the court said privacy is an individual condition of life 
characterized by exclusion from the public and publicity. 65 The court went on to point out 
that this condition embraces all those personal facts which the person concerned has 
determined to be excluded from the knowledge of outsiders and in respect of which he has 
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57 The South African Law Reform ‘Commission Discussion Paper: Privacy and Protection’ (2006) 8. 
58 O’Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd 1954 (2) SA 244 (C) at 248. 
59 See Note 57 above. 
60 Bernstein v Bester 1996 (4) BCLR 449 (CC) at 789. 
61 The South African Law Reform ‘Commission Discussion Paper: Privacy and Protection’ (2006) 9. 
62 See section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
63 See section 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
64 See Note 57 above at 9. 
65 National Media Ltd v Jooste 1994 (2) SA 634 (C) at 271. 
47 | P a g e  
 
the will that they be kept private.66 
Important to note is that in accordance with this definition, a legal subject personally 
determines the private nature of facts.67 In addition, he must exhibit the will or desire that 
facts should be kept private.68 If such a will for privacy is absent, then a person usually has no 
interest in the legal protection of his privacy.69 
The need to protect privacy in South Africa emerged in the early 1950s in a case whose facts 
are similar to those of the classic English defamation case of Tolley v Fry & Sons Ltd.70 In the 
South African version case of O’Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd,71  the 
plaintiff who was a well-known radio personality had consented to the publication of her 
photograph, taken at a pistol range, being used for the purpose of a newspaper article.72 
 The photograph was, however, used in the press for advertising purposes. Watermeyer AJ in 
the Cape Supreme Court turned immediately to Voet’s ‘Commentary on the Digest’ for 
guidance and found examples of what could be classified as invasions of privacy or 
iniuriae.73 
The right to privacy is not absolute.74 As a common law right of personality it is necessarily 
limited by the legitimate interests of others and the public interest.75 As a fundamental right it 
can be limited in accordance with the limitation clause of the Bill of Rights, that is, by a law 
of general application which includes other fundamental rights. 76  In each case a careful 
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weighing up of the right to privacy and the opposing interests or rights will have to take 
place.77 
In Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission78 the court referred to the case 
of Comair Ltd v Minister for Public Enterprises79 in which the court reiterated the trite 
principle that confidentiality does not by itself confer privilege against disclosure.80 
3.3. South African Common Law and the Right to Privacy 
The common law provides for personality rights such as physical integrity, freedom, 
reputation, dignity and privacy.81 The common law emphasises privacy as part of a person’s 
inviolate personality and as such enjoys protection while the Constitution provides for 
privacy as a constitutional right 82 as stated in section 14.83 
In certain common law rulings, the dignity of an individual was widely interpreted, and 
included a host of personality rights including privacy and thus, privacy has advanced from 
the common law as being part of the list of personality rights of an individual up to becoming 
a constitutional right in the final Constitution84 of South Africa.85 
Thus within the ambit of the common law, an invasion of an individual’s privacy would be 
interpreted as an impairment of a person’s personality.86 
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Before the enactment of the ECTA,87 common law could be stretched as far as possible to 
cater for the arrest of online offenders.88 In S v Van den Berg, the court applied common law 
to convict Van den Berg for cyber fraud.89 In S v Harper90 and S v Manuel,91 the court applied 
common law and came to the conclusion that stealing money online amounted to online 
forgery. 
Another common law position was also applied in S v Howard.92  The court considered that 
hacking, cracking and the production and distribution of malicious codes known as viruses, 
worms and Trojan horses amount to the crime of malicious damage to property in common 
law.93  
The court had no doubt whether the crime of malicious damage to property could apply to 
causing an entire information system to breakdown.94 The court noted that the crime no 
longer needed to be committed to ‘physical property’ but could also apply to data messages 
of data information.95 
Although it was the common law which gave rise to the protection of privacy concept in most 
legislation, Lord Hoffmann in Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd stated that, the 
protection of confidential personal information was not being based upon the duty of good 
faith.96 In Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd, it was pointed out that everyone has a right to 
                                                          
87 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002.  
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privacy, including celebrities, although they voluntarily circumscribe their own sphere of 
privacy for financial benefits.97 
3.4. Infringement of the Constitutional Right to Privacy 
No human rights convention is complete without an article that defends privacy, for the 
fundamental reason that privacy is an indispensable adjunct of the minimum that individuals 
require for a chance to build good lives.98 
The elements of liability for an action based on an infringement of a person’s privacy are in 
principle the same as any other injury to the personality, namely an unlawful and intentional 
interference with a legally protected personality interest - here the right to privacy.99 
In Harksen v Lane, the constitutional court pointed out that, to determine whether a 
constitutional right to privacy has been infringed, there has to be a two-stage process.100 The 
first stage would be to assess if there has been an infringement of a right and the second stage 
would be to ascertain if such an infringement can be justified.101  Woolman expressed the 
same point but differently by stating that in the case of a constitutional invasion of privacy 
the following questions need to be answered: (a) has the invasive law or conduct infringed 
the right to privacy in the Constitution?102 (b) If so, is such an infringement justifiable in 
terms of the requirements laid down in the limitation clause (sec 36)103 of the Constitution? 
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This was also stated in the case of S v Makwanyane otherwise known as the Makwanyane 
case.104 
In Bernstein v Bester105 the court stated that to establish infringement of the constitutional 
right to privacy, South African law applies a two-part test that requires a person to have a 
subjective expectation of privacy that society has recognized as objectively reasonable.106 
This is similar to the common law understanding of a wrongful infringement of the right of 
privacy, that is, a person subjectively determines the extent of his or her right of privacy and 
that the boni mores considers this determination to be reasonable.107 
The subjective expectation of privacy is more than whatever feels private, while objectively 
this has to be reasonable within the context to qualify for protection. 108  The subjective 
component of this test determines that a person cannot complain about the invasion of 
privacy if he or she has consented to it.109 The individual himself or herself determines which 
information is private, coupled with the will or desires to keep the particular information facts 
private.110 If the will to keep the facts private is lacking, the individual’s interest in privacy is 
also lacking.111  
Applying these principles, the South African Constitutional court in Bernstein v Bester112 
followed the foreign judgement in Katz v United States113 and it stated that, firstly that person 
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must have exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and secondly that the expectation be one 
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.114  
The same court made a strong illustration by saying, thus a man’s home is, for the most 
purpose, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he 
exposes to the plain view of outsiders are not protected because no intention to keep them has 
been exhibited.115  On the other hand, conversations in the open would not be protected 
against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be 
unreasonable.116   
 A violation of privacy by means of an act of intrusion takes place where an outsider himself 
acquires knowledge of private and personal facts relating to the plaintiff, contrary to the 
plaintiff’s determination and wishes.117 This is also applicable to the collection and storage of 
personal information. When information relating to a person is collected, the total picture 
represented by the record of the facts is usually of such a nature that the person in question 
would like to restrict others from having knowledge thereof despite the fact that some of the 
information, viewed in isolation, is not “private” in the above sense.118 Thus in principle the 
compiling of an information record and obtaining knowledge thereof constitutes an intrusion 
into privacy.119 
3.5. Data Protection: An International Phenomenon 
Technological innovation in ages past always challenged the traditional means of conducting 
trade and commerce, while at the same time facilitating trade and commerce by providing 
faster and easier means of communication and access to a wider range of business 
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opportunities, as well as goods and services.120  
Technological change has always presented a significant challenge to existing regulatory 
structures, and although sometimes it has been regarded as initially having a negative effect 
upon accepted rules and practices, businesses, parliaments, and courts have gradually 
developed legislation with rules and practices that take account of the change.121  
This development necessarily requires re-evaluation of existing rules and regulations and 
their interrelationship within national legal systems, as well as their relationship to 
international law and practice.122  
This is so particularly where technological change facilitates increased interaction between 
parties in the international commercial sphere to an extent that activities that were once 
largely local now have a global effect.123 One of the characteristics of the internet is that it 
supports greater participation by consumers in what are, essentially, international 
transactions.124 
With all the technological changes taking place, it was soon recognized that privacy 
protection was not only a domestic problem, and due to this discovery, two crucial 
international instruments evolved.125 These were the Council of Europe’s 1981 Convention 
for the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data 
(CoE Convention); and the OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Trans 
Border Data Flows of Personal Data (OECD Guidelines).126 
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These two agreements have had a profound effect on the enactment of laws around the world 
with nearly thirty countries signing the CoE Convention and the OECD guidelines having 
also been widely used in national legislation, even outside the OECD member countries.127 
In late 1980, the OECD issued a set of guidelines concerning the privacy of personal 
records. 128  Although broad, the OECD Guidelines set up important standards for future 
governmental privacy rules and these guidelines underpin the most current international 
agreements, national laws, and self-regulatory policies. 129  Although the guidelines were 
voluntary, roughly half of the OECD member-states had already passed or proposed privacy 
protecting legislation by the end of 1980.130 By 1983, 182 American companies claimed to 
have adopted the guidelines, although very few ever implemented practices that directly 
matched the standards.131 
The OECD Guidelines have been highly influential in the enactment and content of 
information protection legislation in non-European jurisdictions, particularly Japan, 
Australia, New Zealand and Hong Kong.132 In North America the OECD Guidelines have 
been formally endorsed by numerous companies and trade associations. 133  These OECD 
Guidelines have additionally constituted the basis for the first comprehensive set of 
information protection standards to be developed by a national standards association: the 
Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information (MCPPI), adopted by the Canadian 
Standards Association (CSA) in March 1996.134 
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3.5.1. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
It is certain that in an increasingly economically interdependent world, the importance of an 
improved legal framework for the facilitation of international trade and investment is widely 
acknowledged and plays an important role in developing that framework.135 This framework 
was developed with a mandate to further the progressive harmonization and modernization of 
the law of international trade by preparing and promoting the use and adoption of legislative 
and non-legislative instruments in a number of key areas of commercial law.136 
As a response to some gaps (lacuna) in legislation governing electronic commerce around the 
globe, the UNCITRAL and governments of various countries called for the drafting of 
internationally recognized uniform electronic transactions legislation. 137  The UNCITRAL 
developed these model laws as an early response to the legal uncertainties pertaining to e-
commerce around the world at that time, especially with the quick growth of the internet.138 
In this dissertation, for all intents and purposes, a  model  law  is  a  legislative  text  that  is 
recommended  to  States  for  enactment  as  part  of  their  national  law.139 
In 1985, the UNCITRAL drafted and adopted the ‘Recommendation on the Legal Value of 
Computer Records’ which at the time of its drafting, was seen as a document, but since the 
development of the UNCITRAL Model Law one would rather call it the ‘policy document’ 
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which laid the basis for the harmonization of electronic communications laws on an 
international level.140 
Inadequate legislation at the national level will inevitably create obstacles to international 
trade.141 The purpose of the UNCITRAL Model Law was to offer national legislators a set of 
internationally acceptable rules for the enhancement of legal certainty. 142  The principles 
expressed in the UNCITRAL Model Law were also intended to be of use to individual users 
of electronic commerce in drafting solutions for contracts that are concluded electronically.143  
One must mention the interesting fact that the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, 
1996 (MLEC), the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Signatures, 2001 (MLES) as well as the 
United Nations Convention on the use of Electronic Communications in International 
Contracts (UNECIC) are not legally binding upon South Africa although the first two 
instruments have been influential in the drafting of the ECTA and have formed the legal basis 
for this Act.144 
The UNCITRAL Model Law has served both to educate lawmakers about the legal 
ramifications of electronic transactions and to provide a framework for any country wishing 
to draft electronic commerce legislation and although South Africa is not a member state, it 
has drawn some inspiration from it in drafting its own legislation.145 
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In South Africa or any other country, the UNCITRAL Model Law can only have effect if and 
only if it is enacted into national law by the country in question.146 It is also imperative to 
recognize that the UNCITRAL Model Law provisions specifying standards do not specify 
technology to be adopted or used by any country which becomes a member state.147  
In South Africa, chapter III of the ECTA is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-
Commerce, 1996 and the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Signatures, 2001. 148  The 
UNCITRAL developed these model laws as an early response to the legal uncertainties 
pertaining to e-commerce around the world at that time, especially the quick growth of the 
internet.149 
The decision by the UNCITRAL to formulate model legislation on electronic commerce was 
also taken in response to the fact that in a number of countries the existing legislation 
governing communication and storage of information is inadequate or outdated because it 
does not contemplate the use of electronic commerce.150 The lack of legislation in many 
countries in dealing with e-commerce as a whole results in uncertainty as to the legal nature 
and validity of information presented in a form other than a traditional paper document.151   
The UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, 1996 is a more conceptual text. 152  The 
legislation  that  has  been  based  on  this  model  law  largely  reflects  the principles of the 
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text, although there are some departures from it in terms of not only drafting, but also in the 
combination of  provisions adopted.153  
3.5.2. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce, 1996 Revised 1998 (MLEC) 
To assist countries in drafting and enacting laws to give legal recognition to electronic 
contracts, in 1996, the United Nations adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on E–
Commerce.154 The UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, 1996 was adopted on 12 June 
1996 and aimed to create a more certain legal environment for what had become known as 
‘electronic commerce’ by providing a tool for States to enhance their legislation of paperless 
communication and storage of information.155  
The UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, 1996, purports to enable and facilitate 
commerce conducted using electronic means by providing national legislators with a set of 
internationally acceptable rules aimed at removing legal obstacles and increasing legal 
predictability for electronic commerce.156 In particular, it was intended to overcome obstacles 
arising from statutory provisions that could not be varied contractually by providing equal 
treatment to paper-based and electronic information.157 Such equal treatment was essential for 
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enabling the use of paperless communication, thus fostering efficiency in international 
trade.158 
The use of e-mails and EDI has increased rapidly and due to the use of modern means of 
communication for the conduct of international trade, transactions have been increasing 
rapidly and are expected to develop further as technical support becomes more widely 
accessible.159 For this reason, the United Nations developed the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
E-Commerce, 1996 because the communication of legally significant information in the form 
of paperless messages was being hindered by legal obstacles to the use of such messages, or 
by uncertainty as to their legal effect or validity.160  
It is against this background of increasing legal uncertainty and the exponential increase in 
international e-commerce (e-trade) that the UNCITRAL established a working group to draft 
legal rules on e-commerce.161 
The UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, 1996 states that the adoption of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce by the UNCITRAL Commission will 
significantly assist all States in enhancing their legislation governing the use of alternatives to 
paper-based methods of communication and storage of information and in formulating such 
legislation where none currently exists.162 Now through the application of the principle of 
functional equivalence, the UNCITRAL Model Law advocated, as a first step, the adaptation 
of existing legal principles to the e-commerce environment.163 
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The UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, 1996 is divided into two parts namely, Part 1, 
that deals with the general electronic commerce provisions and Part 2, that deals with e-
commerce in specific areas and it has an open-ended structure to allow for future additions.164 
It is also worth mentioning that the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, 1996 itself 
lists five non-exhaustive main objectives.165 First, to facilitate electronic commerce among 
and within nations; secondly, to validate transactions that have been concluded by new means 
of technology; third, to promote new technology and encourage the implementation of such 
technology in trade transactions by facilitating and enabling them; fourth, to create and 
promote uniformity and support e-commerce practices. 166  Fifth, Article 5 sets out the 
fundamental principle that electronic communications should not be discriminated against or 
denied legal effect simply because they are in electronic form and Article 6 sets the basic 
standard for an electronic document where it is a legal requirement that a document be in 
writing.167 Thus the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, 1996 points out its intended 
purposes.168  
With Article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, 1996 acknowledging that a 
signature is used in the real world to indicate one‘s approval or verify the contents of the 
document, it gives an electronic signature the same legal effect as an ink signature even if it 
was not authenticated in a manner peculiar to a paper document.169 
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3.5.3. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on 
Electronic Signatures, 2001 (MLES) 
In 2001 UNCITRAL published the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures which 
is usually referred to as UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, 2001 as an 
addition to the 1996 Model Law on Electronic Commerce.170 This was for the purpose of 
offering practical standards against which the technical reliability of electronic signatures 
may be measured, adding substantially to the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, 
1996.171 The UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures would help by adopting an 
approach under which the legal effectiveness of a given electronic signature technique may 
be predetermined or assessed prior to being actually used.172 
The UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, 2001 makes it clear that the 
sufficiency of an electronic signature is first and foremost determined by the parties 
themselves unless there is a peremptory law requiring a signature.173 The UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Electronic Signatures, 2001 unlike the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, 
1996 actually contains the definition of ‘electronic signature’.174   
It defines electronic signature as  
“data in electronic form, affixed to or logically associated with, a data 
message, which may be used to identify the signatory in relation to the data 
message and to indicate the signatory's approval of the information 
contained in the data message.” 175  
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The UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, 2001 also states that requirements for 
electronic signatures should not require a higher level of security or difficulty than their 
physical counterparts to comply with the principles of media neutrality and functional 
equivalence underlying the Model Law.176 
UNCITRAL came to the conclusion that a paper based handwritten signature has a number of 
functions such as identifying a person, providing certainty as to the personal involvement of 
that person in the act of signing, and associating the person with the contents of the 
document.177 According to the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, 1996, in many 
legal systems certain processes such as stamping, printing and even letterheads are accorded 
recognition as signatures depending on the level of certainty required.178  
The UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, 2001 provides a link between 
technical reliability and legal effectiveness of an electronic signature by adopting an approach 
according to which the legal effectiveness of an electronic signature is predetermined.179 It 
sets out the presumption that where electronic signatures meet certain criteria of technical 
reliability, they should be treated as equivalent to hand-written signatures.180 
Wang explains that there are three different approaches when dealing with the various 
electronic signature legislation that have been enacted world-wide, namely the ‘minimalist 
approach’, the ‘prescriptive approach’ (also known as the technology-specific approach) and 
the ‘two-tiered approach’.181  
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Some jurisdictions that follow a technological neutrality approach recognize all technologies 
for electronic signatures. This approach is called the minimalist approach as it is non-
prescriptive.182 
The technological approach is seen as a light approach as it recognizes all forms of electronic 
signatures as functional equivalents of handwritten signatures provided that they fulfil certain 
specified functions and meet the technology-neutral reliability requirement.183 
3.5.4. United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International 
Contracts, 2005 (UNECIC) 
When the United Nations created the Model Laws on E-commerce in 1996 and E-signatures 
in 2001, it became apparent that issues relating to the formation of international contracts 
required further redress. 184  On 23 November 2005, the United Nations (UN) General 
Assembly adopted the new United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic 
Communications in International Contracts (the Convention).185 
With the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, 1996 in place, different countries 
implemented this model differently, resulting in significant variations in electronic commerce 
legislation even amongst countries that had adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-
Commerce, 1996.186 In 2000, the EU promulgated the Directive 2000/31/EC which differed 
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significantly in scope and content from the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, 
1996.187 
There was therefore a serious lack of uniformity and harmonization amongst national e-
commerce legislation around the world and this lack of uniformity and harmonization was 
perceived as a barrier to international trade by electronic means.188 
The Convention builds upon the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, 1996 and the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, 2001, but its provisions have been 
improved and updated to take into account technological developments since 1996, most 
notably, the growth of the internet and as an interpretative legal instrument with minimum 
substantive provisions.189 It facilitates the use of electronic communications in international 
contracting by providing for the functional equivalence of electronic communications, while 
preserving the principle of technological neutrality.190  
Taking the form of a convention, it is a landmark legal instrument that promises to harmonize 
basic electronic commerce legislation amongst contracting states, hence removing legal 
barriers to cross-border e-commerce.191 The Convention is also intended to remove obstacles 
to the use of electronic communications that might arise under existing international trade 
law instruments, most of which were negotiated long before the development of new 
technology, such as e-mail, Electronic Data Interchange and the internet.192 
The Convention does not have autonomous application, and applies only when the law of a 
Contracting State governs the transaction between the parties.193 
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3.5.5. Draft African Union Convention on the Establishment of a Credible Legal Framework 
for Cyber Security in Africa (AUCLCS) 
The Draft African Union Convention on the Establishment of a Credible Legal Framework 
for Cyber Security in Africa (AUCLCS) was created following the 14th AU summit in 2010 
which explored the theme ‘Information and Communication Technologies in Africa: 
Challenges and Prospect for Development’. 194  This was subsequently confirmed by the 
‘Abuja Declaration’, and brought into law by the African Union in June 2014.195  
The Draft African Union Convention on the Establishment of a Credible Legal Framework 
for Cyber Security in Africa gives effect to a resolution of the last session of the Assembly of 
Heads of State of Governments of the African Union and seeks to harmonize African cyber 
legislation on e-commerce, personal data protection, cyber-security promotion and cyber-
crime control. 196 
It is clear, however, that its focus is more on cyber-security and cyber-crimes than provisions 
on enablement and regulation of e-commerce in Africa and interestingly, unlike the MLEC, 
the Draft African Union Convention on the Establishment of a Credible Legal Framework for 
Cyber Security in Africa has omitted definitions such as ‘data’, ‘data messages’, ‘writing’, 
‘electronic signature’ and ‘original’ but includes wide definitions for terms such as 
‘electronic commerce’, ‘electronic mail’ and ‘information’.197  
Although the Draft African Union Convention on the Establishment of a Credible Legal 
Framework for Cyber Security in Africa re-states that electronic commerce is an economic 
activity by which a person offers or provides goods and services by electronic means, it goes 
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on to define the field of electronic commerce as also comprising of services such as those 
providing information on-line, commercial communications, research tools, access, data 
retrieval and access to communication or information hosting network, even where such 
services are not remunerated by the recipients.198 
Murungi, in “Comments on the Draft African Union Convention on the Establishment of a 
Credible Legal Framework for Cyber Security in Africa (2011)”, argues that the definition 
only includes the seller’s economic activity by which a person offers or provides goods and 
services by electronic means.199 He states that a better attempt at such provision would have 
been to use words such as person who offer or receives offers, by electronic means.200  
3.5.6. Influence of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Law  
The UNCITRAL Model Law could be described as an instrument of 'preventive' or 'pre-
emptive' harmonization: it led to the process of development of law by providing universally 
acceptable solutions to the issues likely to arise, rather than being negotiated after practices 
and usage had already resulted in disparate laws and regulations. 201  
However, notwithstanding the fact that many countries widely accepted the principles 
contained in the UNCITRAL Model Law, it could not simply be assumed that its principles 
achieved the goal of world-wide harmonization.202 The provisions of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law soon proved inadequate to deal with all the issues raised by the creation and use of 
electronic signatures.203 
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Already at the time of the drafting of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, 
2001, there were calls for another round of legislation, an international convention on e-
commerce, to achieve further harmonization of national laws.204 Despite the wide acceptance 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, 1996, it cannot simply be assumed that its 
principles have already achieved universal application through domestic legislation.205 
The UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, 1996 does not address aspects of contract 
formation and performance that may be affected by the ways in which electronic transactions 
are currently structured and by the ways in which those structures are being changed to 
facilitate e-commerce.206 
That the challenge was successfully met can be gauged from the influence of the Model Law 
on e-commerce legislation already adopted, or being developed, around the world.207  
3.6. The European Union Directive on Privacy and Data Protection 
On October 24, 1995 the European Union (hereafter EU) enacted the European Union 
Directive on Privacy and Data Protection 95/46/EC (for the purposes of this dissertation this 
will be cited in full to avoid confusion) in order to harmonize member states’ laws in 
providing consistent levels of protections for citizens and ensuring the free flow of personal 
data within the EU.208  
Formally adopted in 1995, the European Union Directive on Privacy and Data Protection 
95/46/EC arose from the sense that European citizens were losing control over their personal 
information and that they had a fundamental right to privacy.209 
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On September 12, 1996, the EU Council adopted the Electronic Communication Data 
Protection Directive, a supplement to the European Union Directive on Privacy and Data 
Protection 95/46/EC.210 In October 1998, the EU enacted the Personal Data Protection Act, 
which was also revised from the European Union Directive on Privacy and Data Protection 
95/46/EC and in early 1999; the European Commission issued the General Principles on 
Personal Data Privacy Protection on the internet, and then promulgated the Advices on 
sightless and automatic personal data processing carried by software and hardware in 
internet.211 
Although the European Union Directive on Privacy and Data Protection 95/46/EC directive 
was designed for the EU with only 15 member states in it, non-member states are affected 
because the Directive provides high standards of data protection and attempts to eliminate 
data transmission barriers in 15 member states.212 In the meanwhile, in order to transmit data 
between the member states and a country outside the EU, the European Union Directive on 
Privacy and Data Protection 95/46/EC stipulates that the country must adopt the same 
protection standards as the EU countries.213 
The EU member states are not allowed to transfer their personal data to any non-member 
state, until it ensures adequate protection. 214  This measure ensures that personal data is 
protected and it prevents accidental data loss, data transform, unauthorized data access or 
exposure, as well as other forms of illegal operation.215 
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The need for a legislative data protection framework in South Africa is largely a trade and 
development issue.216 After the EU introduced the European Union Directive on Privacy and 
Data Protection 95/46/EC, it was deemed necessary by the South African government to 
place the issue of data protection on the agenda.217 Both the European Union and South 
Africa tend to share an overall similarity when it comes to being apprehensive about doing 
business online.218 The concern of users was that their private data/information will not be 
sufficiently protected, thus allowing for others to gain access and carry out illegal practices, 
and hence the “call” from users for the implementation of protective measures to ensure their 
personal data is protected.219 
The EU has two main directives regarding the processing of data which are: the Data 
Protection Directive which applies to general aspects of data processing and the Privacy and 
Electronic Communications Directive.220 The European Union Directive on Privacy and Data 
Protection 2002/58/EC (hereafter EU Directive) replaced the Telecommunications Data 
Protection Directive (97/66/EC).221 Due to the rule of lex specialis the EU Directive has 
priority over the European Union Directive on Privacy and Data Protection 95/46/EC on 
issues covered by both directives.222 
3.7. Applicability of International Law in South Africa 
As stated in the previous chapter, when it was completed, the UNCITRAL Model Law was a 
unique instrument in a legal landscape where there was no existing body of law, whether 
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uniform international law or national law that comprehensively addressed the issues raised by 
e-commerce.223  
As such, the UNCITRAL Model Law could be described as an instrument of 'preventive' or 
'pre-emptive' harmonization: it led the process of development of law by providing 
universally acceptable solutions to the issues likely to arise, rather than being negotiated after 
practices and usage had already resulted in disparate laws and regulations.224 
The UNICITRAL Model Law is very much in use in the South African courts. In  Jafta v 
Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife225 dealing with Short Message Service (SMS) and Electronic mail (e-
mail) contracts, the court used the UNICITRAL Model Law to determine if Jafta's 
communications constituted a valid acceptance of the offer or not and if an SMS is an 
appropriate mode of concluding a contract.226 
The court held that both Jafta's SMS and e-mail were valid acceptances. 227  First, the 
acceptances in both modes were clear, unequivocal and unambiguous as stated in Boerne v 
Harris228 and second, both acceptances corresponded with the offer.229  
 In South Africa, chapter III of the ECTA230 is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-
Commerce, 1996 and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, 2001.231 
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As stated earlier on in this chapter, it is worth noting that although the UNCITRAL Model 
Law serves both to educate lawmakers about the legal ramifications of electronic transactions 
and to provide a framework for any country wishing to draft electronic commerce legislation, 
South Africa is not a member state and is not bound by this UNCITRAL Model Law.232  
Another aspect worth noting is the fact that the UNCITRAL Model Law on e-commerce and 
the model law on electronic signatures are not conventions and as such are not directly 
binding on the South African legal system.233 However, as previously mentioned, they have 
had an influence in the drafting of the ECTA and have formed a clear basis for this 
legislation.234 The ECTA235 has some remarkable consistencies with what is proposed in the 
above model laws; however it also represents a uniquely South African response to the 
challenges of e-commerce.236 The challenges of e-commerce as stated in chapter one of this 
dissertation include but not is not limited to a threat to security, confidentiality and consumer 
trust as well as privacy protection for consumers in data transmission. 
Although our courts are not bound to the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law, by virtue 
of the Constitution237 they are entitled to interpret legislation in a manner that is consistent 
with section 233238 and are bound by it.239   
According to Van der Merwe, it is not just the international law that has had an influence on 
the South African e-commerce laws.240 Van der Merwe stated that during the drafting of the 
ECTA, a wide range of foreign legislation was consulted, apart from UNCITRAL Model 
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Law.241 This included legislation from Australia, Bermuda, Canada, Germany, India, Ireland, 
New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore and the United Kingdom.242 
The principle of functional equivalence is reflected in the ECTA243, as are the principles of 
the ‘party autonomy’ and ‘technology neutrality’.244  
3.7.1. Case Law: Cases Relating to the UNCITRAL Model Law  
To prove the relevance of the UNCITRAL Model Law in the South African legislation and 
its application in the courts of law, the dissertation now turns to the South African court 
decisions and arbitral awards relating to the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
3.7.1.1. Sihlali v South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd (J700/08) [2010] ZALC 1; 
(2010) 31 ILJ 1477 (LC); [2010] 5 BLLR 542 (LC) (14 January 2010) 
In Sihlali v South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd,245 the court dealt with a notice of 
termination of employment contract by sending an SMS.246 
The applicant and the respondent, a South African corporation, entered into a fixed term 
employment contract, under which the former was employed as a legal adviser and after 
learning from the press about allegations of impropriety, and pending an audit on those 
allegations, the applicant informed the respondent of his decision to quit his job with 
immediate effect by sending an SMS.247 The respondent replied with a letter accepting the 
resignation.248 Six weeks after sending the SMS, the applicant sent an email asserting that the 
employment contract was still valid and the respondent replied by indicating that the notice of 
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resignation sent by SMS was valid, and that therefore the employment contract had been 
terminated.249 
The preliminary issue raised was whether an SMS sent by the applicant constituted a valid 
notice of resignation.250 Pursuant to South African labor law, a valid notice of termination of 
an employment contract must be given in writing (unless the employee is illiterate).251 The 
court held that a communication by SMS is a communication in writing, by referring to the 
Section 1 and Section 12 of the ECTA, which are based on articles 2 and 6 (1) UNCITRAL 
Model Law on E-Commerce, 1996.252 The court thus confirmed that the applicant’s notice by 
SMS was a valid written form of notice of resignation.253 
3.7.1.2. Phoenix Shipping Corporation v DHL Global Forwarding SA (Pty) Ltd (AC70/2011) 
[2012] ZAWCHC 11; 2012 (3) SA 381 (WCC) (24 February 2012) 
In Phoenix Shipping Corporation v DHL Global Forwarding SA (Pty) Ltd,254 the Western 
Cape High Court also used the UNCITRAL Model Law to decide on an arbitration matter.255  
3.7.1.3. Spring Forest Trading v Wilberry [2014] ZASCA 178; 2015 (2) SA 118 (SCA), 
725/13 
The case of Spring Forest Trading v Wilberry,256 dealt with the validity of a cancellation 
agreement using e-mail communications in light of a no-oral modification clause providing 
for the cancellation to be in writing and signed by the parties.257 
                                                          
249 ibid. 
250 J Hofman ‘The Moving Finger: sms, on-line communication and on-line disinhibition’ (2011) 8 (1) Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 180. 
251 See Section 37 (4) (a) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997. 
252 Hofman see Note 250 above at 183. 
253 ibid. 
254 (AC70/2011) [2012] ZAWCHC 11; 2012 (3) SA 381 (WCC) (24 February 2012) at paras 36 and 62. 
255 ‘CLOUT case 1397 – UNCITRAL’ available at https://www.uncitral.org/clout/clout/data/ 
zaf/clout_case_1397_leg-2892.html, accessed on 06 February 2017. 
256 [2014] ZASCA 178; 2015 (2) SA 118 (SCA), 725/13 at para 17. 
257 See Note 255 above. 
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The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) held that an e-mail, being a data message, satisfied a 
legal requirement for an agreement to be in writing set forth in Section 12 of the ECTA 
whose enactment was influenced by Article 6 (1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-
Commerce, 1996.258 
In discussing the case, the Supreme Court also considered whether the names of the parties at 
the foot of their e-mail constituted signatures as contemplated in Section 13 (1) of the Act 
which provides that:  
“…where the signature of a person is required by law and such law does not 
specify the type of signature, that requirement in relation to a data message 
is met only if an advanced electronic signature is used”.259  
Section 13 (3) of the ECTA whose enactment was influenced by Article 7 (1) of UNCITRAL 
Model Law on E-Commerce, 1996 provides that:  
“where an electronic signature is required by the parties to an electronic 
transaction and the parties have not agreed on the type of electronic 
signature to be used, that requirement is met in relation to a data message if 
(a) a method is used to identify the person and to indicate the person’s 
approval of the information communicated;260 and (b) having regard to all 
the relevant circumstances at the time the method was used, the method was 
as reliable as was appropriate for the purposes for which the information 
was communicated”.261 
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260 See Section 13 (3) (a) of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002.  
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Section 1 of the ECTA defines an electronic signature as  
“…data attached to, incorporated in, or logically associated with other data 
and which is intended by the user to serve as a signature”262  
This is similar to Article 2 (a) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, 
2001.263 Using this definition of a signature, the Supreme Court dismissed the respondent’s 
argument that no reliable method was used with respect to the e-mails, since the reliability of 
the e-mails, the accuracy of the information communicated and the identities of the authors 
were undisputable.264 
3.7.1.4. Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife (2009) 30 ILJ 131 (LC) 
As stated earlier in this chapter, the case of Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife deals with the 
conclusion of a labor contract in connection with the use of electronic communications (email 
and SMS). 265 
After a successful selection process, the respondent, Ezemvelo, sent by e-mail an 
employment offer to the applicant, Jafta, who tentatively accepted.266 The respondent sent a 
second e-mail, prompting a final decision, to which the applicant replied by accepting the 
offer without conditions.267 Although the applicant’s information system indicated that the 
acceptance e-mail had been successfully sent, it never reached the respondent’s system.268 
Later, one of the respondent’s employees sent a final reminder of the pending offer by Short 
                                                          
262 See Section 1 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002. 
263 ‘CLOUT case 1397 – UNCITRAL’ available at https://www.uncitral.org/clout/clout/data/ 
zaf/clout_case_1397_leg-2892.html, accessed on 06 February 2017. 
264 ibid. 
265 (2009) 30 ILJ 131 (LC) at para 1. 
266 Stoop ‘SMS and e-mail contracts: Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife’ (2009) 21 (1) SA Mercantile Law Journal 
110. 
267 ibid. 
268 Buys & F Cronje (eds) Cyberlaw @ SA II: The Law of the Internet in South Africa 2 ed (2004) 104. 
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Message System (SMS), to which the applicant replied promptly confirming his 
acceptance.269  
The Court considered the conclusion of the labor contract by e-mail and SMS in the context 
of the ECTA which is based, in the relevant parts, on the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-
Commerce, 1996.270 In particular, the Court noted the necessity to interpret the ECTA in light 
of its uniform origin and of the inherent transnational nature of the law of electronic 
communications; it therefore made reference to the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-
Commerce, 1996, to other enactments of the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, 1996 
as well as to relevant case law from foreign jurisdictions.271  
Moreover, the Court noted that certain principles of the law of electronic communications are 
widely accepted worldwide and enacted in South African law.272 Such principles include: 
non-discrimination of electronic communications (section 11 ECTA; article 5 of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, 1996); due evidential weight of data messages 
(section 15 ECTA; article 9 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, 1996); and 
freedom of the parties to vary statutory provisions by agreement (section 21 ECTA; article 4 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, 1996).273  
With respect to the formation of the contract, the Court noted that there was no evidence that 
the e-mail reply by the applicant containing unconditional acceptance of the offer had entered 
the information system under the control of the intended recipient, and that therefore the 
contract could not be considered concluded at that moment (see section 23 (b) ECTA, 
inspired by article 15 (2) (a) (i) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, 1996, but 
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adding the requirement that the message should be capable of being retrieved and processed 
by the addressee).274 
 The Court then stated that a message sent by SMS meets the notion of electronic 
communication set in the ETCA, with particular regard to the definitions of ‘electronic 
communication’ and ‘data message’ (drafted after Article 2 (a) of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on E-Commerce, 1996) contained therein, and that therefore the acceptance expressed 
by SMS constitutes a valid method of communicating the acceptance of an offer (section 22 
ECTA; see also Article 11 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, 1996).275 
3.8. Conclusion  
This chapter dealt with the right to privacy and other principles of information protection. In 
e-commerce rightly regulated, everyone has the right to the protection of personal data 
concerning him or her. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the 
basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. 
Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and 
the right to have it rectified. 
Due to globalization and standardization, there is a great need for South Africa to design 
electronic commerce regulatory framework that is in line with international standards by 
harmonizing its e-commerce laws with the international legal perspective on e-commerce. 
These international standards are not just those set by first world countries in their e-
commerce regulatory framework, but includes among others e-commerce regulation adopted 
by international organisations to which South Africa subscribes. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. SOUTH AFRICA’S DATA PROTECTION LAWS 
4.1. Introduction  
Due to the consumer’s online shopping activities or business transactions, consumers either 
advertently or inadvertently disclose personal information to other people.1 Because of these 
new threats to consumers, the need for the protection of the right to privacy has led to 
protection of personal information becoming a basic necessity.2 Data protection legislation is 
becoming more common and electronic information has become a vital corporate asset.3 
Business practices are moving from traditional paper-based business practices that involve 
personal contact with clients, towards e-commerce. 4  E-commerce certainly brings new 
benefits to consumers and businesses alike but consumer protection remains crucial and a top 
priority since there is uncertainty in e-business privacy.5 
It is just in this past century that the internet has developed so much and over the last few 
years the internet has developed from a glorified catalogue with companies advertising their 
products on a passive website, into a real marketplace with interactive websites offering a 
wide range of products and services, which can be ordered, paid for and sometimes even 
delivered on-line.6  
 
                                                          
1 D Goodburn & M Ngoye ‘Privacy and the internet’ in R Buys & F Cronje (eds) Cyberlaw @ SA II: The Law 
of the Internet in South Africa 2 ed (2004) 171. 
2 L Swales ‘Protection of personal information: South Africa's answer to the global phenomenon in the context 
of unsolicited electronic messages (spam)’ (2016) 28 (1) SA Mercantile Law Journal 49. 
3 ibid. 
4 R F Henschel & E B Cleff ‘Information requirements and consumer protection in future m-commerce: Textual 
information overload or alternative regulation and communication?’ (2007) 1 (1) International Journal of 
Intercultural Information Management 59.  
5 ibid. 
6 F Le Roux ‘E-commerce: The legal framework’ (2000) 392 De Rebus 25. 
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Because of such a development in electronic transactions, in Heroldt v Wills, Judge Willis 
commented: 
“The pace of the march of technological progress has quickened to the 
extent that the social changes that result therefrom require high levels of 
skill not only from the courts, which must respond appropriately, but also 
from the lawyers....”7 
Many scholars have argued that the lack of adequate privacy protection may slow economic 
growth or hinder economic development because of the lack of foreign markets and 
consumers which is a direct result of hesitancy by consumers to transact online.8 According 
to Justice Sachs in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice, 
privacy recognizes that we all have a right to a sphere of private intimacy and autonomy 
without interference from the outside community.9 
When it comes to e-commerce legislation, it is true that governments, businesses and internet 
users in general are confronted with a range of legal issues, complicated by the unique nature 
of electronic communication, a medium for which existing legal rules do not always provide 
satisfactory answers.10 
South Africa has no ‘Data Privacy Act’ yet which deals solely with data privacy matters, but 
certain important provisions and references to the need for personal privacy have been 
mentioned in several legal instruments.11 It is the rise of electronic commerce transactions in 
South Africa that has led to this study of the legal issues pertaining to privacy. 
                                                          
7 Heroldt v Wills 2013 (2) SA 530 (GSJ) at para 8. 
8 See Note 1 above. 
9 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para 32.  
10 Roux see Note 6 above.  
11 H N Olinger … et al ‘Western privacy and/or ubuntu? Some critical comments on the influences in the 
forthcoming data privacy bill in South Africa’ (2007) 39 (1) The International Information & Library Review 
38.  
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Again, it is vital to note that in South Africa, as in most countries, a plethora of national 
legislation has been enacted seeking to regulate various aspects of electronic communications 
as well as to promote data protection and hence this chapter will analyse those legislation and 
discuss the references made to privacy.12  
4.2. Fiduciary Regulation of E-commerce (Privacy, Trust and Confidence) 
Due to the physical location of the buyer being separate from that of the seller, as well as the 
physical location of the buyer and that of the merchandise, privacy, trust and confidence 
become a major concern in e-commerce.13 Privacy is an issue in a virtual world where online 
consumers use computer systems and it plays a primary role in e-commerce.14  
The existence of terms like ‘TRUST’, ‘WebTrust’, and ‘WebAssure’ is a prime indication of 
the expressions of privacy or trust and the importance of confidence to e-commerce.15  
Businesses involved in e-commerce transactions ensure trust by protection of consumer’s 
personal information (data) and thereby establishing user confidence.16 TRUST which is one 
of the web seal providers has a statement on their website which reads: 
“One of the best ways to make consumers feel comfortable providing 
personal information and conducting transactions on the internet is to use a 
third-party oversight program such as TRUST's. Our oversight procedures 
go a long way to ease consumers' privacy concerns and to establish website 
credibility in the minds of your online customers and visitors.”17  
                                                          
12 ibid.  
13 B C Ho & K B Oh ‘An empirical study of the use of e-security seals in e-commerce’ (2009) 33 (4) Online 
Information Review 658. 
14 ibid.  
15 L I Rotman ‘The fiduciary regulation of e-commerce’ (2004) 29 Queen's Law Journal 739.  
16 ibid 740. 
17 “TRUSTe Oversight” available at http://www.truste.com, accessed on 16 February 2017. 
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Ernst & Young an accounting firm also advertised their approach on user trust when they 
advertised their firm in the Wired Magazine: 
“Protect your customers' privacy and transactions or you may be the one 
who gets burned.... If your internet customers feel exposed they'll quickly 
take their business elsewhere. The cyber process certification solutions that 
we offer, including WebTrust, help you build and maintain their trust. So 
you can grow your customer base and establish a competitive advantage.”18   
It is the lack of trust that is identified as the major obstacle to consumer acceptance of e-
commerce.19 With the growth of the internet and e-commerce, cyber-trust has become critical 
to the success of e-business and privacy protection determines the user confidence of the 
internet in e-commerce.20  
Therefore it is for fiduciary trust that a reason has been created to regulate e-commerce in 
South Africa to establish user trust as well as user confidence. 
4.3. Functions of E-commerce Legislation 
Proper and functional e-commerce legislation has to serve various purposes. 21  Legal 
impediments to the implementation of e-commerce should be removed, certainty must be 
achieved as to the application of the law to e-commerce and business and consumer trust has 
to be enhanced.22 Costs need to be minimized; legislation has to be applied to a wide range of 
transactions, facilitating both related and unrelated transactions.23  Legislation also has to 
                                                          
18 Rotman see Note 15 above at 741. 
19 T Sun ‘The roles of trust and experience in consumer confidence in conducting e-commerce: A cross-cultural 
comparison between France and Germany’ (2011) 35 (3) International Journal of Consumer Studies 330. 
20 ibid. See also Goodburn & Ngoye see Note 1 above. 
21 Roux see Note 6 above. 
22 ibid 26. 
23 ibid. 
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facilitate the cross-border recognition and the enforcement of electronic transactions and 
signatures with regulatory burdens minimized upon government and businesses.24 
Leonard I Rotman stated that: 
“Although e-commerce is a relatively new phenomenon, it has quickly 
entrenched itself in the contemporary commercial psyche. Its rapid 
expansion has created new challenges for those seeking to ensure its 
continued vitality while simultaneously protecting the interests of its users. 
The trans-jurisdictional nature of e-commerce increases these challenges. 
For the most part, e-commerce regulation has looked to traditional methods, 
such as legislation, international agreements, and voluntary self-regulation 
(including website privacy policies and third-party webseals or trust marks).  
These methods do not always pay sufficient attention to the interactive 
nature of e-commerce transactions, and to the fact that the central issue in e-
commerce regulation is fostering user confidence in the system. The 
fiduciary concept is concerned with maintaining the integrity of certain 
important relationships in a contemporary society. By focusing on the often 
neglected but essential human interaction component of e-commerce, the 
fiduciary concept could provide a valuable means of coming to grips with 
the problem of user confidence.”25 
It is important for South Africa to examine its existing legal rules, and amend those rules if 
necessary, so as to facilitate the development of e-commerce in this country, for it seems that 
                                                          
24 ibid. 
25 Rotman see Note 15 above.  
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the UNCITRAL Model Law, as an influential example of the minimalist approach to 
legislation, is no longer a suitable point of departure for purposes of such an exercise.26  
4.4. South African Legislation 
E-consumer law is a branch of the lex informatica, otherwise referred to as cyber-law, which 
is not a traditional source of law but rather a new hybrid-law encompassing various pieces of 
telecommunications legislation as well as the common law. 27  One must also note the 
supremacy of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 28  In addition, the 
Constitution states that international law must be considered and foreign law may be 
considered in the interpretation of South African law.29 
As was stated earlier in chapter two of this dissertation, the greatest challenge in South 
Africa’s e-commerce is its regulation. Legislation has been put in place in South Africa as 
consumer-centric in order to protect consumers. 
Like many other countries, the South African government recognized the need for the 
formation of electronic commerce policy and saw its role as an enabler, facilitator, educator 
and law enforcer to prevent internet crimes.30  It was crucial that South Africa should develop 
a policy that is in harmony with international best practice so that it is not excluded from 
trading electronically with the global world. 31   South Africa therefore monitored 
developments and followed debates that were taking place around the world.32 
                                                          
26 Roux see Note 6 above. 
27 Snail ‘South African e-consumer law in the context of the ECT Act (part 1)’ (2007) 15 (1) The Quarterly Law 
Review for People in Business 40. 
28 ibid 40. See section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
29 Snail ‘Electronic contracts in South Africa - A comparative analysis’ (2008) 2 (1) Journal of Information, 
Law & Technology 2. See section 39 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
30 N Zantsi & M Eloff ‘Guide to South African law’ (2003) available at http://icsa.cs.up.ac.za/issa/ 
2003/Publications/001.doc/, accessed on 13 February 2017. 
31 ibid.  
32 ibid. 
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On 4 and 5 April 2013 the Lex Informatica 2013: Cyber Law, ICT Law and Information 
Ethics Conference was held in Pretoria.33 Andries Nel, the then Deputy Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development cited that the main objective of the convention which was 
then expected to be in force by 2014, was to harmonize legislation relating to electronic 
transactions, development of personal data protection, cyber security promotion and the fight 
against cyber-crime.34 
In that same conference, Lenja Dahms-Jansen from the law firm Bowman Gilfillan 
encouraged employers to be aware of the following legislation: the Protection of Personal 
Information Bill35, which would later become the Protection of Personal Information Act36 on 
11 April 2014, the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication-related Information Act37, the Electronic Communications and Transactions 
Act38, and Section 6 of the Employment Equity Act39. Lenja Dahms-Jansen also spoke about 
social media and misconduct. 40 
The famous author on cyber laws and electronic transactions, Sylvia Papadopoulos from the 
University of Pretoria’s law faculty also spoke on the changing face of spam regulation in 
South Africa and stated that having different pieces of legislation dealing with spam was 
problematic.41 
Another famous author on electronic transaction laws, Sizwe Snail, the director of Snail 
Attorneys also spoke on cyber-crime in South Africa and various sections of the ECTA 
                                                          
33 K O'Reilly ‘South African law coming to grips with cyber-crime: News’ 2013 (530) De Rebus 14. 
34 ibid. 
35 Protection of Personal Information Bill B9B of 2009. 
36 Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013. 
37 Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related Information Act 70 
of 2002. 
38 The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002. 
39 Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
40 See Note 33 above. 
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dealing with different types of cyber-crime.42 He also noted that there were other statutory 
remedies that could apply to cyber-crime. 43  These remedies included the Prevention of 
Organised Crime Act (POCA)44 and the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA)45. 
To conclude the above discussion, it is also worth noting that the South African data 
protection legislation must comply with the international data protection law standards. A 
case in point was when Nedbank Ltd. responded to the South African Law Reform 
Commission’s (SALRC) issue paper in which Nedbank stated the impact of the lack of 
adequate data protection in South Africa on its business: 
“Nedbank has been forced, in the absence of data protection legislation 
locally which would have facilitated the bank processing information 
within South Africa, at great extra cost, to set up processing centres in 
Europe, in order to meet European information protection legislative 
requirements.”46 
In interpreting the legislation providing for the protection of data by privatising personal 
information, the South African case law has accepted Neethling’s definition of privacy.47 
Neethling defined privacy as  
“…individual condition of life characterized by exclusion from publicity, 
which condition includes all those personal facts which the person himself 
or herself at the relevant time determines to be excluded from the 
                                                          
42 ibid 14-15. 
43 ibid 15. 
44 Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998. 
45 Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001. 
46 South African Law Reform Commission ‘Privacy and Data Protection Project 124 Discussion Paper 109’ 
(2005).  
47 See for example National Media Ltd v Jooste 1996 (3) SA 262 (A) at 271; Jooste v National Media Ltd 1994 
(2) SA 634 (C) at 645; Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1977 (4) SA 376 (T) at 
384; Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at 789; Swanepoel v Minister van Veiligheid en Sekuriteit 1999 
(4) SA 549 (T) at 553. 
86 | P a g e  
 
knowledge of outsiders and in respect of which he or she evidences a will 
for privacy.”48 
4.4.1. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
In Heroldt v Wills 2013, 49  the court stated that prior to South Africa's constitutional 
dispensation, privacy protection was entrenched by virtue of ancient common law rights. This 
common law right which protected the right to privacy in ancient times is known as the actio 
iniuriarum, as it protected privacy by affording a general delictual remedy for wrongs to an 
individual's personality. 50  This was first accepted in O'Keeffe v Argus Printing and 
Publishing Co Ltd & Another.51 
The right to privacy is enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.52 The 
Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, 
and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled. 53  Accordingly, the electronic 
communication and e-commerce industries are subject to the provisions of the Constitution.54 
This is because the right to privacy is found in the Bill of Rights of which section 8 of the 
Constitution states that its provisions bind the judiciary,55 the natural persons as well as the 
juristic persons.56 Although juristic persons also enjoy the rights in the Bill of Rights as 
stipulated by section 8,57 in Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit, the court pointed 
                                                          
48 J Neethling … et al Neethling’s Law of Personality 2 ed (2005) 14 and 32. 
49 Heroldt v Wills 2013 (2) SA 530 (GSJ) at para 7.  
50 J Burchell ‘The legal protection of privacy in South Africa: A transplantable hybrid’ (2009) 13 (1) Electronic 
Journal of Comparative Law 6. 
51 O'Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd & Another 1954 (3) SA 244 (C) at paras 247H–249E.  
52 H N Olinger … et al ‘Western privacy and/or ubuntu? Some critical comments on the influences in the 
forthcoming data privacy bill in South Africa’ (2007) 39 (1) The International Information & Library Review 
38. Snail ‘Electronic contracts in South Africa - A comparative analysis’ (2008) 2 (1) Journal of Information, 
Law & Technology 2. See Section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
53 See section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. J De Waal & I Currie The Bill of 
Rights Handbook (1998) 7. 
54 C Cupido ‘Electronic communications regulation’ in S Papadopoulos & S Snail (eds) Cyberlaw @ SA III: The 
Law of the Internet in South Africa 3 ed (2012) 25. 
55 See section 8 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
56 See section 8 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
57 ibid. 
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out that juristic persons are not bearers of human dignity and as such, their privacy rights may 
be attenuated.58 
The Constitution also gives an injunction for courts to interpret any provision or to develop 
common and customary law by promoting the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of 
Rights.59 In a matter concerning the private law governing invasion of privacy in NM v Smith 
(Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae)60 the court examined the sweep of the 
common law of privacy against fundamental concepts of dignity and privacy thereby 
adhering to section 39 of the Constitution.61  
In the same case NM v Smith (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) the court 
stated that privacy encompasses the right of a person to live his or her life as he or she 
pleases.62 The court also defined private facts as those matters the disclosure of which will 
cause mental distress and injury to anyone possessed of ordinary feelings and intelligence in 
the same circumstances and in respect of which there is a will to keep them private.63  
The two important provisions when dealing with privacy issues are Section 16 64  which 
includes the freedom of expression and section 1465 which provides for the right to privacy.66  
The provisions for privacy in the Constitution place the South African government under 
obligation to provide the relevant legislation to protect these privacy rights of South African 
citizens. 67  The term ‘possessions’ in Section 14(c) 68  could be interpreted to range from 
tangible property through to intangible property such as personal reputation, intellectual 
                                                          
58 Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) at para 18.  
59 See section 39 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
60 NM v Smith (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (7) BCLR 751 (CC) at para 32. 
61 See section 39 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
62 See Note 60 above at 33. 
63 ibid at 34.  
64 See section 16 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
65 See section 14 (d) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
66 See Note 54 above. 
67 Olinger … et al see Note 52 above. 
68 See section 14 (c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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property, personal photographs, and personality-related concepts such as personal 
preferences.69 
A constitutional right is the highest form of right a citizen or juristic person may enjoy, 
because it binds all state organs, the judiciary and the executive to ensure these rights are 
protected and entrenched for citizens.70 The right to privacy was also enshrined in the Interim 
Constitution of South Africa71 Section 13: Privacy: 
“Every person shall have the right to his or her personal privacy, which 
shall include the right not to be subject to searches of his or her person, 
home or property, the seizure of private possessions or the violation of 
private communications.”72 
From the Interim Constitution, the current Constitution also included the right to privacy. 
Section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa73 dealing with the right to 
privacy is closely related to the common law right to privacy which is part of a person’s 
dignitas.74 It is the violation of the person’s right to privacy and/or the disclosure of their 
private facts that amounts to the violation of the right to privacy as encapsulated in this 
section.75 
In Bernstein v Bester76 and in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of 
Justice,77 Ackermann J applied the constitutional right to privacy as contained in section 14 
and stated that privacy extends beyond the individual’s personal realm to cover autonomous 
                                                          
69 Olinger … et al see Note 52 above. 
70 ibid. See section 8 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
71 The Interim Constitution of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
72 See section 13 of the Interim Constitution of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
73 ibid. 
74 I J Prinsloo ‘How safe are South African schools?’ (2005) 25 (1) South African Journal of Education 8. 
75 ibid 8. NM v Smith (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (7) BCLR 751 (CC) at paras 33 
and 34. 
76 Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at para 65 and 59. 
77 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para 32. 
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identity. In an appeal case of Douglas v Hello!78 Sedley LJ pointed out personal autonomy as 
the essence of privacy.79  
O’Regan J in NM v Smith (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) said: the value 
we place on privacy reflects our constitutional understanding of what it means to be human.80 
Ackermann J in Bernstein v Bester also pointed out that the right to privacy is recognized as 
an independent personality right which the Courts have included within the concept of 
dignitas.81 O’Regan J in the Constitutional court in Khumalo v Holomisa stated that no sharp 
lines can be drawn between various facets of personality rights in giving effect to the value of 
human dignity in our Constitution.82 
With the right to privacy being implanted in the Constitution, it is also important to note that 
the Constitution also provides for the right of access to personal information.83 Section 32 of 
the South African Constitution provides for the right of access to personal information,84 
which might limit the constitutional right to privacy. Although the right to privacy is 
embedded in the South African Constitution in section 14,85 in Khumalo v Holomisa, the 
court stated that this right to privacy like any other right is not absolute.86 
Ackermann J in Bernstein v Bester stated that privacy is acknowledged in the truly personal 
realm, but as a person moves into communal relations and activities, such as business and 
social interaction, the scope of personal space shrinks accordingly.87 In light of what this 
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dissertation has shown so far, this statement by Ackermann J may also mean that the right to 
privacy in e-business also shrinks although he did not state under what circumstances.88  
This approach is an echo to section 36 of the Constitution which clearly points out that rights 
in the Bill of Rights may be limited.89 As noted in the paragraph above, this interpretation by 
Ackermann J was later reiterated in Khumalo v Holomisa when the court stated that this right 
to privacy like any other rights is not absolute.90 
Reasonableness can be used as justification for limiting the right to privacy that a person 
holds.91 O’Regan in NM v Smith (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) also 
recognized that privacy must be balanced against the right to freedom of expression. 92 
O’Regan also noted that the main defences to an action for invasion of privacy would be that 
the publication was in the public interest or that informed consent had been given.93 
In e-commerce, the risk of invasion of the right to privacy happens if the information privacy 
is not protected since e-business consists mainly of the process of sending information and 
receiving of the same.  
In Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa, the court gave some general 
guidelines that govern data protection and these are:  
a) was the information obtained in an intrusive manner;  
b) was the information about intimate aspects of the subject’s personal life;  
c) was it provided for one purpose but used for another;  
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d) was it disseminated to the press or general public from whom the subject ‘could 
reasonably expect such information would be withheld’?94 
The Constitution gave way to the development of the Promotion of Access to Information 
Act 95  which governs the right of access to all other information, the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act96 which sets out information protection principles and 
the National Credit Act97 which regulates credit information and credit bureaux.98 These and 
other related legislation will be discussed briefly in light of the right to privacy, access to 
information and information protection with a detailed discussion of the ECTA and with 
specific references in some instances to e-commerce.  
4.4.2. Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 
The Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) was enacted to give effect to the right 
stipulated by section 32 of the Constitution. 99  The PAIA deals with inter alia allowing 
individuals access to personal information, but it does not regulate who and how that personal 
information may be collected and controlled by the individual.100 
As stated in the paragraphs above, the right to privacy was enshrined in section 13 of the 
Interim Constitution which granted everybody the right to privacy. 101  The Interim 
Constitution advocated for the right to privacy, however the constitutional court when 
certifying the final Constitution explicitly demanded transparency.102 The court also stated 
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that the right of access to information generally helps to achieve what is commonly referred 
to as good governance.103 
The final Constitution obliged the State in section 32 (2) to enact national legislation to give 
effect to the right of access to information. 104  Thus by giving the right of access to 
information, the PAIA regularizes the need for certain justifiable limitations on privacy 
and/or commercial confidentiality. With the foremost objective of the PAIA being to give 
effect to section 32 of the Constitution,105 the court in S v Makwanyane and Another stated 
that the PAIA has to be interpreted purposively.106 
Although the PAIA facilitates the access to information, chapter 4 sets out some grounds for 
refusal of access to records. 107  A request for access to a record must be refused if its 
disclosure would involve the unreasonable disclosure of personal information about a third 
party, including a deceased individual.108 
By permitting an individual to have access to both manual and electronic records relating to 
personal information, the PAIA promotes privacy or data protection.109 
Privacy is strongly related to how personal information can be controlled by the information 
owner, and this provision is missing in the PAIA. It is specifically the failure of the PAIA in 
comprehensively addressing privacy that led to a separate Data Privacy Bill being drafted and 
legislated.110 
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4.4.3. Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002  
The ECTA deals with cryptography, cyber-crime and the protection of personal information 
or data (privacy).111 To specifically address electronic related commerce, the ECTA112 was 
enacted to focus on establishing a framework within which e-commerce can be regulated.113 
As set out in the preamble, 114  the ECTA was also created to regulate electronic 
communications and transactions by advancing universal access to electronic 
communications and transactions.115 
One of the supporting objectives of the ECTA is to protect individuals engaged in e-
commerce and this expresses itself in Chapter 8 as a voluntary regime of data protection 
principles for personal information. 116  The ECTA creates technological neutrality by 
developing a safe and secure environment thereby promoting legal certainty and confidence 
in respect of electronic transactions. 117  Thus the objective of the ECTA is to facilitate 
electronic transactions by protecting privacy around such transactions.118 
The ECTA comprises of 14 chapters with 95 sections, which addresses e-commerce issues 
such as e-government, consumer protection, privacy, cyber-crime, and liabilities of service 
providers, to mention a few.119 The ECTA in e-commerce provides some obligations that are 
incumbent on the e-vendor that prohibit them from disclosing the e-consumer’s private 
                                                          
111 Z N Jobodwana ‘E-commerce and mobile commerce in South Africa: Regulatory challenges’ (2009) 4 (4) 
Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 291. 
112 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002. 
113 See Note 100 above. 
114 See Note 112 above. 
115 Swales ‘Protection of personal information: South Africa's answer to the global phenomenon in the context 
of unsolicited electronic messages (spam)’ (2016) 28 (1) SA Mercantile Law Journal 68. 
116 ibid 38.  
117  W Jacobs ‘The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act: Consumer protection and internet 
contracts’ (2004) 16 (1) SA Mercantile Law Journal 557. 
118 Deloitte & Touche ‘Legal Electronic Communications & Transaction Bill 2002. (South Africa)’ (2002) 
available at http://www.doc.pwv.gov.za/, accessed on 13 February 2017. 
119 ibid. 
94 | P a g e  
 
information. 120  This is called a non-disclosure obligation which helps in information 
protection by providing data protection.121 
The ECTA has an entire chapter that applies only to personal information obtained through 
electronic transactions.122 According to section 51 of the ECTA, in order to collect, collate 
and process or disclose any personal information belonging to a data subject, a data controller 
must possess express written permission to do so.123 If required by the law to do so, the 
information must be necessary for the lawful purpose for which the personal information is 
required.124 
According to both the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA)125 and the ECTA126, 
personal information is defined as: 
“(a) information relating to the race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, 
national, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, physical or 
mental health, well-being, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, 
language and birth of the individual; 
(b) information relating to the education or the medical, criminal or 
employment history of the individual or information relating to financial 
transactions in which the individual has been involved: 
(c) any identifying number, symbol, or other particular assigned to the 
individual; 
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(d) the address, fingerprints or blood type of the individual; 
(e) the personal opinions, views or preferences of the individual, except 
where they are about another individual or about a proposal for a grant, an 
award or a prize to be made to another individual: 
(f) correspondence sent by the individual that is implicitly or explicitly of a 
private or confidential nature or further correspondence that would reveal 
the contents of the original correspondence; 
(g) the views or opinions of another individual about the individual: 
(h) the views or opinions of another individual about a proposal for a grant, 
an award or a prize to be made to the individual, but excluding the name of 
the other individual where it appears with the views or opinions of the other 
individual; and 
(i) the name of the individual where it appears with other personal 
information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name 
itself would reveal information about the individual, 
but excludes information about an individual who has been dead for more 
than 20 years.”127 
As stated in the paragraph above, the ECTA deals with the protection of this personal 
information in sections 50 and 51.128 Section 50 gives the scope of protection of personal 
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information, while section 51 provides for the principles for electronically collecting personal 
information.129 
Although the ECTA has been key in data protection, it however does not impose legally 
binding obligations on data controllers as the data controller may exclude such principles by 
agreement with a data subject. 130  The danger of such a provision in the ECTA is that 
disclosure of information is likely going to be an exception rather than the norm.  
4.4.3.1. The Shortcomings of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 
2002 on Consumer Protection 
The ECTA provides for the protection of consumers in chapter 7.131 Although the ECTA 
provides for the protection of all consumer electronic transactions, there are some other 
electronic transactions which are subject to limitations as stated in section 42.132  
According to the ECTA, a consumer is any natural person who enters or intends entering into 
an electronic transaction with a supplier as the end user of the goods or services offered by 
that supplier.133 
A supplier offering goods or services for sale, for hire or for exchange by way of an 
electronic transaction must make certain information such as its full name, physical address 
and telephone number available to its customers.134 The information does not need to be 
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made available on the website itself.135 However, the ECTA does not state that the consumer 
must make his information to the supplier. 
Although supplier information must be provided, section 43 (1)136 only refers to an offer and 
not online advertisements.137 Thus if that provision is analysed stricto sensu by applying a 
narrow interpretation, supplier information would not be required for all advertisements 
where consumers have the option of making offers by placing orders, thereby putting 
consumers at a risk.138 
Another challenge that chapter 7 does not deal with pertains to the uncertainty also found in 
section 43 (1).139 The ECTA only shows that supplier information should be made available 
when goods or services are offered for sale, hire, or exchange by way of an electronic 
transaction.140 The ECTA does not state if supplier information should be provided or not 
when goods or services are not offered on the website of the supplier, for example, when an 
offer and acceptance is made by e-mail.141  
The exact meaning of goods and services as pointed out in section 43 (1)142 is not given. 
There are other financial services which are excluded from the list of goods and services and 
yet the ECTA does not give a list of these services as is done with other electronic 
transactions that are listed in section 42.143 This lack of certainty poses a challenge to the 
consumers since suppliers won’t provide information that consumers need for privacy 
protection.  
                                                          
135 Jacobs see Note 134 above at 559. 
136 See section 43 (1) of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002. 
137 Jacobs see note 134 above at 559. 
138 ibid. 
139 See Note 136 above. 
140 ibid. 
141 Jacobs see note 134 above at 559. 
142 See Note 136 above. 
143 See Note 132 above. 
98 | P a g e  
 
It is also stated in section 50 of the ECTA that a data controller may elect to subscribe to the 
principles outlined in section 51, which means that subscription to these principles is 
voluntary as the parties are only governed by the terms of their agreement.144 This provision 
implies that the supplier and the consumer do not have to comply with the provisions of 
section 51 if they do not wish to. 
4.4.3.2. The Success of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 in 
Dealing with Privacy Protection 
Parties cannot choose to exclude the provisions of chapter 7 by agreement.145 Any agreement 
that the parties will make to exclude the requirements of chapter 7 will be invalid to the point 
of inconsistency.146   
One of the legal measures that ensure the protection of data in electronic transactions is found 
in chapter 10 of the ECTA.147 The existence of the provision which agitates for the protection 
of critical data by the establishment of the cryptography providers prevents information 
technology (IT) related crimes.148 
Cryptography relates to the hiding of information such that when a message has been 
encrypted it is impossible for an intruder to read it. The ECTA defines a cryptography 
product as  
“any product that makes use of cryptographic techniques and is used by a 
sender or recipient of data messages for the purposes of ensuring-that such 
data can be accessed only by relevant persons.”149  
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The authenticity of the data, the integrity of the data or the source of the data can be correctly 
ascertained.150 
In chapter VIII, according to section 51, the data controller may not use the personal 
information for any other purpose than the disclosed purpose without the express written 
permission of the data subject, unless he or she is permitted or required to do so by law.151 
The information that is in the control of a data controller may not be disclosed to a third party 
and must be deleted or destroyed once it has become obsolete.152 However the data controller 
can disclose information if required or permitted by law or specifically authorised to do so in 
writing by the data subject.153 
The ECTA also provides for the protection of information by providing chapter XIII, which 
deals with the regulation of cybercrime. 154  Section 86 of the ECTA deals with the 
unauthorized access to, interception of or interference with data. 155  This chapter also 
introduces statutory criminal offences relating to information systems.156 Thus information is 
protected against unauthorized access and disclosure.  
4.4.4. Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-
related Information Act 70 of 2002 
The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related 
Information Act (RICA)157, deals with the circumstances under which electronic surveillance 
and interception are permitted, as well as related procedures and responsibilities.158  
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The RICA, also known as the ‘Surveillance Act,’ primarily focuses on the communications 
aspect of privacy by prohibiting all wiretaps and surveillance of all personal 
communications.159 The only exception allowed is either for law enforcement agencies to 
perform wiretaps during criminal investigations or when special permission has been 
obtained.160 
4.4.5. National Credit Act 34 of 2005 
The National Credit Act (NCA) was assented to by the president of the Republic of South 
Africa in March 2006.161 In the preamble as well as in part B of the NCA, 162 it is clear that 
the purpose of the enactment of the NCA is to inter alia regulate credit information. Thus the 
NCA was enacted to promote a fair and non-discriminatory marketplace which improves the 
standards of consumer information.163 
Some of the sections of the NCA came into operation in June 2006, others in September 2006 
and the rest in June 2007 as the dates were fixed by proclamation by the President in terms of 
section 173 of the NCA. 164  As this chapter of the dissertation is dealing with personal 
information it is worth noting that the provisions on issues of confidentiality as well as 
consumer credit information came into operation on 1 September 2006. 
According to part B of the NCA dealing with confidentiality, personal information and 
consumer credit records, any person who, in terms of this Act, receives, compiles, retains or 
reports any confidential information pertaining to a consumer, consumers, prospective 
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consumer or prospective consumers, must protect the confidentiality of that information.165 
To uphold the right to confidentiality, use of any information should be only for a purpose 
permitted or required in terms of the NCA, national legislation or provincial legislation.166 
The use of a consumer’s personal information (confidential information) is allowed only 
when use of the information is permitted by the NCA or any other legislation or when the 
consumer has consented to having their information processed.167 Information can also be 
released to a third party if the release is directed by an order of a court or the Tribunal.168  
Confidential information is defined by the NCA as any personal information that belongs to a 
person and is not generally available to other people or known by them.169 Consumer credit 
information is also defined by the NCA as information concerning a person’s credit, 
financial, employment, educational, professional, business, or career history. 170  This also 
includes information relating to identity such as name, date of birth, identity number, marital 
status, past and current addresses, and contact details.171 
The challenge with the NCA when it comes to the protection of consumer information is that 
it does not specifically require that the purpose for which the information is collected should 
be spelled out before the collection takes place. That is a gap in law that allows for the misuse 
of information by other credit offering institutions.  
Of the statutes dealing with privacy protection, the NCA is probably the most successful in its 
attempt to introduce data protection provisions. It proposes to deal with the security and 
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confidentiality principle by instructing persons who receive, compile, retain or report 
confidential information to protect the confidentiality of that information.  
4.4.6. Electronic Communications Act 36 of 2006 
A number of legislative reforms undertaken since the year 2000 culminated in the adoption of 
the Electronic Communications Act (ECA) in 2006.172 The ECA is the primary piece of 
legislation governing the substantive regulation of the electronic communications industry in 
South Africa.173 The ECA regulates the convergence of technologies in the ICT sector.174  
The ECA repealed the Telecommunications Act, 175  as well as some sections of the 
Broadcasting Act176, excluding sections dealing with the public broadcaster.177 The ECA 
seeks to promote convergence in the broadcasting, broadcasting signal distribution and 
telecommunications sectors, and to provide the legal framework for convergence of these 
sectors.178 
4.4.7. Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 
The Consumer Protection Act (CPA)179 provides an overarching legislative and institutional 
framework for consumer protection and all other Acts providing for consumer protection 
must be read with this Act to provide a common standard for consumer protection. 180 
According to section 5, 181  the CPA applies to every transaction occurring within the 
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Republic, apart from the exceptions also listed in sections 5.182 Whether the supplier resides 
or has its principal office within or outside South Africa is irrelevant and insignificant.183  
Section 1 broadly defines a transaction to include an agreement between a person acting in 
the ordinary course of business and another person for the supply of goods or services in 
exchange for consideration, as well as the supply of goods or the performance of services to a 
consumer for consideration.184 
The overarching philosophy of the CPA is to protect consumers from unfair business 
practices and this includes electronic business or electronic transactions in which consumer 
information should be protected. 185  Issues of particular concern range from questions 
regarding consumer’s financial security, data protection, protection from unsolicited 
information, access to adequate information, and availability of effective and affordable 
redress mechanisms.186  
Section 11 of the CPA deals with the consumers’ right to privacy. It states that:  
“The right of every person to privacy includes the right to - 
a. refuse to accept; 
b. require another person to discontinue; or 
c. in the case of an approach other than in person, to pre-emptively block, 
any approach or communication to that person, if the approach or 
communication is primarily for the purpose of direct marketing.”187 
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Marketers have an obligation to respect consumers by making sure that their personal 
information is protected.  
4.4.8. Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 
The Protection of Personal Information Act (POPI)188 is the latest of the legislation dealing 
with consumer protection in South Africa. In August 2009, the Cabinet published the 
Protection of Personal Information Bill (PPI)189 which is now the POPI. The POPI came into 
force on 11 April 2014 and it promotes the protection of personal information by public and 
private bodies. 
In the context of electronic transactions, the promulgation of the POPI190 follows the recent 
trend in South Africa of enacting consumer-centric legislation.191 The other consumer-centric 
legislation is the Consumer Protection Act and the National Credit Act.192 The POPI also 
came as an addition to the Protection of Access to Information Act193 which deals with the 
negligent use or disclosure of information.194 
Sachs J in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 195  in 
analysing the South African jurisprudence in the area of privacy law explains: Privacy 
recognizes that we all have a right to a sphere of private intimacy and autonomy without 
interference from the outside community.196 
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In Bernstein v Bester,197 the court poignantly noted that privacy is not based on a notion of 
the unencumbered self, but on the notion of what is necessary to have one's own autonomous 
identity. 
Information is sacrosanct and in e-commerce, privacy relates to e-mail addresses, age, 
gender, sexual orientation, race, spending habits, location, medical information and any other 
information that will, or has the potential to identify an individual.198 According to one of the 
salient provisions of the POPI, it is pointed out that personal information means information 
relating to an identifiable, living, natural person, and where it is applicable, an identifiable, 
existing juristic person.199  
In e-commerce as mentioned in the paragraph above, this personal information may include, 
but is not limited to race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, national, ethnic or social 
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, physical or mental health, well-being, disability, 
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth of the person.200 
The overarching principle of the POPI is safeguarding personal information of the data 
subject by giving effect to the constitutional right to privacy, subject to justifiable 
limitations.201 Any juristic person or natural person to whom the personal information relates 
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4.5. Conclusion 
All the legislation discussed above present the myriad of laws that address information 
security related issues including matters of privacy. 203  These pieces of legislation place 
similar non-disclosure obligations on the e-vendor as regards specific disclosures.204 
In all aspects where a person’s legitimate expectation of privacy has been infringed by 
personal information being processed or divulged, he/she can have a remedy by relying on 
the law of delict, but only once active control of personal information has been established.205  
This remedy may prevent a person from wrongfully processing or divulging personal data or 
continuing to divulge personal data, or the actio iniuriarum for a solatium for non-
patrimonial loss in the form of injury to personality (iniuria) resulting from the wrongful and 
intentional processing of personal information, or lastly, compensation under the actio legis 
aquiliae for patrimonial loss (damnum iniuria datum) sustained as a result of the wrongful, 
negligent processing of personal information.206 
However as stated in earlier paragraphs, the right to privacy is not absolute as was pointed in 
S v Bailey207 in which a defendant relied on his right to privacy as a defence for not having 
his status furnished as compulsory information in terms of the Statistics Act.208 The court 
held that interference with the plaintiff’s right to privacy was lawful, because it was justified 
by some superior legal right, namely the Statistics Act.209  
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security legislation redundant?’ available at http://uir.unisa.ac.za/handle/10500/2660, accessed on 17 February 
2017. 
204 Snail ‘An overview of South African e-consumer law in the context of the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act (part 2)’ (2007) 15 (1) Journal of Business Law 54.  
205 Neethling … et al Neethling’s Law of Personality 2 ed (2005) 334ff. 
206 ibid 334 ff. 
207 S v Bailey 1981 (4) SA 187 (N) at 6. 
208 Statistics Act 66 of 1976. 
209 ibid.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5. E-COMMERCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter seeks to analyze the UK online privacy and data protection laws by discussing 
the Human Rights Act of 19981 as well as both the Data Protection Act of 19842 and the Data 
Protection Act of 1998.3 To avoid confusion in this discussion, the Data Protection Act of 
1984 will be referred to as the (1984 DPA) and the Data Protection Act of 1998 will be 
referred to as the (1998 DPA). A brief discussion of the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) 
Regulations 20024 and the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 20035 will 
also ensue.  
This chapter will also briefly analyze other UK legislation containing some elements dealing 
with privacy. These Acts to be discussed are the Consumer Credit Act,6 Rehabilitation of 
Offenders Act,7 Telecommunications Act,8 Police Act,9 Broadcasting Act,10 Protection from 
Harassment Act,11 Access to Medical Reports Act,12 Access to Health Records Act,13 Health 
and Social Care Act14  and the Crime and Disorder Act15 . Although these statutes were 
                                                          
1 Human Rights Act 1998, Chapter 42. 
2 Data Protection Act 1984, Chapter 35. 
3 Data Protection Act 1998, Chapter 29. 
4 Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, No. 2013. 
5 Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 2003, No. 2426. 
6 Consumer Credit Act of 1974, Chapter 39. 
7 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, Chapter 53. 
8 Telecommunications Act 1984, Chapter 12. 
9 Police Act 1997, Chapter 50. 
10 Broadcasting Act 1996, Chapter 55. 
11 Protection from Harassment Act 1997, Chapter 40. 
12 Access to Medical Reports Act 1988, Chapter 28. 
13 Access to Health Records Act 1990, Chapter 23. 
14 The Health and Social Care Act 2001, Chapter 15. 
15 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Chapter 37. 
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enacted and adopted in the UK, some of those enacted before 1998 have now been repealed 
in part or replaced in full by the 1998 DPA.16  
5.2. Common Law Protection of Privacy and Data Before the Incorporation of the 
Human Rights Act 1998,  Chapter 42 
The Human Rights Act of 199817 is an Act of Parliament of the UK which received Royal 
Assent on 9 November 1998, and mostly came into force on 2 October 2000 in Scotland and 
in the UK it was fully adopted and came into effect on 1 October 2001.18  
Before the enactment of the Human Rights Act of 1998,19 the right to privacy was protected 
indirectly by the common law which covered issues such as the breach of confidence, 
conspiracy, copyright, breach of contract, negligence, trespass, private nuisance, defamation, 
legal professional privilege, and certain statutory remedies.20 Although the 1998 DPA does 
not abolish any of the above remedies, the protection they provide to privacy in personal 
information is direct, but incidental and limited.21 
In Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Robert Megarry held that English law 
did not recognize a right to privacy and that the tapping of a telephone conversation by the 
Post Office could therefore not amount to a breach of such a right because such a right does 
not exist in common law.22 In Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd., the court dealt 
with the common law of confidentiality.23 Lord Justice Keith pointed out that the right to 
                                                          
16 The South African Law Reform Commission ‘Discussion Paper: Privacy and Protection’ (2006) 386. P Reid 
‘'Regulating' online data privacy’ (2004) 2 (3) Script-ed Journal 489. 
17 Human Rights Act 1998, Chapter 42. 
18 L B Cardonsky ‘Towards a meaningful right to privacy in the United Kingdom’ (2002) 20 (2) Boston 
University International Law Journal 399. 
19 Human Rights Act 1998, Chapter 42. 
20 L B Cardonsky ‘Towards a meaningful right to privacy in the United Kingdom’ (2002) 20 (2) Boston 
University International Law Journal 399. 
21 A Roos ‘The law of data (privacy) protection: A comparative and theoretical study’ (unpublished LLD 
dissertation, University of South Africa, 2003) 247. 
22 Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (No2) [1979] 2 All ER 620 at para 2. 
23 Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd. No. 2, 1 A.C. 109 (H.L. 1990). 
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personal privacy must be protected by the law.24  
The old English case of Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62, reiterated the sentiments of 
Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner25 by pointing out that in English law, common 
law does not recognize a general right to privacy.26 Glidewell, LJ stated that: 
“It is ... invasion of privacy which underlies the plaintiff’s complaint. Yet it 
alone, however gross, does not entitle him to relief in English law”27 
Although the UK common law does not protect and does not provide for a specific right to 
privacy, infringement of privacy could be actionable at common law if a breach of 
confidence could be proved.28 In Terrapin v Builders' Supply Co (Hayes) Ltd,29 the court 
stated that under the rules of ‘equity’, one who receives information under express or implied 
conditions of confidence is under a duty not to reveal it without consent.30  
In two other separate cases, the court also stated that under the rules of ‘equity’, an action 
may also be brought for breach of commercial confidence where a person uses another's 
confidential material for his own commercial gain.31  
Using the principles set forth in the case of Morison v Moat, in Thomas Marshall (Exporters) 
Ltd v Guinle,32  commercial information  such as the names and telex addresses of the 
company's manufacturers and suppliers and their individual contacts; details of the company's 
current negotiations; information as to the requirements of the company's customers; the 
                                                          
24 ibid. 
25 Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (No2) [1979] 2 All ER 620. 
26 Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62, 70. 
27 ibid. 
28 Saltman Engineering v Campbell Engineering [1948] 65 RPC 203. 
29 Terrapin v Builders' Supply Co (Hayes) Ltd [1967] RPC 375. 
30 See also Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 at 281. 
31 Morison v Moat [1851] 9 Hare 241. See also Saltman Engineering v Campbell Engineering [1948] 65 RPC 
203. 
32 Thomas Marshall (Exporters) Ltd v Guinle [1978] 3 WLR 116. 
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company's new ranges, actual or proposed, the company's samples and negotiated prices paid 
to the company by customers were held to be capable of being confidential.33 
In Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG, the duty of confidence was also said to arise from any type 
of a professional relationship like that between an employer and an employee.34 In turn, in 
Golder v United Kingdom, the court also stated that a prisoner has a resounding right to 
communicate with his or her lawyer.35 
The professional relationship of a lawyer is seen in Lord Ashburton v Pape, which 
established that a solicitor has a duty of confidentiality in respect of any information received 
directly from a client. 36  In Hunter v Mann, the professional relationship of medical 
practitioner was described as a duty of a doctor not to disclose information obtained in his 
professional capacity without the affirmed consent of his or her patient.37 The professional 
relationship in Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England was said to be an 
implied term in the banker's contract with the customer that the banker shall not disclose the 
customers’ accounts and transactions arising thereto.38  
In Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd, the defendant eavesdropped on a telephone 
conversation using a radio-telephone to gain access to a private conversation.39 The court 
pointed out that in circumstances where there is no professional relationship existing, the 
courts will give the duty of confidence if the information is confidential and there is a need to 
protect the privacy of another person.40  
                                                          
33 ibid. 
34 Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 1 All ER 577. 
35 Golder v United Kingdom (1975) 1 EHRR 524. 
36 Lord Ashburton v Pape [1913] 2 Ch 469. 
37 Hunter v Mann [1974] 1 QB 767. 
38 Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461. 
39 Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 892.  
40 ibid. 
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The English common law recognized the protection of privacy rights that is substantive in 
protecting the right not to disclose confidential information on family relationships.41 The 
case of Argyll v Argyll, applied this substantive common law when dealing with the Duchess 
of Argyll and the Duke of Argyll in a case relating to trust and personal privacy in the 
marriage.42 The court gave an injunction preventing one spouse from disclosing to the public 
any of the intimate details of their marriage.43 The court in Moore v East Cleveland rejected 
the definition of family unit which limits ‘family’ to occupancy of a dwelling to members of 
the same family.44   
In A v B, the UK went on to expand the ground which common law covers in protecting 
privacy by allowing a professional football player to prohibit a certain newspaper company 
from publishing information about his extra-marital affair.45 The court in this and other cases 
of a similar nature stated that confidences must refer to information which is not in the public 
domain.46  
For that information to be disclosed there must be some form of relationship between the 
discloser of the information (the data controller) and recipient of that information (the data 
receiver), unless if consent has been given by the interested party (the data subject).47 
5.3. The Data Protection Act 1984 and The Data Protection Act 1998 
To investigate invasions of privacy in the private sector, Sir Kenneth Younger was appointed 
by the UK government to lead a committee in the late 1960s known as the Privacy Committee 
                                                          
41 Argyll v Argyll, [1965] 2 W.L.R. 790 (Chancery Div.). 
42 ibid. 
43 ibid. 
44 Moore v East Cleveland (1977) 431 US 494, 52 LEd 2d 531, 97 SCt 1932. 
45 A v B [2001] 1 All ER 449 (QB). 
46 Cardonsky ‘Towards a meaningful right to privacy in the United Kingdom’ (2002) 20 (2) Boston University 
International Law Journal 400. 
47 ibid. 
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of the Society of Conservative Lawyers (Conservative Political Centre). 48  Following the 
committee’s report, the government issued two white papers on privacy.49  
The Privacy Committee of the Society of Conservative Lawyers, when discussing the price of 
privacy in July 1971, called for legislation from the government which would protect 
personal information by introducing the right to privacy.50 The call was made because of the 
increase of personal information being stored on computers.51  
It was the USA, California case of Kerby v Hal Roach Studios from which the Privacy 
Committee of the Society of Conservative Lawyers coined their definition of what was to be 
privacy in the UK.52 
In Kerby v Hal Roach Studios, the court defined the right to privacy by stating that: 
“Privacy is the right to live one's life in seclusion, without being subjected 
to unwarranted and undesired publicity. In short, it is the right to be left 
alone.”53 
The UK government also adopted the privacy concept by the European Convention of 
Human Rights54 which was also implemented from the Human Rights Act of 1998.55 Article 
8 of the Convention provides: 
(1) “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence.”56 
                                                          
48 V Collins ‘Privacy in the United Kingdom: A Right conferred by Europe?’ (1994) 1 (3) International Journal 
of Law and Information Technology 291. 
49 See White paper ‘Computers and Privacy’ (Cmnd 6353), (1975) and the ‘Computers: Safeguards for Privacy’ 
(Cmnd 6354), (1975). 
50 See Note 48 above at 292. 
51 At 291-292. 
52 Kerby v Hal Roach Studios (1942) 53 Cal App 2d 207. 
53 Supra at 210. See also Olmstead v United States 277 US 438 at 478. 
54 See Article 8 of The European Convention on Human Rights 1953. 
55 P Reid ‘'Regulating' online data privacy’ (2004) 2 (3) Script-ed Journal 490.  
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Another committee which was set up by the UK government was the Data Protection 
Committee chaired by Sir Norman Lindop to safeguard individual privacy and it reported in 
1978.57 
The UK does not have a written Constitution and their common law does not in any way 
recognize the right to privacy. 58  For this reason, after consulting with all the various 
committees59 the UK government, established the Data Protection Act of 198460 which was 
created and adopted for the protection against any misuse of data or information in the 
automated processing of personal information.61  
Before the 1984 DPA was enacted, the UK had no legislation giving individuals the right to 
privacy although it had already been a party to treaties that recognized the right to privacy.62 
In order to protect individual’s personal information, the 1984 DPA accorded every person 
the right to have their data held by another person protected.63   
In July 1998, the 1998 DPA was approved by parliament and in March 2000 it was signed 
into law as an update of the 1984 DPA.64 This was a way of aligning the United Kingdom 
privacy and data protection laws with the European Union Data Protection Directive 
(95/46/EC) of 24 October 1995 which deals with basic privacy rights when processing 
personal data since the 1984 DPA only regulated the use of automated files about 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
56 See Article 8 of The European Convention on Human Rights 1953. 
57 ‘Report of the Committee on Data Protection’ (Cmnd 7341), (1978). 
58 The South African Law Reform Commission ‘Discussion Paper: Privacy and Protection’ (2006) 385. See also 
Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62, 70 and Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (No2) [1979] 2 All ER 
620. 
59 See for example, the Younger Committee, the Lindop Committee and the Privacy Committee of the Society 
of Conservative Lawyers. 
60 Data Protection Act 1984, Chapter 35. 
61 E Taylor ‘UK schools, CCTV and the Data Protection Act 1998’ (2011) 26 (1) Journal of Education Policy 3. 
62 Collins ‘Privacy in the United Kingdom: A right conferred by Europe?’ (1994) 1 (3) International Journal of 
Law and Information Technology 290.  
63 ibid 290.  
64 The South African Law Reform Commission ‘Discussion Paper: Privacy and Protection’ (2006) 385. Taylor 
see note 61 above. 
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individuals.65  
This European Union Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) was supposed to be implemented 
by member states before 24 October 1998 and it was only Sweden which met the deadline.66 
The purpose of this dissertation prohibits an exhaustive discussion of the entire 1998 DPA; 
therefore attention will only be given to sections as well as schedules that are of particular 
interest in relation to online privacy protection. 
5.3.1. Applicability of the Data Protection Act of 1998 in the UK 
Unlike the 1984 DPA which only regulated the use of automated files about individuals, the 
1988 DPA applies to paper-based records as well as automated or electronic records. 67 
However, a number of the basic provisions of the 1984 DPA and the 1998 DPA are similar. 
‘Data’ according to the 1998 DPA means information which: 
“(a) is being processed by means of equipment operating automatically in 
response to instructions given for that purpose, (b) is recorded with the 
intention that it should be processed by means of such equipment, (c) is 
recorded as part of a relevant filing system or with the intention that it 
should form part of a relevant filing system, (d) does not fall within 
paragraph (a), (b) or (c) but forms part of an accessible record as defined by 
section 68;or (e) is recorded information held by a public authority and does 
not fall within any of paragraphs (a) to (d)”68 
                                                          
65 ibid. See also D Beyleveld ‘Data protection and genetics: Medical research and the public good’ (2007) 18 (1) 
King’s Law Journal 276 
66 Reid ‘'Regulating' online data privacy’ (2004) 2 (3) Script-ed Journal 492. 
67 See Section 1 (1) of the Data Protection Act 1998, Chapter 29. 
68 ibid. 
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Data as defined in the 1998 DPA refers to paper-based records as well as automated or 
electronic records and applies to information that is being processed whether the information 
is in the process of being recorded or already exists in recorded form.69  
5.3.2. Personal Data and Sensitive Personal Data 
The 1998 DPA 70  distinguishes between personal data and sensitive personal data. 71 
Conditions applied to sensitive personal data are much stricter than those applied when 
processing just personal data.72 In Michael John Durant v Financial Services Authority,73 the 
court pointed out that sensitive personal data according to the 1998 DPA is not just data in 
digital form, but includes manual data that is structured and readily accessible.74 
According to the 1998 DPA, sensitive personal data is information relating to a data subject’s 
race, ethnicity, political opinions, religious beliefs or information of such a nature and the 
physical or mental condition of a data subject. 75  It also includes the sexual life and 
commission or alleged commission of any offence by the data subject.76  
According to Lorber: 
“The concept of 'personal data' is fundamental to data protection legislation. 
If data is personal, a data controller has strict duties with which it must 
comply; if data is not personal, no data protection duties apply and, subject 
                                                          
69 ibid.  
70 Data Protection Act 1998, Chapter 29. 
71 R Ananthapur ‘India's new data protection legislation’ (2011) 8 (2) Script-ed Journal 195. See Section 1 of 
the Data Protection Act 1998, Chapter 29. 
72 See Section 1, schedule 2 & schedule 3 of the Data Protection Act 1998, Chapter 29. 
73 Michael John Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746; [2004] FSR 28. 
74 See Section 1 (c) of the Data Protection Act 1998, Chapter 29. 
75 See Part I, Section 2 of the Data Protection Act 1998, Chapter 29. 
76 ibid. 
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of course to any other legal constraints, the data controller can do whatever 
it likes with the data.”77 
If the data in question is not ‘personal data’, it is considered too wide in scope to protect it as 
private information and if data is ‘personal data’ there is a danger of failing to give enough 
protection since the scope of information protection will be too narrow.78 The reason why the 
1998 DPA79 distinguishes between sensitive personal data and just personal data results from 
a judgement handed down in Michael John Durant v Financial Services Authority80 in which 
the court gave a narrow interpretation of personal data.81   
The Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC 24 October 1995) from which the 1998 DPA 
adopted some of its sections on privacy, defined personal data as any information relating to 
an identified or identifiable natural person (data subject).82 It also defines an identifiable 
person as a person who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to 
an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, 
mental, economic, cultural or social identity.83 
The 1998 DPA also defines personal data as information which relates to a living individual 
who can be identified from the data and other information which is in the possession of, or is 
likely to come into the possession of a data controller and includes any expression of opinion 
about the individual.84 It is noteworthy that personal data must relate only to a person who is 
alive.  
                                                          
77 S Allison ‘The concept of "personal data" under the data protection regime’ (2009) 48 (1) Edinburgh Student 
Law Review 48. S Lorber ‘Data protection and subject access requests’ (2004) 179 (1) International Law 
Journal 183.  
78 Allison see note 77 above. 
79 See Section 2 of the Data Protection Act 1998, Chapter 29.  
80 Michael John Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746; [2004] FSR 28. 
81 Allison see note 77 above. 
82 See Chapter 1, Article 2 (a) of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC 24 October 1995). 
83 ibid. 
84 See Section 1 (1) of the Data Protection Act 1998, Chapter 29.  
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It can be noted that the two definitions above are very similar and they mean one and the 
same thing, although the wording is not alike. However the definition in the 1998 DPA85 
added the phrase ‘likely to come into the possession of’.86 This would mean that, if a data 
controller possesses an encrypted database but does not possess, or is unlikely to come into 
possession of, the key for decryption, then the information will not constitute personal 
information.87   
The 1998 DPA gives the data subject the right to have access to their data being processed by 
the data controller or on behalf of that data controller.88  Although this section presents the 
presumption that a data subject must be informed about any data involving them, the right to 
access of information is not absolute due to a number of miscellaneous exemptions set out in 
schedule 7.89 
The 1998 DPA also specifies that: 
“Unless the context otherwise requires— 
(a) 'obtaining' or 'recording', in relation to personal data, includes obtaining 
or recording the information to be contained in the data, and 
(b) 'using' or 'disclosing', in relation to personal data, includes using or 
disclosing the information contained in the data.”90 
 
 
                                                          
85 See Section 1 (1) of the Data Protection Act 1998, Chapter 29. 
86 Allison ‘The concept of "personal data" under the data protection regime’ (2009) 48 (1) Edinburgh Student 
Law Review 48. 
87 ibid 52.   
88 See Section 7 (1) (a) of the Data Protection Act 1998, Chapter 29. 
89 C McDougall ‘An introduction to the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Freedom of Information Act 2000: 
Part I’ (2002) 7 (1) Judicial Review 204. See also Schedule 7 of the Data Protection Act 1998, Chapter 29. 
90 See Section 1 (2) (a) and 1 (2) (b) of the Data Protection Act 1998, Chapter 29. 
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5.3.3. Data subject, Data Controller and Data Processor 
The 1998 DPA also defines a “data subject” as an individual who is the subject of personal 
data.91 The definition given by the 1998 DPA allows third parties about whom personal 
information is processed, to be regarded as data subjects.  
The 1998 DPA also defines a “data controller”  
“as a person who (either alone or jointly or in common with other persons) 
determines the purposes for which and the manner in which any personal 
data are, or are to be, processed”.92  
A “data processor”, in relation to personal data, means any person (other than an employee of 
the data controller) who processes the data on behalf of the data controller.93 
5.3.4. E-commerce and Medical Privacy Rights  
In R v Dep't of Health ex parte Source Informatics Ltd., the British Appellate court held that, 
for whatever purpose they wish, pharmacists can use a patient’s personal data even without 
authorization or consent.94 This includes online information submitted by a patient when 
making a medical transaction.95 Data that could be obtained included but is not limited to the 
physician's name, the date of prescription, the product and the quantity prescribed.96 
                                                          
91 See Section 1 (1) of the Data Protection Act 1998, Chapter 29. 
92 ibid. 
93 ibid. 
94 R v Dep't of Health ex parte Source Informatics Ltd., [2000] 1 All E.R. 786 (C.A.), rev'g 4 All E.R. 185 (Q.B. 
1999) at 796-97. I Walden ‘Anonymising personal data’ (2002) 10 (2) International Journal of Law and 
Information Technology 224. 
95 ibid at 797. 
96 Y F Dunkel ‘Medical privacy rights in anonymous data: Discussion of rights in the United Kingdom and the 
United States in light of the source informatics cases’ (2001) 23 (41) The Loyola of Los Angeles International 
and Comparative Law Review 42. 
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This was countered by the British Department of Health which issued a policy prohibiting 
any pharmacist from selling any patient’s information relating to prescription data.97 The 
British Department of Health Policy on disclosure of information stated:  
"Under common law... the general rule is that information given in 
confidence [by a patient] may not be disclosed without the consent of the 
provider of the information.”98 
This policy document resulted in the doctors and pharmacists refusing to sell prescription 
drug information to any data collection companies such as (Source Informatics Limited) for 
fear it would result in the breach of confidence of the patients.99 The court agreed with the 
policy document by dismissing an appeal made by Source Informatics Limited and it 
reiterated the policy document’s position by stating that use by the pharmacist of confidential 
information was a clear breach of confidence.100 
This position follows the 1998 DPA which stated that information must only be used for the 
purposes for which it was obtained and any use contrary to this provision amounts to a breach 










101 See Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 of the Data Protection Act 1998, Chapter 29. 
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5.3.5. Lack of a Definition of Consent in the Data Protection Act of 1998 and the Processing 
of Personal Data for Direct Marketing in E-Commerce 
The 1998 DPA and the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 2003102 only 
allow the processing of personal information by the data controller if consent has been given 
by the data subject.103  
Although the word ‘consent’ is mentioned in Schedule 2 of the 1998 DPA as a condition for 
processing personal information, it is however not defined in the same Act.104 Schedule 1 of 
the 1998 DPA states that: 
"In determining for the purposes of the first principle [i.e. the fairness 
principle] whether personal data are processed fairly, regard is to be had to 
the method by which they are obtained, including in particular whether any 
person from whom they are obtained is deceived or misled as to the purpose 
or purposes for which they are to be processed."105 
The lack of the definition of ‘consent’ in the 1998 DPA  does not, however, make the 
processing of information without consent legal since schedule 1 does state that the personal 
data must be obtained and processed fairly.106 The inclusion of this schedule in the 1998 DPA 
implies that consent of the data subject must be given freely and that the consent must be an 
informed one before personal data is processed.107  
                                                          
102 Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 2003, No 2426.  
103 A Mitton ‘Data protection and web 2.0: Whose data is it anyway?’ (2007) 3 (1) Convergence 94. See also 
Schedule 2 of the Data Protection Act 1998, Chapter 29. 
104 Kosta ‘Construing the meaning of "opt-out"- An analysis of the European, U.K. and German data protection 
legislation’ (2015) 1 (1) European Data Protection Law 21.   
105 See Schedule 1 of the Data Protection Act 1998, Chapter 29. 
106 See Note 104 above.   
107 ibid.  
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It therefore follows that any processing of personal data without the consent of the concerned 
individual amounts to the invasion of privacy.108 The only exception is if, and only if, this is 
done following the exemptions stipulated in part four of the 1998 DPA.109 
5.3.6. Implied Consent in Data Processing  
The 1998 DPA prohibits the data controller from processing or from beginning to process 
personal data belonging to a data subject if that data subject through a notice writes to him or 
her ordering that he/she stop processing or begin to process the data for direct marketing.110 
According to the 1998 DPA, direct marketing means the communication by whatever means 
of any advertising or marketing material which is directed to particular individuals.111  
With the business-oriented approach adopted by the UK construing ‘opt-out’ as an implied 
consent in which if the data subject does not take actions (for example, failure to tick a box) 
consent would be assumed.112 The ‘opt-out consent’ as it is known in the UK literature must 
not be in fine print for it to be accepted as a valid consent since the data subject may not have 
been able to read the material sentence or may not have seen the box at all.113  
The UK Information Commissioner stated that organizations should not infer consent if an 
individual does not respond to an electronic mail communication.114 The UK Information 
Commissioner however also stated that when the sender has clearly given the opportunity to 
the potential recipient to object to receiving unsolicited electronic communications and the 
                                                          
108 ibid.  
109 See part IV (Section 27 to Section 39) of the Data Protection Act 1998, Chapter 29. 
110 See Section 11 (1) and 11 (2) of the Data Protection Act 1998, Chapter 29. 
111 See Section 11 (3) of the Data Protection Act 1998, Chapter 29.  
112 Kosta ‘Construing the meaning of "opt-out"- An analysis of the European, U.K. and German data protection 
legislation’ (2015) 1 (1) European Data Protection Law 23.   
113 R Jay Data Protection Law and Practice 3 ed (2007) 65.   
114 See Note 112 above.   
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latter does not make use of this option, consent can then be implied thus supporting the 
position of the 1998 DPA.115  
Besides an opportunity being given to opt out before personal information is processed, the 
information must not be sensitive personal data.116 As stated in paragraphs above, sensitive 
personal data is described in the 1998 DPA as consisting of information relating to the data 
subject’s race, ethnicity, political opinions, religious beliefs or information of such a nature 
and the physical or mental condition of a data subject.117 It also includes the sexual life and 
commission or alleged commission by him of any offence by the data subject.118 
5.4. Human Rights Act 1998 
As mentioned in the paragraphs above, the Human Rights Act of 1998 119  is an Act of 
Parliament of the UK which received royal assent on 9 November 1998, and came into force 
on 2 October 2000 in Scotland and in the UK it came into effect on 1 October 2001.120 In 
2001, the Human Rights Act of 1998121 was finally enacted fully adopted in the UK.122  
In Earl and Countess Spencer v United Kingdom Applications Nos 28851/95 and 
28852/95,123 the application was deemed inadmissible because the domestic law remedies 
had not been exhausted.124 Prior to the adoption and enactment of the Human Rights Act of 
1998125 in the UK, any applicant who wished to sue someone for violating their privacy right, 
                                                          
115 ibid 23. 
116 I Lloyd Information Technology Law 5 ed (2008) 32-33. 
117 See Part I, Section 2 of the Data Protection Act 1998, Chapter 29. 
118 ibid. 
119 Human Rights Act 1998, Chapter 42. 
120 Cardonsky ‘Towards A meaningful right to privacy in the United Kingdom’ (2002) 20 (2) Boston University 
International Law Journal 399. 
121 See Note 119 above. 
122 See Note 120 above. 
123 Earl and Countess Spencer v United Kingdom Applications Nos 28851/95 and 28852/95. 
124 ibid. 
125 See Note 119 above. 
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could appeal to the European Court of Human Rights provided all the available domestic law 
remedies had been exhausted.126 
Section 2 (1) of the Human Rights Act of 1998127 states that the court in dealing with matters 
concerning human rights must consider judgements, decisions, declarations, and advisory 
opinions of the European Convention on Human Rights,128 and any other relevant opinions 
and decisions as set out in Section 2 (1) (b ) to ( d) of the Human Rights Act 1998.129 
It was the case of Kaye v Robertson which depicted the need to enumerate the right to privacy 
in the UK since there is no Constitution to guarantee this right at any moment.130 The English 
actor Kaye had undergone brain surgery and during his recovery, he was unable to prevent an 
interviewer from entering his hospital room to conduct an interview since he was heavily 
sedated. 131  While ignoring all the notices outside the hospital room forbidding entry, 
Robertson proceeded with the interview on behalf of Sunday Sport.132  
The case was brought before the court by Kaye in order to stop Sunday Sport from publishing 
the interview and the pictures, but the court nevertheless did not grant the interdict sought 
after.133 It pointed out that while there was indeed the invasion of privacy, there was no 
legislation which guaranteed the right to privacy.134  
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The UK introduced the right to privacy by incorporating the European Convention on Human 
Rights 135  (ECHR) (formally the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms) into law.136 The European Convention on Human Rights guarantees 
individuals a general right to privacy and since its adoption by the UK into law, it has 
provided for rights to be directly enforced by the UK government.137 The Human Rights Act 
of 1998 incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights which protects privacy in 
articles 8 (1) and 8 (2).138 
Domestic courts in the UK now apply article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
which provides for a right to respect one's "private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence".139 Both article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Human Rights Act of 1998 however do not provide for the extent of the right to privacy over 
the right of freedom of expression.140 Due to the application of article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights in the UK, the courts have, as stated in Douglas v Hello! Ltd  
"…reached a point at which it can be said with confidence that the law 
recognizes and will appropriately protect a right of personal privacy."141 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights extends to protect an individual from 
the acts of other individuals.142 This means that the Human Rights Act of 1998 also applies to 
relationships vertically as well as horizontally.  
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Halford v United Kingdom was the leading case in the application of article 8 to the 
workplace.143 Alison Halford, the assistant chief constable of the Merseyside Police, had a 
telephone at work which was designated for her personal use but subject to covert monitoring 
by the police authority in order to gain information about a sex discrimination case which Ms 
Halford was bringing against them.144  
The court found that the employer breached the employee's right to respect for private life 
and correspondence which is a right guaranteed by article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.145 The decision was based on the reasonable expectation that such calls would 
remain private. 146  Although the Human Rights Act of 1998 was created to govern the 
relationships between the state and the individuals, since its adoption by the UK legislature, it 
also applies horizontally in private actions.147 
According to the jurisprudence developed by the European Court of Human Rights, when 
sensitive personal data (which includes health data, hence genetic data for medical research) 
is processed without explicit consent, article 8.1 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights is engaged.148 This means that if there is explicit consent, there is no breach of privacy 
or confidentiality and in effect, the duties that would otherwise arise are negated, and no 
justification is required for the action in question.149  
However, if there is no explicit consent, then prima facie duties exist and there will be a 
breach of privacy or confidentiality unless justification can be found under article 8.2 for 
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breaching or overriding the right enshrined in article 8.1 which was adopted by the United 
Kingdom as binding legislation.150  
Section 2 (1) and section 8 of the Human Rights Act of 1998 give the domestic courts the 
power to give an order or to grant any remedies or relief for a breach of the rights given by 
the European Convention on Human Rights provided that such order, right or relief is within 
the powers of the court.151  
Section 3 of the Human Rights Act points out that when interpreting any legislation, 
interpretation given to any such act must favour the provisions of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. 152  However, any interpretation given which is incompatible with the 
European Convention on Human Rights is not rendered invalid due to its incompatibility.153  
According to section 6 of the Human Rights Act, that unless a statute positively prevents it, 
public authorities and courts must apply the European Convention on Human Rights.154 If 
there is an inconsistency between the Human Rights Act of 1998 and the European 
Convention on Human Rights provisions, the Human Rights Act will take priority over the 
European Convention on Human Rights to the point of the inconsistency.155  
5.4.1. Effectiveness of the Human Rights Act 1998 
The Human Rights Act of 1998 is only enforceable against public authorities, thus limiting 
the protection of the right to privacy by the Human Rights Act of 1998 as it essentially 
strengthens the rights of individuals against the state and not individuals.156 However, in 
Douglas v Hello!, the court took into account the provisions of the Human Rights Act of 
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1998 and article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, although the action was 
brought against a newspaper company and not against the government.157 
The Human Rights Act of 1998 is also less effective because of its implementation 
mechanism and weak remedial scheme, since, according to the Human Rights Act of 1998, a 
person who feels aggrieved by an act or omission on the part of a public authority which is in 
contravention of any right in terms of the European Convention on Human Rights, may 
challenge the act or omission in court.158 The public authority is exposed to criminal penalties 
if found to have acted outside the confines of the European Convention on Human Rights.159  
The court in circumstances like the one above, may, within its normal powers, grant a remedy 
that it considers reasonable and appropriate.160  
The Human Rights Act of 1998 is also less effective in circumstances where the legislation is 
incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights and a declaration of 
incompatibility is made.161 Even though a declaration of incompatibility is pronounced, such 
a declaration does not change the law, or its validity, or continuing operation, neither is it 
binding on the parties to the proceedings.162 This is only left to the parliament to change the 
law or the minister may by order amend the offending legislation.163  
5.5. The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 
Modelled after the European Union Electronic Commerce Directive 2000, The Electronic 
Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 were published in 2002 by the UK government 
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and it applies to virtually every electronic business. 164  The Electronic Commerce (EC 
Directive) Regulations 2002 were established to harmonise the rules regulating electronic 
commerce throughout Europe by implementing the European Union's Electronic Commerce 
Directive 2000 into the UK law.165 
The main objective of the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 is to 
bolster the single market by ensuring the free movement of “information society services” 
(ISSs) across the European Economic Area and to encourage greater use of e-commerce by 
clarifying the rights and obligations of businesses and consumers.166  
The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 only apply to people who are 
involved in the sale of goods or services to businesses or consumers on the internet or by 
email or those who advertise on the internet or by email.167 The Electronic Commerce (EC 
Directive) Regulations 2002 apply only to online trade and advertising and do not apply to 
online activities that are not of a commercial nature.168  
Anyone who provides or receives a service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, 
by means of electronic equipment for the processing and storage of data and at the individual 
request of the recipient is bound by the provisions of The Electronic Commerce (EC 
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Directive) Regulations 2002.169 As entailed in chapter two of this thesis, online commercial 
activities entail a business-to-business as well as any business-to-consumer online services.170  
Put in e-commerce terms, every company which operates a virtual world website must 
comply with the provisions of The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, if 
that virtual website offers merchandise or services, failure of which will lead to prosecution 
by the relevant authorities.171 Any virtual world website that advertises goods or services 
online should comply with The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002.172 
“Online” in this case would include, via the internet, on interactive television, as well as by 
mobile telephones as the internet and mobile phones are now the primary means of access to 
virtual forums.173    
According to The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, a consumer must 
be a natural person who is acting for purposes other than those of his trade, business or 
profession and must be a recipient of the service. 174  In terms of the definition in the 
Electronic Directive (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, a consumer is a “recipient of the 
service”.175 The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 states that, in any 
form, commercial communications is defined as communications that is designed to promote, 
directly or indirectly, the goods, services or image of any person pursuing a commercial, 
industrial or craft activity or exercising a regulated profession.176  
The definition of commercial communications given by The Electronic Commerce (EC 
Directive) Regulations 2002 includes any online forms of communication, including websites 
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and emails.177 Some other forms of commercial communication such as mobile text messages 
or electronic greeting cards are not considered to fall within the definition of “commercial 
communication”178 
Although the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 apply virtually to 
almost every electronic business, 179 there are other various transactions to which it does not 
apply, chief among them being the field of taxation. 180  The Electronic Commerce (EC 
Directive) Regulations 2002 also do not apply to questions relating to information society 
services covered by the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, the Telecoms Data Protection 
Directive 97/66/EC, and Directive 2002/58/EC.181 The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) 
Regulations 2002 do not apply to questions relating to agreements or practices governed by 
cartel law nor to betting, gaming or lotteries which involve wagering a stake with monetary 
value.182 
Regulation 6 of the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 requires that the 
information society service providers should, in a manner that is “easily, directly and 
permanently accessible” make certain information available to their recipients. 183  The 
information that the information society service provider is supposed to provide to the 
recipients includes, but not limited to: 
“(a) the name of the service provider; 
(b) the geographic address at which the service provider is established; 
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178 ibid at 7. 
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(c) the details of the service provider, including his electronic mail address, 
which make it possible to contact him rapidly and communicate with him in 
a direct and effective manner; 
(d) where the service provider is registered in a trade or similar register 
available to the public, details of the register in which the service provider 
is entered and his registration number, or equivalent means of identification 
in that register; 
(e) where the provision of the service is subject to an authorisation scheme, 
the particulars of the relevant supervisory authority; 
(f) where the service provider exercises a regulated profession; 
(i) the details of any professional body or similar institution with which the 
service provider is registered; 
(ii) his professional title and the member State where that title has been 
granted; 
(iii) a reference to the professional rules applicable to the service provider 
in the member State of establishment and the means to access them; and 
(g) where the service provider undertakes an activity that is subject to value 
added tax, the identification number referred to in Article 22(1) of the sixth 
Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the 
laws of the member States relating to turnover taxes—Common system of 
value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (1).”184   
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If the information society service provider makes mention of prices in his email to the 
information society services recipient, then those prices referred to shall be indicated clearly 
and unambiguously and, in particular, shall indicate whether they are inclusive of tax and 
delivery costs.185 Again this provision does not describe how “clearly and unambiguously 
and, in particular” are to be met in practical terms.186  
Regulation 7 provides that any form of communication designed to promote either directly or 
indirectly, the goods, services or image of any person pursuing a commercial, industrial or 
craft activity must: 
 “(a) be clearly identifiable as a commercial communication; 
(b) clearly identify the person on whose behalf the commercial 
communication is made; 
(c) clearly identify as such any promotional offer (including any discount, 
premium or gift) and ensure that any conditions which must be met to 
qualify for it are easily accessible, and presented clearly and 
unambiguously; and 
(d) clearly identify as such any promotional competition or game and 
ensure that any conditions for participation are easily accessible and 
presented clearly and unambiguously.”187 
The provisions of regulation 7 of The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 
do not prescribe how the requirement to make commercial communications “clearly 
identifiable” should be met in practice. 188 
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The provisions of regulation 8 of The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 
state that all unsolicited commercial communications by email (for example an email 
advertising goods or services which is sent to a recipient who has not requested it), must be 
“clearly and unambiguously identifiable as such” when it gets to the recipient. 189  This 
provision has been stipulated for the sole purpose of ensuring that the recipients can delete 
the email or block the sender without the need to actually open and read message send.190 
5.6. Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive)  Regulations 2003 (PEC 
Regulations) 
The Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (PEC 
Regulations) came into force on the 11th of December 2003.191 The European Union passed a 
Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications known as The Unsolicited 
Communications Order,192 under the European Communities Act of 1973.193  The Order’s 
recital number 40 gives the aim of the directive which states that: 
“Safeguards should be provided for subscribers against intrusion of their 
privacy by unsolicited communications for direct marketing purposes in 
particular by means of automated calling machines, telefaxes, and e-mails, 
including SMS messages. These forms of unsolicited commercial 
communications may on the one hand be relatively easy and cheap to send 
and on the other may impose a burden and/or cost on the recipient.”194 
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In the UK, the Directive was implemented by the adoption of the Privacy and Electronic 
Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003.195 
Regulation 6 of the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 
prohibits the free use of an electronic communications network to store information, or to 
gain access to information stored, in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user unless the 
requirements sets out in the same regulation are met.196 Before this information can be stored 
or before access is gained in the terminal equipment of a subscriber, clear and comprehensive 
information about the purposes of the storage of, or access to, that information must be given 
to the subscriber and the subscriber must be given an opportunity to refuse the storage of or 
access to that information.197 
Consent to the storage of and/or access to information can be given by means of any 
appropriate web browser settings or any other application that is linked to it.198 
Organizations or companies that carry out their marketing businesses by mobile phones, 
emails, fax or text messages are bound by the provisions of the Privacy and Electronic 
Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (PEC Regulations) which provides some 
legal constrains. 199  The regulations of the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC 
Directive) Regulations 2003 (PEC Regulations) apply to all the electronic communications 
services as defined by section 32 of the Communications Act which states that “electronic 
communications service” means:200  
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“…a service consisting in, or having as its principal feature, the conveyance 
by means of an electronic communications network of signals, except in so 
far as it is a content service.”201 
Regulation 19 of the PEC Regulations prohibits, without the consent of the called party, any 
transmission of automated recorded calls for the purposes of direct marketing.202 Regulation 
20 prohibits the use of faxes as direct marketing faxes, in some instances when faxes are 
unsolicited and in other instances when such faxes are send to numbers that are not part of the 
official register for that purpose.203 Regulation 21 also prohibits the making of calls for direct 
marketing telephone calls if the subscriber has notified the caller that such calls should not be 
made to their cell phone or to their mobile number.204 Lastly, regulation 25 prohibits the 
sending of unsolicited messages or emails for the purposes of direct marketing unless if 
consent has been given by the recipient of such emails or messages.205  
All the PEC regulations are enforced by the Information Commissioner under the Data 
Protection Act206 of 1998.207 Regulation 4 states that:  
“Nothing in these Regulations shall relieve a person of his obligations 
under the Data Protection Act 1998 in relation to the processing of personal 
data.”208 
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This is because the definition of direct marketing used in regulations 19, 20, 21 and 25 of the 
Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) regulations 2003 (PEC Regulations) 
is the same definition that is used in the Data Protection Act 1998 as the PEC regulation 
states that the definition in the Data Protection Act shall apply to it as well.209 The Data 
Protection Act defines direct marketing as:  
“…the communication (by whatever means) of any advertising or 
marketing material which is directed to particular individuals”.210  
Although the two have a similar definition of direct marketing, PEC regulations have a 
broader application since they are applying to processing of “any personal data” which means 
they apply even if the organization does not know the name of the person it is contacting.211 
5.7. Computer Misuse Act 1990 
The substantive legislation governing e-commerce and computer usage in the UK is the 
Computer Misuse Act of 1990 hereafter referred to as the (CMA).212 In Regina v Gold & 
Schifreen, the call for the introduction of the CMA came as a result of the court pointing out 
that existing computer laws did not accommodate as well as reflect the changes brought about 
by the computer technology.213 This led to the eventual acquittal of the defendants who were 
being accused of hacking into bank’s computer system.214 They were initially charged and 
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convicted under section 1, and section 8 (1) (d) of the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act of 
1981.215  
In upholding the decision of the UK Appeal Court in which the defendants were acquitted, 
the House of Lords stated that; 
"A device could not be an instrument under 8 (1)  (d) of the 1981 Act by 
which the information was recorded or stored by electronic means, unless it 
preserved the information for an appreciable time with the object of 
subsequent retrieval or recovery. Since the momentary holding of the 
customer identification numbers and passwords while they were verified 
did not amount to the recording and storage of information, the respondents 
had not made an instrument within section 8 (1) (d) and could not be guilty 
of an offence under section 1."216 
On 1 October 2008, the CMA was amended to clarify the meaning of "unauthorized access" 
to a computer after certain loopholes were discovered.217  
The CMA made the access of computer material without authorization (also known as 
hacking) a crime and by extension, invasion of privacy.218 According to the CMA, computer 
misuse offences are (a) unauthorized access to computer material, (b) unauthorized access 
with intent to commit or facilitate commission of further offences, (c) unauthorized acts with 
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intent to impair, or with recklessness as to impairing, operation of a computer, etcetera and 
the unauthorized acts causing, or creating risk of and/or serious damage.219 
The actual act (actus reus) of unlawfully gaining access to a computer system suffices for a 
finding of guilt as it is in itself an invasion of privacy as pointed out by the CMA.220 Thus the 
offence of invasion of privacy in e-commerce is clearly stated by the CMA when it points out 
that, a person is guilty of an offence if the access he intends to secure is unauthorized.221 
Although any unauthorized use of or access to a computer is defined as “computer misuse”, 
Stefan Fafinski argues that not all computer misuse attracts the attention of criminal law since 
computer misuse is not a computer crime.222 The CMA does not in itself define neither 
“computer” nor “misuse” and this judicial uncertainty has made the CMA to see relatively 
very little use in the UK.223  
5.8. Other UK Acts of Parliament with Components of Privacy and Data Protection 
In this discussion, acts of parliament will be cited, not to demonstrate the utility of specific 
individual statutes in the protection of privacy, but instructive as examples of details that may 
be included in general legislation for the protection of privacy in e-commerce. The 
guaranteed privacy protection provided for in the statutes below is necessarily limited to the 
subject matter dealt with by the relevant statute, and the specific circumstances provided for 
and specified in the relevant provisions. 
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5.8.1. Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 
The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act of 1974 protects privacy by making evidence about a 
spent conviction inadmissible.224 According to the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act of 1974, a 
person who maliciously publishes details of the plaintiffs spent conviction can be sued for 
damages.225 
5.8.2. Telecommunications Act 1984 
Section 43 of the Telecommunications Act of 1984 (as amended by the Telecommunications 
Regulations of 1999) makes it an offence to use a public tele-communications system to send 
any material that is threatening, grossly offensive, and/or obscene.226 
5.8.3. Police Act 1997 
The Police Act of 1997 in section 97, contains provisions similar to those found in The 
Interception of Communications Act of 1985227 regulating police interception of confidential 
material.228 The Police Act of 1997 also requires authorisation from a Commissioner for the 
use of listening devices by the police.229  
5.8.4. Broadcasting Act 1996 
Section 166 of the Broadcasting Act of 1996 states that defamatory words, visual images, 
pictures, gestures and other forms of broadcast on radio or television or any other programme 
service are actionable as libel.230  
 
                                                          
224 See Section 4 (1) of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, Chapter 53. 
225 See Section 8 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, Chapter 53. 
226 See Section 43 of the Telecommunications Act 1984, Chapter 12.  
227 The Interception of Communications Act of 1985, Chapter 56. 
228 See Section 97 of the Police Act 1997, Chapter 50.  
229 ibid. 
230 See Section 166 of the Broadcasting Act 1996, Chapter 55. 
140 | P a g e  
 
5.8.5. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 
The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988, also gives limited protection for privacy 
where a person's proprietary interest in literary231 or artistic work232 has been infringed.233 
The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988, gives a cause of action for false attribution 
of authorship.234  
5.8.6. Theatres Act 1968 
The Theatres Act of 1968 has similar provisions as those found in the Broadcasting Act of 
1996 in section 4 (1) which states that it is an actionable libel to publish defamatory words in 
the course of a performance of a play.235  
5.8.7. Adoption Act 1976 
Section 64 of the Adoption Act of 1976 provides that proceedings under that same act should 
be held in private.236  
5.8.8. Official Secrets Act 1989 
The Official Secrets Act of 1989 provides penalties for spying which is "prejudicial to the 
safety or interests of the State".237  
5.8.9. Access to Health Records 1990 
The Access to Health Records of 1990 states that it is an offence to obtain or communicate 
information where such information is calculated or intended to be "directly or indirectly 
useful to an enemy.”238 
                                                          
231 See Section 3 (1) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, Chapter 48. 
232 See Section 4 (1) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, Chapter 48. 
233 See Sections 3 and 4 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, Chapter 48. 
234 See Sections 83 and 84 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, Chapter 48. 
235 See Section 4 (1) of the Theatres Act 1968, Chapter 54. 
236 See Section 64 of the Adoption Act 1976, Chapter 36. 
237 See Section 1 of the Access to Health Records 1990, Chapter 23. 
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Access to Health Records Act 1990 also had some privacy components in it when it was 
enacted. The 1998 DPA replaced the Access to Health Records Act239, which gave access to 
manual records kept after 1 November 1991. The Access to Health Records Act was repealed 
except in respect of records of deceased patients. 240  According to the Access to Health 
Records Act, a health record includes all nursing records, physiotherapy records, pathology 
laboratory records and any other record relating to the patient's health.241 The Access to 
Health Records of 1990242 like the Access to Medical Reports Act of 1988243 also gives 
guidelines for disclosure of health records by making provision for patients and other persons 
authorised by law to gain access to their health records.244 
5.8.10. Access to Medical Reports Act of 1988 
The Access to Medical Reports Act of 1988 provides guidelines for the disclosure of medical 
records. 245  The Access to Medical Reports Act has limited provisions for the general 
protection of data, but exemptions to giving access to medical records are provided for 
section 7 of the Access to Medical Reports Act, thus maintaining privacy by protecting 
data.246 Where the disclosure of a medical report or part thereof is likely to reveal information 
about another person, or to reveal the identity of another person who has supplied 
information to the medical practitioner about the individual, access is denied.247 
By defining “medical report”, as a report relating to the physical or mental health of the 
individual prepared by a medical practitioner who is or has been responsible for the clinical 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
238 See Section 1 (c) of the Access to Health Records 1990, Chapter 23. 
239 Access to Health Records Act 1990, Chapter 23. 
240 B Dimond ‘Rights to information access under the Data Protection Act’ (2005) 14 (14) British Journal of 
Nursing 774. 
241 ibid 774. 
242 See Note 239 above. 
243 See Section 1 of the Access to Medical Reports Act 1988, Chapter 28. 
244 See Section 3 of the Access to Health Records 1990, Chapter 23. 
245 See Section 4 of the Access to Medical Reports Act 1988 Chapter 28. 
246 See Section 7 (1) to 7 (4) of the Access to Medical Reports Act 1988, Chapter 28. 
247 See Section 7 (2) of the Access to Medical Reports Act 1988, Chapter 28. 
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care of the individual, the Access to Medical Reports Act of 1988 protects not just the 
computerized records but manual records as well.248  
5.8.11. Children and Young Persons Act 1933 
Similarly, section 49 of the Children and Young Persons Act of 1933 restricts the reporting of 
the proceedings of juvenile courts. 249  Section 39 of the same act also provides for the 
obtaining of a court order prohibiting newspaper reports from publishing personal details 
such as the name, address, school or any detail "calculated to lead to the identification of any 
child or young person" concerned in proceedings.250 
5.8.12. Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 
Section 4 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act of 1976 provides for anonymity to 
victims of rape and any other case of sexual offences.251  
5.8.13. Criminal Justice Act 1988 
In Section 158, the Criminal Justice Act of 1988 protects the anonymity of victims in cases 
involving conspiracy to rape and burglary with intent to rape.252  
5.8.14. Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 
Section 69 of the Magistrates' Courts Act of 1980 provides that the public is excluded from 
family proceedings in the magistrates' courts.253 
 
 
                                                          
248 See Section 1 (1) of the Access to Medical Reports Act 1988, Chapter 28. 
249 See Section 49 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, Chapter 12. 
250 See Section 39 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, Chapter 12. 
251 See Section 4 of the Sexual Offences Amendment Act 1976, Chapter 82. 
252 See Section 158 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, Chapter 33. 
253 Section 69 of the Magistrates' Courts Act of 1980, Chapter 43. 
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5.8.15. Protection from Harassment Act 1997 
The Protection from Harassment Act of 1997 does not define harassment; however Wessels J 
in a South African case of Epstein v Epstein defines harassment as “a most vexatious 
nuisance” that amounts to an invasion of privacy. 254  Section 1 of the Protection from 
Harassment Act states that, a person must not pursue a course of conduct that amounts to 
harassment of another and which he or she knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of 
another.255 Section 7 of the same provides that harassing a person includes alarming a person 
or causing the person distress which may include the invasion of their privacy.256  
5.8.16. Interception of Communications Act 1985 
The Interception of Communications Act of 1985 sets some limitations on surveillance of any 
tele-communications.257 The Interception of Communications Act in section 1 makes it an 
offence to intercept communications sent through the post and telecommunication system, 
without authorisation by the Secretary of State, thus promoting privacy.258 The Interception 
of Communications Act in section 2 also specifies conditions under which a warrant may be 
issued.259  
5.8.17. Consumer Credit Act 1974 
Consumer Credit Act of 1974, among many other functions, governs consumer credit 
information by providing protection in respect of information collected by credit reference 
agencies. Sections 158 to section 160 of the Consumer Credit Act260 was amended by section 
                                                          
254 Epstein v Epstein 1987 (4) SA 606 (C) at 87. 
255 See Section 1 (1) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, Chapter 40. 
256 See Section 7 (2) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, Chapter 40. 
257 See Section 1 of the Interception of Communications Act 1985 Chapter 56. 
258 Christie v United Kingdom (1994) 7S-A DR 119. 
259 See Section 2 (2) of the Interception of Communications Act 1985, Chapter 56. 
260 Consumer Credit Act 1974, Chapter 39.  
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62 of the 1998 DPA.261 Section 158 gives an agency the duty to disclose filed information.262 
Section 62263 also amended section 159 which deals with the Consumer Credit Act which 
deals with the correction of wrong information264. The effect of section 62 amendments is to 
widen the scope of section 158, 159 and 160.  
5.9. What lessons can South Africa learn from United Kingdom and its laws in 
protecting e-traders or buyers 
The UK e-commerce legislation is applied as a collaborative initiative involving the police, 
members of the private sector and academics jointly working together to stamp out cyber-
crime. In all the different sectors that deal with personal information of individuals when 
transacting commercially, there are laws that deal with privacy protection. South Africa can 
learn from this ingenious and commendable step in the sense that various stakeholders in the 
economy are brought together from various walks of life to contribute a significant measure 
of information, based on their knowledge and experiences to make practical propositions on 
how to address the growing menace of cyber-crime and breach of personal information 
privacy.  
South Africa like the UK can also adopt sector-specific e-commerce policies and legislation 
in order to encourage and/or restrict the use of encryption in commercial data transmissions. 
In order to encourage greater public confidence in e-commerce, the South African 
government should officially endorse certain cryptographic methods, or institutions like in 
the UK. 
In domestic businesses’ electronic transactions, the South African government law 
enforcement agencies can participate in international deliberations and agreements toward 
                                                          
261 See Section 62 of the Data Protection Act 1998, Chapter 29.  
262 See Section 158 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974, Chapter 39. 
263 See Section 62 (2) of the Data Protection Act 1998, Chapter 29. 
264 See Section 159 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974, Chapter 39. 
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common standards for cross-border data security and access as the UK adopted most if not all 
of the EU directives on electronic commerce as its domestic e-commerce legislation. This 
will help South Africa on matters of standardisation and international harmonisation. As 
noted in the previous chapters, South Africa is not bound by some international treaties 
controlling e-commerce because it is not a member to those treaties. 
Finally, as noted in the discussion above, the UK presents an equally interesting case study as 
it amended its existing law (the CMA) a number of times to bring it in line with current 
trends. This is reflective of the legislature‘s attempt at keeping pace with the technology, in 
view of the dynamic nature of technology, which has the ability to render legislation in this 
field outdated. If South Africa adopts this approach, it will bring its e-commerce laws up to 
date with the latest technology being used in electronic commerce transactions. 
5.10. Conclusion 
Countries with sector-specific e-commerce legislation like the UK and those countries 
without such sector specific e-commerce legislation like South Africa, face somewhat 
similar problems. These problems could be seen through different UK and South African 
case law, although it is at very different scales. The main problem that seems to cause 
glitches in the UK is on implementation of e-commerce legilslation and is worse in South 
Africa.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
6. PRIVACY, DATA PROTECTION AND E-COMMERCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 
6.1. Introduction 
There is a direct relationship between efficiency of e-commerce and the privacy protection 
laws as privacy has always been largely a matter of commerce rather than a matter of law.1 
With efficiency and privacy being amorphous terms in e-commerce, consumers expect some 
level of protection of their privacy to be provided when they engage in some electronic 
transactions and if this level of privacy is not provided for by the government, the same will 
weaken the e-commerce industry of that nation.2  
The relationship between e-commerce efficiency and privacy is summarised by Stephen R 
Bergerson as follows: 
 “While privacy concerns predate the personal computer, the advent of e-
commerce has heightened consumers' concerns and intensified their distrust 
of information gatherers.”3 
In the United States America (hereafter USA), discussions on e-commerce and privacy 
protection moved from national privacy to international transactions with so much focus 
being on four aspects:  
a) collection of personal identifiable information; 
b) use of personal identifiable information; 
                                                          
1 K H Sohn ‘Privacy and security protection under korean e-commerce law and proposals for its improvements’ 
(2016) 33 (1) Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law 241. 
2 J Spratt ‘An economic argument for electronic privacy’ (2011) 6 (3) I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the 
Information Society 516. 
3 S R Bergerson ‘E-commerce privacy and the black hole of cyberspace’ (2001) 27 (3) William Mitchell Law 
Review 1528. 
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c) dissemination of personal identifiable information; and  
d) redress after violations are discovered.4 
One of the major privacy concerns that emerge with the rise of e-commerce is interruption 
and/or intrusion.5  
Even though the rules used when doing online business in the USA are the same as those 
used to conduct a regular storefront business, there are extra rules that apply only to online 
businesses.6 For privacy and security purposes, special attention in online businesses must be 
given to the collection of information, the storage of such information, and the use of 
personal identifiable information that has been collected online.7  
In the USA, computer-communication systems and data processing services that are 
internationally operated such as Tymnet and Telenet are examples of transnational 
communications networks which are remotely computerized.8 When it comes to the record 
keeping systems of automated personal identifiable data, the right to privacy refers to the 
rights that individuals have in relation to the collection, storage, usage (processing) and 
dissemination of  such personal  identifiable information.9  
Just like South Africa and many other countries in the world, the USA does not have a single 
overarching electronic privacy law, but it uses the scattered system of threat-and-industry-
                                                          
4 See Note 2 above at 518. 
5 S D Balz & O Hance ‘Privacy and the internet: Intrusion, surveillance and personal data’ (1996) 10 (2) 
International Review of Law Computers & Technology 220. 
6 L Plave ‘Franchising: Data protection and e-commerce issues in the United States’ (2006) 4 (2) International 
Journal of Franchising Law 3. 
7 ibid.  
8 R Turn ‘Privacy protection and security in transnational data processing systems’ (1980) 16 (1) Stanford 
Journal of International Law 67. 
9 ibid 69. 
148 | P a g e  
 
specific protections aimed at curbing particularized threats to privacy.10 A lot of companies in 
the USA do not acknowledge personal data privacy as a fundamental human right.11 
6.2. Common Law Privacy Protection in the United States of America 
From the time when there were no individual privacy rights, to the current time when judges 
are now giving definition to privacy rights, the courts have found and/or used very little 
common law.12 Even though there was little use of common law to protect individual privacy 
in the USA, common law rights to privacy originated in the theory of property law in cases 
where it protected data.13 After Warren and Brandeis wrote their journal article on common 
privacy in 1890, 14  Dean Prosser many years later categorized the common law right to 
privacy into four torts in his journal article.15 
In common law, the right to privacy was accepted as falling into one or more of the following 
categories (otherwise known as Torts of Law) which did not include informational privacy:  
a) “wrongful appropriation and use of a person's name, likeness or 
personality; 
b)  physical intrusion into a person's solitude or seclusion;  
c) public disclosure of private facts that a reasonable person would find 
objectionable; and  
d) publicity that places a person in a false light in the public eye.”16 
                                                          
10 See Note 2 above at 515 and 525. 
11 ibid 525. 
12 M W Iannotta ‘Protecting individual privacy in the shadow of a national data base: The need for data 
protection legislation’ (1989) 17 (1) Capital University Law Review 123. 
13 ibid. 
14 S D Warren & L D Brandeis ‘The right to privacy’ (1890) 4 (5) Harvard Law Review 193. 
15 D Prosser ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 (1) California Law Review 383 and 389.  
16 Iannotta see Note 12 above. Prosser ibid. Bergerson ‘E-commerce privacy and the black hole of cyberspace’ 
(2001) 27 (3) William Mitchell Law Review 1535. 
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The leading case in the application of these privacy law torts is Shibley v Time, Inc. in which 
the Court of appeal in Ohio pointed out that the sale of a mailing list does not give rise to a 
privacy cause of action.17 There are some courts that have since adopted the decision of the 
aforesaid case while several others are of the view that the decision in Shibley v Time, Inc. 
should be revisited due to the circumstances which have also changed.18  
6.2.1. Appropriations 
The Second Restatement of Torts provides that “One who appropriates to his own use or 
benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his 
privacy”.19 
In Hirsch v S.C. Johnson & Sons Inc., it was pointed out that using another person’s 
nickname amounts to appropriation of their name.20 The use of a nickname ‘Crazylegs’ on a 
women's shaving gel by the defendant violated publicity rights of a famous football player 
well known by that nickname and ultimately resulting in the invasion of privacy by 
appropriation.21 In John W. Carson v Here's Johnny Portable Toilets Inc., it was pointed out 
that using another person’s slogan without their permission amounts to appropriation.22 A 
Michigan company in this case violated the plaintiff’s publicity rights by using (without 
consent) the phrase ‘Here’s Johnny’ which was a slogan belonging to a certain entertainer.23 
In Motschenbacher v R J Reynolds Tobacco Co., it was also pointed out that using another 
person’s costume without their permission amounts to appropriation.24 
 
                                                          
17 Shibley v Time, Inc. 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) at 337 and 339. 
18 Bergerson ‘E-commerce privacy and the black hole of cyberspace’ (2001) 27 (3) William Mitchell Law 
Review 1535. 
19 See the Second Restatement of Torts (1977) Section 652C. 
20 Hirsch v S.C. Johnson & Sons Inc. 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 NW2d (1979) at 389. 
21 ibid. 
22 John W. Carson v Here's Johnny Portable Toilets Inc. 698 F2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) at 835-836. 
23 ibid. 
24 Motschenbacher v R J Reynolds Tobacco Co. 498 F2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974) at 824 and 826-827. 
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6.2.2. Intrusions 
In explaining the common torts above, the American Law Institute defined intrusion upon 
seclusion by stating that:  
“One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude 
or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to 
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person.”25 
This definition of intrusion includes, but is not limited to eavesdropping, any illegal search 
and the invasion of one’s physical solitude.26  
The case of Miller v Motorola, Inc. rejected the idea that, if someone willingly gives access 
to private personal information, it is considered as if consent has been given to the 
intrusion.27 Consent should not be inferred by reason of employees having provided their 
personal private information willingly in compliance with the employment requirements.28  
In-order for someone to invoke the intrusion tort, the act for which the tort is to be invoked 
should be of such a nature that it is very offensive to a reasonable person.29 In Cape Pubs. 
Inc. v Bridges, the publishing of someone’s naked picture in the newspaper did not invoke the 
intrusion tort since the court pointed out that the photo published did not reveal more flesh 
that did any woman on the beach.30 
6.2.3. Disclosure of Private Facts 
In the Second Restatement of Torts, it is also stated that: 
                                                          
25 See Comment (a) of the American Law Institute Second Restatement of Torts (1977) Section 652B. 
26 ibid. 
27 Miller v Motorola, Inc. 202 Ill. App.3d 976 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) at 978-979. 
28 ibid. 
29 See the Second Restatement of Torts (1977) Section 652B. 
30 Cape Pubs. Inc. v Bridges 423 So 2d 426 (1982 Fla App). 
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“One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another 
is subject to liability to the other for the invasion of his privacy if the matter 
publicised is of a kind that: would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person, and is not of legitimate concern to the public.”31 
In Melvin v Reid, the court defended the plaintiff’s right to privacy after a film revealed her 
past life as a prostitute, the profession she had renounced and had reformed from.32 The court 
considered exposing the past life of the plaintiff to be falling under the tort prohibiting the 
public disclosure of private facts.33  
However, critiques are raised against this tort on the basis that it infringes against the USA 
Constitutional freedom of speech as guaranteed by the First and the Fourteenth Amendments 
to the USA Constitution.34 In Florida Star v B. J. F., the court went against the decision in 
MeIvin v Reid by citing that matter was of public significance.35 In this case of Florida Star v 
B.J.F., the rape victim who had challenged the newspaper company for clearly citing her 
name in newspaper lost the case.36 
6.2.4. False Light 
The Second Restatement of Torts also provides that: 
 “One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the 
other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for 
invasion of his privacy, if: the false light in which the other was placed 
                                                          
31 See Section 652 B of the Second Restatement of Torts (1977). 
32 Melvin v Reid 112 Cal. App 285, 286; 297 P. 91 (1931) at 292. 
33 ibid. 
34 F O Laosebikan ‘Privacy and Technological Development: A Comparative Analysis of South African and 
Nigerian Privacy and Data Protection Laws with Particular Reference to the Protection of Privacy and Data in 
internet Cafes and Suggestions for Appropriate Legislation in Nigeria’ (unpublished LLD dissertation, 
University of  KwaZulu-Natal, 2007) 206. 
35 Florida Star v B. J. F. 491 U.S. 524 (1989) at 536-7.   
36 ibid 537. 
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would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and the actor had 
knowledge or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicised 
matter and the false light in which the other would be placed”37 
Publicity that places a person in a false light in the public eye is publicity that is objectionable 
to an ordinary reasonable man and has major inaccuracies.38 Critics have however observed 
that this requirement does not protect the right to privacy because there may never be major 
inaccuracies since the victim’s information when published is often true.39   
6.3. Common Law Data Protection in the United States of America 
In the USA, there was very little to no common law to protect data from being exploited and 
used for things other than what it was intended for.40 The only time when common law data 
protection was applied by the courts, was when privacy law also protected data, like in 
Melvin v Reid wherein data infringement resulted in the publication of private facts.41 Data 
protection was also coupled with privacy protection in a common law appropriation case of 
Goodyear Tire Rubber Co. v Vandergriff,42 where the defendant impersonated the plaintiff to 
obtain information about him, or in the intrusion case of Dietemann v Time, Incorporated 43 
where the defendant unlawfully gained access to the plaintiff’s land in order to obtain 
information and to use it without the plaintiff’s consent.44 
                                                          
37 See Note 31 above. 
38  Laosebikan ‘Privacy and Technological Development: A Comparative Analysis of South African and 
Nigerian Privacy and Data Protection Laws with Particular Reference to the Protection of Privacy and Data in 
Internet Cafes and Suggestions for Appropriate Legislation in Nigeria’ (unpublished LLD dissertation, 
University of  KwaZulu-Natal, 2007) 207. 
39 ibid. 
40 ibid 211. 
41 Melvin v Reid 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931) at 285-287ff. 
42 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v Vandergriff 52 Ga. App. 662, 184 S.E. 452 (1936). 
43 Dietemann v Time, Incorporated 284 F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 1968). 
44  284 F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 1968) at 927. Cf See also the South African case where the plaintiff's 
correspondence is read unlawfully (S v Hammer 1994 (2) SACR 496 (C) at 498.) 
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6.4. State Laws on Privacy and Data Protection in the United States of America: The 
Right to Privacy 
The right to privacy is now formally protected in the USA following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in the important milestone constitutional case of National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People v Alabama ex. Rel. Patterson.45 Even though the Supreme 
Court’s decision allowed private groups to keep membership information confidential from 
the state, when dealing with matters of associational privacy, the decision also became a 
precedent for cases dealing with decisional as well as informational privacy.46  
It is common knowledge in the USA that the state can legitimately demand to know the 
agents of any organization, its mandate, its activities as well as its officers.47 In the landmark 
case of NAACP v Alabama, the court decided that the state should never ask for information 
about the members of the organization because this amounts to the invasion of privacy.48 
Again, from the decision of NAACP v Alabama, confidentiality and anonymity are promised 
to members as their data is constitutionally protected from mandatory disclosure whether that 
information is handwritten on lined paper or it is just stored electronically in a computer 
system.49 
In the progressive cases of Griswold v Connecticut50 and Roe v Wade,51 decisional privacy as 
well as informational privacy were extended by the Supreme Court’s decision which allowed 
private groups to keep membership information confidential from the state.52 
                                                          
45 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v Alabama ex. Rel. Patterson 357 U.S. 449 
(1958) at 462. 
46 A L Allen ‘Associational privacy and the First Amendment: NAACP v Alabama, privacy and data protection’ 
(2011) 1 (1) Alabama Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Law Review 1. 
47 See Note 45 above at 464-465. 
48 ibid 465. 
49 ibid. 
50 Griswold v Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Balz & Hance ‘Privacy and the internet: Intrusion, surveillance 
and personal data’ (1996) 10 (2) International Review of Law Computers & Technology 222. 
51 Roe v Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Balz & Hance ibid. 
154 | P a g e  
 
The State of California took the leading role in privacy protection by passing the California 
Assembly Bill 1950 also known as the California "A.B. 1950" which requires businesses to 
implement and to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices for the purposes of 
protecting certain unencrypted personal identifiable information from unauthorized access, 
destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.53 This privacy law also means that third parties 
who are unaffiliated are contractually required to maintain reasonable security procedures 
and practices if they receive such unencrypted personal identifiable information.54 
‘Personal identifiable information’ means an individual's first name or first name initial and 
his or her last name in combination with any one or more elements like the social security 
number, driver's license number or California identification card number, his or her account 
number, credit or debit card number, in combination with any required security code, access 
code, or password that would permit access to an individual's financial account and medical 
information.55 Personal identifiable information according to the California Assembly Bill 
1950 does not include any information that is publicly available and has been lawfully made 
available to the general public through the Federal, State, or local government’s records.56 
Another data protection mechanism introduced by many other States after the State of 
California was the exemption from the notification laws if the company's data was by any 
means encrypted.57 Although encryption of data was not a requirement, the exemption from 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
52 See Note 46 above. Griswold v Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965) at 483. Roe v Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973) at 
154-155. 
53 See Section 1 of the California Assembly Bill 1950. Plave ‘Franchising: Data protection and e-commerce 
issues in the United States’ (2006) 4 (2) International Journal of Franchising Law 11. 
54 See Section 1 of the California Assembly Bill 1950. 
55 See Section 1 (d) (1) (A)-(D) of the California Assembly Bill 1950. 
56 See Section 1 (d) (3) of the California Assembly Bill 1950. 
57 A C Border ‘Untangling the web’ (2012) 35 (2) Suffolk Transnational Law Review 369. 
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notification laws is meant to influence corporations to encrypt their data, and thus protect 
personal identifiable information.58  
In 1972, the State of California amended its Constitution59 in order to give its residents the 
right to privacy and it also became the first State in the entire USA to make security breach 
notification law in order to deal with security data breaches in online businesses.60 These 
security breach notification laws apply to any person owning an online business or anyone 
owning or licencing computerized data in their business, if that data contains personal 
identifiable information.61  
Even though this law only applies to California, the security breach notification law also 
applies to any breach of personal information regarding California residents despite the fact 
that the personal information is maintained by an online business that is outside of 
California.62 The California privacy law requires that, if there is a breach of security that 
leads to the exploitation of personal information by an unauthorized person, the breach must 
be reported by the discovering institution as soon as it gets a notification of breach.63  
The ‘Shine the Light’ Law, Civil Code 1798.83 is privacy law in California otherwise also 
known as the ‘S.B. 27’ the name given during its designation when it was passed by the 
California State Legislature in 2003.64 After its consideration by the legislature, it became 
                                                          
58 ibid 370. 
59 See Article 1 Section 1 of the California Constitution, November 1972 stating, “All people are by nature free 
and independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and 
liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and 
privacy.” 
60 Border ‘Untangling the web’ (2012) 35 (2) Suffolk Transnational Law Review 369. D H Flaherty ‘On the 
utility of constitutional rights to privacy and data protection’ (1991) 41 (1) Case Western Reserve Law Review 
837. 
61 D Medine & N D Steimer ‘Recent developments in data security and data privacy’ (2006) 1 (1) Journal of 
Payment System Laws 264. 
62 ibid. 
63 ibid. 
64 CA Civil Code Section 1798.83 of 2005. 
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active in 2005. 65  Although this code does not specifically deal with online privacy, it 
certainly has an impact on the online privacy services.66  
The Civil Code 1798.83 privacy law gives all the privacy advocates and the press members 
the right to obtain detailed information about a business’ and non-profit organization’s data 
disclosure practices for the purposes of giving it to a third party for commercial marketing 
purposes unless if, and only if, the business or non-profit organization provides a broad opt-
out of disclosures to its affiliates.67 The California Civil Code 1798.83 serves e-businesses by 
providing an incentive to opt-out of third party disclosures for marketing purposes, which is 
an incentive that is missing from the Federal government’s online privacy laws.68 
At the beginning of 2006, about twenty-two other States in the USA also joined California in 
making it mandatory for e-business to give some form of notice in the case of a suspected 
data security breach or in the case of an inadvertent disclosure, fortuitous disclosure or 
otherwise.69 On 1January 2010, the State of Nevada went a step further in privacy protection 
by making encryption of personal information a requirement, when personal identifiable 
information is being transmitted within an insecure system.70  
On 1 March 2010, the State of Massachusetts surpassed every other State or Federal law 
when it introduced a new broad and strict regulatory scheme for the purposes of data privacy 
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by regulating anyone who possessed another’s personal identifiable information regardless of 
their industry.71 Even though the privacy law passed by the State of Massachusetts is limited 
in its scope and effect, it has had a nationwide impact on companies doing business within 
Massachusetts and on companies that have customers within Massachusetts.72  
Besides the Californian Constitution having some provisions protecting the right to privacy in 
the State of California, there are many other states with similar provisions in their State 
Constitutions.73  
The Alaska Constitution has a provision that encourages all kinds of privacy rights including 
informational privacy rights and it states that:  
“…the right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be 
infringed”.74  
The New York Constitution also has a provision protecting the right to privacy, which is in 
every respect similar to the Fourth Amendment to the USA Constitution.75 The New York 
Constitution inter alia states that:  
“…the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects, and against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated”.76 
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6.5. United States of America Data and Privacy Protection Through the Federal 
Constitution  
Although the USA Constitution does not explicitly provide for the right to privacy in its 
articles or in its amendments, the Supreme Court of the USA has in a number of cases, 
implied the right of privacy in the word ‘liberty’ as found in the Fifth and the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the USA Constitution.77  
Jurisprudence has found a certain ‘zone of privacy’ in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the USA Constitution which limit the Federal and State 
government from certain activities, in order to protect privacy. 78  It was in Griswold v 
Connecticut that privacy protection was extracted from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and 
Ninth Amendments to the USA Constitution.79 
In a privacy and abortion case of Roe v Wade, the Supreme Court took a huge step in the 
development of the constitutional right to privacy.80 As stated in the paragraphs above, prior 
to this interpretation, the Supreme Court did not interpret the right of privacy to include 
informational privacy.81 The right to privacy was always limited to decisional privacy.82 
Decisional privacy applied only to cases of marriage, 83  procreation, 84  abortion, 85 
contraception,86 family relationships,87 and to child rearing matters.88  It was in Whalen v Roe 
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that the court dealt with the issue of informational privacy.89  The Supreme Court in the case 
insupra rendered the decision which expands the right to privacy to include informational 
privacy, clearly illustrating the government’s reluctance when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights.90  
The case of United States Department of Justice v Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press91 is another landmark case which dealt with informational privacy.92 The case arose 
when a CBS news reporter and a media rights advocacy group requested criminal 
identification records from the Federal Bureau of Investigation by filing a request under the 
Freedom of Information Act. 93  The main issue was whether the disclosure of criminal 
identification records to a third party would amount to the invasion of personal privacy.94 The 
court pointed out that right of privacy that is ‘strong’ exists essentially and permanently in the 
non-disclosure of computerized information.95  
In Katz v United States, the Supreme Court decided that although the Fourth Amendment 
protected the USA citizens against unreasonable search and seizure, it should be interpreted 
to protect people rather than places and to protect the privacy rather than property. 96  
Following the decision of Katz v United States, the Canadian case of Hunter v Southam97 and 
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the case of R v Dyment,98 also interpreted the right against unreasonable search and seizure to 
constitute the right to privacy.99  
In R v Duarte, the court reiterated that the right against unreasonable search and seizure 
should be interpreted to constitute the privacy right if there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.100 With the Supreme Court not being able to give an exhaustive list on the protection 
of informational privacy, it cited a list of other cases in which the word ‘liberty’ was 
interpreted to include other specific rights.101 In Lochner v New York however, the court was 
very reluctant to interpret new substantive rights by reading into the word ‘liberty’.102 
6.5.1. First Amendment 
As mentioned in paragraphs above, in NAACP v Alabama, the court decided that the State 
should never ask for information about the members of the organization because this amounts 
to the invasion of privacy.103 Again, from the decision of NAACP v Alabama, confidentiality 
and anonymity are promised to members as their data is constitutionally protected from 
mandatory disclosure, whether that information is handwritten and on paper or it is just stored 
electronically in a computer system.104  
Thus the Alabama State Law was deemed to be contrary to the First Amendment provision 
by requiring constitutionally formed private associations to reveal the names of its members 
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and officers.105 The First Amendment to the USA Constitution has provisions that prohibit 
the making of laws curtailing the freedom of assembly and the freedom of speech.106  
The Supreme Court of the USA also relied on the First Amendment to protect informational 
privacy in Bartnicki v Vopper, in which it prohibited the re-broadcasting of a telephone 
conversation that had been illegally intercepted by a commercial radio station.107 This was 
deemed to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court because the interception violated the 
right to privacy and the freedom of speech granted by the First Amendment.108 
The Supreme Court also based its decision on the First Amendment to the USA Constitution 
in McIntyre v Ohio Elections Commission by recognising the right to anonymity. 109  In 
Watchtower Society v Village of Stratton, the First Amendment implied right to anonymity 
was also the basis for repudiating a law that required registration with the government in 
order to do door-to-door canvassing or soliciting.110 
In Reno v American Civil Liberties Union111 and in McNamara v Freedom Newspapers, 
Inc.,112 the court defended both the right to privacy and the right to access information by 
applying the First Amendment to the USA Constitution. 113  In McNamara v Freedom 
Newspapers, the case involved a plaintiff who was featured in a newspaper article that 
reported a school game as chasing a soccer ball with his pants falling and his genitalia 
exposed.114 The plaintiff lost the case because the court pointed out that this article was an 
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accurate depiction of the event and that the event was newsworthy, thereby protecting the 
right of access to information.115  
6.5.2. Third Amendment 
The Third Amendment to the USA Constitution provides that in the time of peace in the 
USA, no soldier shall be quartered in any house unless consent has been given by the owner 
of the house.116 This is a guarantee against invasion of privacy by the army during the time of 
peace.117 The Third Amendment provision extends to require that if there is war; quartering 
of soldiers must be done in a way prescribed by the law.118 
6.5.3. Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment to the USA Constitution provides that:  
“…the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated....”119 
In Rakas v Illinois the court defined ‘unreasonable search’ defined by the Bill of Rights 1791, 
Fourth Amendment as the ‘governmental invasion of privacy’.120  
Both the case of Olmstead v United States121 and the case of Katz v United States122 involved 
the issues of telephone interception with the court pointing out in Olmstead v United States 
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that telephone tapping did not constitute an ‘unreasonable search’.123 In Katz v United States, 
the Supreme Court applied the Fourth Amendment by pointing out that electronic 
eavesdropping was considered to be an “unreasonable search” if the conversation was 
private.124  
By expanding the scope of the Fourth Amendment to render wiretapping without a warrant 
unconstitutional, the decision in Katz v United States reversed the Supreme Court’s decision 
in the case of Olmstead v United States. 125  In People v Shinkle, the court accepted an 
intercepted telephone conversation as admissible evidence since consent had been given by 
another party to the conversation and it was therefore considered that there was no breach of 
the right to privacy. 126  In the United Kingdom case of Attorney General v Guardian 
Newspapers, Lord Goff also stated that the only time when eavesdropping or a telephone 
interception amounts to a violation of the right to privacy is when a third party eavesdrops on 
a conversation without the consent of both or any one of the parties to that conversation. 127  
Again, in the ‘Fourth Amendment’ case of Olmstead v United States,128 Justice Brandeis 
argued (in dissent) that although there is no express right to privacy in the USA Constitution, 
there is ‘the right to be let alone’ as first described by Judge Thomas M. Cooley in 1864 
when he was still a Michigan jurist at the beginning of his profession as city clerk.129  It was 
in the same case of Olmstead v United States that Justice Brandeis, concerning individual 
privacy, stated that: 
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“The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favourable 
to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's 
spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a 
part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material 
things. 
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their 
emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, 
the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the most 
valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion 
by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means 
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”130                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
This argument received a lot of support in the USA, Canada and other outside countries’ 
courts, even though it was a judgement in the minority.131 In another ‘Fourth Amendment’ 
case of United States v Jones,132 the right to privacy was also advocated for by a successful 
challenge made on GPS surveillance.133 The judge in this case considered surveillance to be 
an infringement on an individual’s right of privacy.134  
The conclusion in United States v Jones is consistent with Supreme Court's Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence applied in Katz v United States, which has moved from the 
exclusive property-based approach to an individual’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ in 
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any industry.135 The Court used the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test in Katz but did 
not substitute it for the ‘common-law of trespassing’ test.136  
The court in Smith v Maryland, also pointed out that, if there is no ‘reasonable expectation of 
privacy’, there can be no violation of the right to privacy. 137  In this case, the Fourth 
Amendment search could not be invoked because the law enforcement officials electronically 
monitored numbers that were dialled from a private phone and therefore, there was a clear 
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’.138 It was also in United States v David Lee Smith, that 
the court also mentioned that if a cell-phone is used or any codeless phone, a Fourth 
Amendment search cannot be invoked since there is a ‘reasonable right of privacy’.139 
The Fourth Amendment search was permitted in New Jersey v T.L.O. where the court ruled 
that there could not be an invasion of privacy if a search is not conducted in a home but in a 
public space like a school, business environment or offices.140 In this New Jersey v T.L.O. 
case, the vice-principal at a certain school had searched the purse belonging to a pupil 
suspected of possessing drugs. 141  In the purse she found some marijuana and the court 
deemed this search permissible citing that even though students have a reasonable 
‘expectation of privacy’, the search conducted is reasonably related to the objectives of the 
search and not excessively intrusive in the light of the student's age, sex and the nature of the 
infraction.142  
In O'Connor v Ortega, while a psychiatrist was on leave, his office was searched because he 
was suspected of being involved in illegal activities and the court pointed out that the 
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employer can use the Fourth Amendment search without violating the employees right of 
privacy, if that employee has a standard of reasonableness to conduct the search.143 Similarly, 
in Alana Shoars v Epson America, Inc. No., even though the facts were different, the court 
stated that the employer has a right to read all employee emails since there is a reasonable 
expectation that all mails sent and received relate to work.144  
In United States v Miller and in Smith v Maryland, the court concluded that the private 
personal identifiable information found in cheques that are deposited into a bank voluntarily, 
form part of ordinary commerce and therefore, there is no Fourth Amendment expectation of 
privacy arising from that.145 These two decisions have been highly criticized since then for 
suggesting that customers can forfeit their right to privacy by complying with requirements of 
the service providers.146 
6.5.4. Fifth Amendment 
This Amendment protects against informational privacy by stating that a person shall not be 
compelled to testify against him/herself by giving information to be used for his or her 
prosecution.147  
6.5.5. Ninth Amendment 
The Fifth Amendment to the USA Constitution states that: 
 “…the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people”.148  
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The Supreme Court used this provision in Griswold v Connecticut, disputing the fact that the 
lack of a specific right of privacy in the Bill of Rights means that no such right exists.149 The 
Supreme Court argued that such a right to privacy exists if it is implicit in the concept of the 
ordered liberty.150 The same sentiments were reiterated in Bowers v Hardwick.151 
Again, in Griswold v Connecticut, Justice Goldberg also expressed his belief that the right to 
privacy was in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights by stating that:152  
"…the right of privacy in the marital relation is fundamental and basic - a 
personal right 'retained by the people' within the meaning of the ninth 
amendment." 153 
Thus the USA Supreme Court pointed out, that even though there is no explicit constitutional 
right to privacy, there was a Ninth Amendment implicit right to privacy.154 The court also 
mentioned in Bowers v Hardwick that when considering whether any right should be 
recognized or not, the courts are also supposed to ask whether that right is deeply rooted in 
the country's history and or traditions.155  
6.5.6. Fourteenth Amendment 
The Supreme Court in Griswold v Connecticut also pointed to the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the Constitution of the USA which prohibits the making of laws or enforcing of laws that 
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abridge the citizens’ immunities or privileges.156 In Roe v Wade, the Supreme Court went 
even further in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty to 
include the right to privacy.157  
In upholding substantive privacy rights in both of these cases, the Supreme Court applied the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Although the court defended substantive privacy rights, in these 
cases, it also noted that the scope covered by this Amendment is so wide and could include 
informational privacy rights.158  
6.6. Statutory Protection of Privacy and Data in the United States of America under 
Federal Laws and Other Sector-Specific Privacy State Law Bills 
Although there are various statutes that protect individual privacy in the USA as shall be seen 
below, the following Acts only protect against unwarranted government intrusion into 
personal privacy: The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 restricts warrantless 
electronic surveillance during criminal investigation;159 The Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act of 1974 limits the disclosure of student information by Federally-funded 
schools:160 and The Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 restricts the disclosure of private 
information by state motor vehicle offices,161 do not apply to the private sector. 
The Privacy Act of 1974162 and The Freedom of Information Act of 1966163 are the only two 
statutes in the USA that deal with both privacy protection as well as data protection as shall 
be seen below. 
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It was due to the lack of an express direction in matters involving informational privacy by 
the common law and by the Constitution of the USA, that congress sought to remedy this by 
passing various pieces of legislation.164 There are various laws that are aimed at protecting 
online data and privacy, but in specific sectors of the Federal government and these affect 
online businesses at the Federal level.165 The sector-specific legislation is based on each 
industry determining the meaning of the term ‘appropriate’ in terms of privacy according to 
its industry norms and it relies heavily on self-created privacy standards that are outside the 
Federal privacy laws.166  Some of these statutes are not created entirely for the purposes of 
protecting online business, although they serve well in that aspect. 
There are some other state laws such as ones which stipulate restrictions on the use and 
display of social security numbers which generally function as Federal identification numbers 
for USA nationals.167 Generally, most of these laws restrict or prohibit the use of social 
security numbers as account numbers without individuals consenting and the ability to 
request from individuals or display social security numbers on the internet over an unsecure 
connection or unencrypted transmission.168 
6.6.1. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 
The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, (38 Stat. 717) (hereafter Federal Trade 
Commission Act) was signed into law by President Woodrow Wilson in 1913 and it allows 
the Federal Trade Commission (independent administrative agency organised in 1915 
pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act) to act in the interest of all consumers to 
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prevent deceptive and unfair acts or practices, thus protecting the data and privacy of online 
traders.169 
There are four core principles that can be extracted from the undertakings of the Federal 
Trade Commission in its bid to protect the privacy of consumer information collected over 
the internet and stored in databases. 170  To protect the privacy of consumer information 
collected over the internet and stored in databases, the four principals guiding data collection 
are ‘notice or awareness’, ‘choice or consent’, ‘access or participation’, and ‘security, 
enforcement or redress’.171 
In its Federal Trade Commission Report to Congress on Privacy Online, which contained a 
seminal report submitted to Congress, the Federal Trade Commission stated that: 
“…these core principles require that consumers be given notice of an 
entity's information practices; that consumers be given choice with respect 
to the use and dissemination of information collected from or about them; 
that consumers be given access to information about them collected and 
stored by an entity; and that the data collector take appropriate steps to 
ensure the security and integrity of any information collected.”172 
The report to Congress by the Federal Trade Commission was foundational to the 
establishment of the Privacy Act of 1974,173  another very important piece of legislation 
dealing with e-commerce privacy and data protection.174 The principles above as set out by 
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the Federal Trade Commission Act became a framework for online privacy and were to be 
adopted in online activities by all the online entities.175  
As a follow up to the policy report, in August of 1998, the Federal Trade Commission began 
the enforcement of privacy violations by charging Geo-Cities for failure to protect individual 
privacy.176 Geo-Cities is a web-based company that failed to protect the online consumer’s 
privacy by collecting and using information from its website improperly.177  
6.6.2. Freedom of Information Act of 1966 
The Freedom of Information Act of 1966178  is similar to the Privacy Act of 1974179 in that it 
applies to Federal agencies and other private agencies that process and control information 
flow.180 The Freedom of Information Act promotes access to government information by the 
public, with its main objective being the disclosure of government records according to the 
procedural laws.181  
The Freedom of Information Act provides that information must be given to the public182 and 
specific information must be made available for public inspection and copying. 183  The 
provisions above regulate the collection and the disclosure of information.184 
To the extent required for the prevention of a clearly unwarranted privacy invasion, the 
Freedom of Information Act also provides that details that identify an individual may be 
deleted from the copies of records, policy statements, opinions, interpretations, staff manuals 
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and instructions.185 Even though the Freedom of Information Act provides for the disclosure 
of information by the government agencies, it also provides some exemptions for the 
purposes of privacy protection.186  
Exempted information that cannot be disclosed includes all the trade secrets, commercial and 
financial information taken from an individual, certain financial records, privileged and 
confidential information, personnel and medical files or such files which would amount to 
invasion of privacy if disclosed records or information put together for the purposes of law 
enforcement.187  
In United States Department of Justice v Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the 
court upheld the decision by the Department of Justice to conceal some information because 
the disclosure of the criminal records would be contrary to one of the exemptions cited in 
section 552 (b) (7) (A)-(F) of the Freedom of Information Act.188 The court pointed out that 
the main purpose of the Freedom of Information Act was not to disclose private information 
about citizens but to ensure openness in all the Government’s dealings with its citizens.189 
The Freedom of Information Act also prohibits the disclosure of information or records 
compiled for the mere purposes of law enforcement if that information would amount to the 
invasion of privacy.190  
The Freedom of Information Act also provides that the information described as ‘classified 
information’ by reason of an Executive Order must be kept as secret information, if it is for 
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the purposes of national policy or national defence.191 The Freedom of Information Act also 
exempts the disclosure of information relating to internal rules, information exempted by 
statute, inter-agency and intra-agency memorandums and letters that are not readily and 
ordinarily available to the public.192  
However, in Chrysler Corp. v Brown, the exemptions in the Freedom of Information Act of 
1966 were ruled not to be guaranteed rights as they are not compulsory.193 An agent has 
discretion to disclose any kind of information and no individual can rely solely on these 
exemptions in order to prohibit the agent from disclosing such information.194 
In order to include disclosure of computerized records, the Freedom of Information Act195 
was amended by the Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1996196 which makes the 
Freedom of Information Act to allow for electronic records to be disclosed in the same way 
as paper-based records.197 
6.6.3. Wiretap Act of 1968 
The Wiretap Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. Sections 2510-2522 provides for informational 
protection against unlawful search and seizure of personal information only if the personal 
information is being transmitted through telephone communications systems.198 The Katz v 
Olmstead decision which prohibited the tapping of telephone lines with no warrant, led to the 
passing of the Wiretap Act.199 While it is illegal for a private person to record a third party’s 
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phone call without their consent, the government can intercept telephone calls, provided it 
has met all the basic requirements given by the Wiretap Act in order to get a warrant.200 
The decision in Bartnicki v Vopper permitted wiretapping as the court pointed out that 
disclosure of media is not prohibited if the information that has been published is a ‘public 
concern’.201 This decision was criticized by many as an erroneous decision.202  
6.6.4. Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 
The first piece of legislation advanced by the US Congress to deal with issues of privacy 
specifically was the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. Section 1681 (1970) 
(hereafter FCRA). 203  FCRA only applies to financial institutions that process and hold 
personal identifiable information.204 FCRA prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of credit 
information that is arbitrary and inaccurate unless if such a disclosure is for the purposes 
described by the Act.205 Although the FCRA prohibits information disclosures, there are 
some exemptions to this general rule, for example; giving information to someone named in a 
report, where there is a legitimate business need to do so and if the disclosure of information 
is in compliance with the court order.206 
FCRA deals with the respect that should be given to consumers over their right of privacy.207 
This complex piece of legislation deals with the use of personal identifiable information by 
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consumer credit reporting agencies.208 It limited the consumer credit reports’ information to 
some specific uses.209 Any business that wants to use such information from the credit reports 
must first comply with the requirements of the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s ‘Disposal Rule’ 
which requires proper and secure reporting of consumer credit information.210 The Disposal 
Rule was included in the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA) which 
amended the FCRA.211 
The FCRA also deals with account number truncation by prohibiting any person that accepts 
a credit or a debit card for the transaction of business from printing more than the last five 
digits of the account number or of the expiration date of the credit or debit card on any receipt 
provided to the card-holder.212  
The FCRA also requires that personal credit information be given by agencies if it benefits 
the federal government or if the one who requests the information will: 
 “…use the information in connection with a credit transaction involving 
the consumer ... or otherwise has a legitimate business need for the 
information in connection with a business transaction involving the 
consumer”213 
Nothing in the FCRA shall exempt persons from complying with any Federal state laws 
regarding the collection, the distribution or the use of any information on consumers, or for 
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the prevention or mitigation of identity theft, but of course with some exception to the extent 
of any inconsistency with the FCRA.214  
Even though the applicability of the FCRA to consumers involved in electronic commerce 
businesses is limited, it has evidenced congressional interest when it comes to e-commerce 
personal identifiable information collection, distribution and disclosure. 215  The FCRA 
protects privacy by giving customers the right to correct information in credit files and 
thereby permitting consumers to be aware of the information that is available about them and 
to exercise some form of control over that information. 216  The FCRA prohibits certain 
information from being included in the credit files of customers and therefore privacy is 
protected.217  
6.6.5. The Privacy Act of 1974 
The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. Section 552a (1974), limits the Federal government's 
capacity to collect, retain, and process (use) personal identifiable information.218 The Privacy 
Act also gives consumers who use electronic transactions in e-commerce the right to review 
and have their records corrected.219 In the USA, the Privacy Act places on all record-keeping 
agencies of the Federal government, the requirement for privacy protection, but not private 
companies.220 Private entities cannot be held responsible or liable under the Privacy Act since 
only public entities are subject to it.221 
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This piece of legislation shows that increases in technology and increases in the 
sophistication of computer systems has led to intrusion and to the invasion of privacy that 
takes place when personal identifiable information is being collected, stored, maintained, 
processed and disseminated. 222  Although there is no express statement in the USA 
Constitution, in the Privacy Act, the right to privacy is deemed to be a fundamental and 
personal right.223  
The Privacy Act permits individuals to have access to their personal information and to have 
that information corrected if it is considered to be inaccurate.224 Besides the conditions for 
disclosure of any agency records, the Privacy Act also provides controls to be applied when 
collecting data and when publishing personal identifiable information as kept by the Federal 
agent.225  
Agent maintained records must be reasonably accurate, timely, relevant and complete.226 In 
Bechhoefer v U.S. Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Admin, the court defined records 
as any information about a person that is private and is only connected to that person through 
an identifying particular.227 In Tobey v NLRB, the court also held that information which is 
defined as a record must have a person’s name or any of the identifying particulars.228 In 
McGregor v Greer, information which was retained in the records of the Department of 
Education was said to not constitute a “record” by the court since it was retrievable using the 
name of the employee or his identifying particulars.229 
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There are several rules surrounding the collection, the use and the disclosure of personal 
identifiable information in the Privacy Act.230 According to the Privacy Act, individuals from 
whom information is being collected must be informed of such a process, must be told if the 
disclosure is mandatory or voluntary and information must only be used for the purposes for 
which it was collected.231 
While Congress sought to prohibit the Federal government agents from disclosing private 
personal identifiable information without the consent of the individual concerned, they also 
set up some exemptions to the provision under the ‘routine use’ exception.232 ‘Routine use’, 
as an exemption to allow government agencies to disseminate personal identifiable 
information without prior consent would mean a use whose purpose is very much compatible 
with the purpose for which that information was collected.233 
Most critics of these exemptions have termed this ‘routine use’ as the ‘removal of teeth from 
a vicious dog’.234 It is also worth noting that there are no mechanisms in place created by the 
Privacy Act to inform the Americans of their right of inspection.235 This, according to critics, 
renders the Act ineffectual, since the Privacy Act then fails in securing individual right to 
privacy.236  
For individuals whose right to privacy has been violated, the Privacy Act provides for civil 
remedies.237 In other cases, the breach of someone’s right to privacy can actually attract a 
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criminal penalty of a very limited scope.238 Most remedies in cases of the violation of a 
person’s right to privacy take the form of awards or court injunctions.239  
6.6.6. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974  
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, (hereafter FERPA) also known as 
the Buckley Amendment protects the privacy of student education records by prohibiting the 
disclosure of educational records to anyone else other than the learners themselves or the 
parents of the learners.240 It applies to all the schools in the USA that are receiving Federal 
funding.241 This restriction by the FERPA has an exception in that Federal, local, State and 
educational authorities are permitted to have access to educational records when performing 
their lawful duties.242 
6.6.7. Copyright Act of 1976  
The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. Section 106 protects all original:  
“literary works; musical works, including any accompanying words; 
dramatic works, including any accompanying music; pantomimes and 
choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; motion 
pictures and other audio-visual works; sound recordings; and architectural 
works.”243 
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Commercial exploitation of another person’s personality is also prohibited by the Copyright 
Act.244 Commercial exploitation is defined by the Copyright Act to include the exploitation of 
a person’s name, likeness, photograph, voice or their identifying slogans.245 The plaintiff was 
awarded damages in the case of Midler v Young & Rubicam when that entertainer’s sound 
and style was copied by another vocalist.246 In White v Samsung Electronics America Inc. 
where the plaintiff’s voice was imitated by a robot, the court ruled that this imitation 
amounted to commercial exploitation of the plaintiff’s personality.247  
6.6.8. Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978  
When scanning financial records of customers, strict procedures must be followed by Federal 
Government Agencies as described by The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978.248 The 
Right to Financial Privacy Act was enacted for the purposes of protecting the confidentiality 
of personal financial records through a Fourth Amendment protection for all bank records.249 
Unless if it is for the purposes of complying with the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 
accessing of records by government authorities relating to customers' relationships with 
consumer reporting agencies, credit card companies and other financial institutions is deemed 
illegal.250  
Financial institutions are also prohibited from disclosing customer’s financial (records) 
information unless if it is for the purposes of compliance with the provisions of the Right to 
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Financial Privacy Act.251 The disclosure of financial records by financial institutions will not 
be deemed illegal if the disclosure has been authorised by the customer through consent.252  
6.6.9. Electronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978  
The Electronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978, (15 USC 1693 et seq.) (hereafter EFTA) was 
passed by Congress in 1980 with a single and specific application only to financial 
institutions. 253  Although it only applies to financial institutions, it has a bearing on e-
commerce because of its provision which states that notices must be given to consumers by 
financial institutions before their personal information is disclosed to third parties.254 The 
EFTA regulates all the electronic transactions in the banking system for example, cell phone 
banking, internet banking, automated teller machines (ATMs), point of sale terminal 
transactions and many others alike.255  
Customers must be informed by financial institutions as to which information will be made 
available to a third party.256 The EFTA also protects customer’s privacy by regulating codes 
as means to access accounts.257 All codes, passwords, automated teller machine (ATM) cards, 
Credit Cards, Debit Cards and any other means of accessing accounts should be given to 
customers only if requested for by way of application or if it is a renewal or replacement of 
an already existing card or code or password.258 These and other provisions in the EFTA give 
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some form of security against intrusions and fraudulent invasions of privacy by protecting, 
private personal identifiable information.259  
6.6.10. Privacy Protection Act of 1980 
For the purposes of protecting privacy by reducing law enforcement controlled searches and 
seizures of books and other publishers, the USA Congress in 1980 enacted the Privacy 
Protection Act of 1980 (PPA).260 Unless if a person is believed to be committing or if there is 
probable cause to believe that he or she has committed a criminal offence by publishing 
information in a broadcast, book, newspaper or any such publication, the government official 
is prohibited  from searching and seizing such public communication.261 
6.6.11. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 and the Telecommunications Act  of 1996 
To amend the Communications Act of 1924, the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 
(hereafter Cable Act) was enacted by Congress. 262  The Cable Act and the Tele- 
Communications Act of 1996, read together protect personal identifiable information by 
imposing restrictions on parties who work in the telecommunications and the cable 
communications industries.263 These two pieces of legislation stipulate that collection of and 
use of personal identifiable information should only be done if that information is necessary 
to perform the relevant contractual service and if the relevant data subject has given the 
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required consent for his or her information to be collected and or used.264  These laws are 
sector-specific legislation as they only apply within strictly defined industries.265 
6.6.12. Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986  
Since the Wiretap Act did not apply to emails, computer and other e-communications, the 
Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986, (hereafter ECPA) was enacted by the US 
Congress to protect privacy in all electronic communications.266 The ECPA prohibits access 
to stored electronic communications (emails and computer communications) without the 
concerned person’s consent and it also restricts the government from wiretapping 
transmissions of electronic data.267  
The government is allowed by the ECPA to demand handing over of personal consumer data 
by the service providers.268 Not only does ECPA cover computer communications, it also 
includes voice communications devices like the telephones and radio paging instruments 
which are not included in the Wiretap Act of 1968.269 The ECPA has pen register and traps 
and trace provisions which permit tracing of telephone communications under certain 
circumstances. 270  The ECPA does not cover wireless phones as was confirmed in an 
unpublished case opinion in United States v David Lee Smith.271 
The ECPA was applied in McVeigh v Cohen et al where the court set aside the dismissal of 
the plaintiff by the defendant on the basis correct procedures were not taken in accordance 
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with the ECPA when information was obtained from an electronic mail.272 The ECPA was 
also enacted as a challenge to the Smith v Maryland case decision which pointed out that 
telephone toll records are not private.273 
6.6.13. Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988 
The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988 (hereafter Computer Matching 
and Privacy Protection Act), was introduced by the USA Senate in an effort to amend the 
Privacy Act by bringing into balance the developed computer technology and the right to 
informational privacy.274 Unlike the Privacy Act which only applies to Federal government 
agencies, the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act apply to both the Federal 
government agencies as well as to non-Federal matching entities.275  
The term ‘non-Federal matching entity’ has been described by the Computer Matching and 
Privacy Protection Act to mean the local government or the state, or the agency of such a 
government (local or state), and any private or public organization that is participating in any 
matching program.276 Agencies must give individuals an opportunity to verify the correctness 
of information obtained from records through the match-making programme.277 
6.6.14. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988  
Following the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 which prohibited cable companies 
from non–consensual disclosure of customer’s personal identifiable information without the 
customer’s consent, the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988278 was also passed in 1988 
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prohibiting the disclosure of customer’s video rental choices without their consent.279 When 
customers have selected the videos they want, their selection should be kept private under all 
circumstances unless consent has been given for the disclosure of such selections.280 
6.6.15. Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1990  
The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1990, (hereafter COPPA) provides that 
when collecting information from children under the age of 13 years, clear notices of 
informational gathering practices must be provided by any website operators engaged in 
commercial activities and parents of these children must consent to such solicitations.281  
When the information has been collected, even after consent has been given, parents have a 
right to check the information collected, reduce it in extent or quantity and to impose a 
restriction on that information.282 Website operators are also mandated by COPPA to have in 
place, procedures that are reasonable in order to protect the confidentiality, security and 
integrity of personal identifiable information collected from children.283 
6.6.16. Drivers' Privacy Protection Act of 1994  
In 1993, the Congress passed the Driver’s Privacy Act of 1994, which prohibits the 
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) from passing out personal information about licence 
holders by State motor vehicle agencies.284 Disclosure of personal information is permitted in 
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cases where the information relates to a motor vehicle, driver safety and or performance 
monitoring.285 
 In cases where the personal information is required by the Federal, State and or local 
agencies for reasons that relate to the motor vehicle, driver safety and performance 
monitoring, an exemption to disclose personal information is granted.286  
6.6.17. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1994 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1994, (hereafter CFAA) was first introduced in the 
United States of America in 1986.287 It was later amended in 1994 and in 1996 and in 2001 
through the USA PATRIOT Act.288 The CFAA prohibits individuals from accessing Federal 
computers or computers belonging to a financial institution, for the purposes of obtaining 
personal identifiable information about some other individual.289  
6.6.18. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, (hereafter HIPPA)290, also 
known as Kennedy–Kassebaum Act (a name given after its leading sponsors), deals with all 
the health care privacy matters of personal information.291 The HIPPA sets out the standards 
that should be used when transacting healthcare information electronically.292 Although the 
HIPPA apply directly to medical providers and health planers, it however also applies to 
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associated businesses and, in other instances, to companies that provide or collect health 
insurance information.293 
6.6.19. Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act 
(GLBA)) 
The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act of 1999 (hereafter GLBA) also known as the Financial 
Services Modernization Act of 1999, applies to the use of personal identifiable information 
by financial institutions and banks.294 The GLBA permits the financial institutions to share 
personal information with affiliated parties without an ‘opt-out’ option unlike the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act of 1970 which demands that the financial institution must give the consumers 
an ‘opt-out’ option as well as a notice to opt out before sharing their personal information.295 
The disclosure of personal information is only limited to personal information that relates to 
financial institution's transactions or experiences with the consumer.296 
The States of California, North Dakota, New Mexico and Vermont adopted the GLBA, which 
provides for even tougher privacy laws by forbidding entities from sharing personal 
information with third parties unless a consumer affirmatively by consent "opts in" to the 
disclosure.297  
In American Bankers Association v Lockyer, (ABA v Lockyer), the ABA claimed that 
California's limitations on data sharing with affiliates were pre-emptied by the FCRA.298 Due 
to this gap, the GLBA was amended in part by the enactment of the Privacy Act299 to now 
require a business entity the sale or marketing of personally identifiable information to non-
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affiliated parties.300 The Privacy Act of 2005 also requires financial institutions to allow its 
customers the opportunity to opt out of personal information sharing under a joint agreement 
between financial institutions of which such information is exempted from the opt-out 
requirement under the GLBA.301 
6.6.20. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001  
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, otherwise known as the USA PATRIOT Act 
was enacted as an amendment to the FERPA. The USA PATRIOT Act amended the FERPA 
in 1994 to allow for the disclosure of certain records for purposes of investigation and 
prosecution of terrorism by the appropriate Federal authorities by giving exceptions to 
wiretapping.302  
The USA PATRIOT Act amended section 2516 of the ECPA to permit interception of oral, 
wire and e-communications in cases relating to computer abuse and fraud. 303  The USA 
PATRIOT Act also amended section 2517 of the ECPA to allow law enforcement officers to 
disclose information (contents of oral, wire and e-communications) to Federal intelligence 
officials or security agents if the information relates to counter-intelligence or foreign 
intelligence.304 For the purposes of protecting life and limb, the USA PATRIOT Act further 
amended the ECPA by authorizing the disclosure of electronic information in such 
circumstances. 305  Section 204 and 217 of the USA PATRIOT Act also allows for the 
interception of electronic communications if the information contained in the communication 
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is classified as intelligence information 306  and if communication is done by computer 
trespassers.307  
The controversial USA PATRIOT Act threatens the right to privacy.308 It allows for searches 
of business records, roving wiretaps and surveillance of individuals suspected of terrorist 
related activities not linked to terrorist groups.309 The USA PATRIOT Act was amended by 
the Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective 
Discipline Over Monitoring Act of 2015 otherwise known as the USA FREEDOM Act to 
prohibit the National Security Agency (NSA) from continuing its unrestricted mass email 
data collection. 310  The USA FREEDOM Act prohibits communication companies from 
retaining the data from which the National Security Agency (NSA) obtains information 
unless if permitted by the Federal court.311  
6.6.21. Social Security On-Line Privacy Protection Act of 2001 
This prohibits computer services that are interactive from disclosing personal identifiable 
information to third parties without the written consent from the individual concerned.312 
6.6.22. Social Security Number Protection Act of 2005  
The Social Security Number Protection Act (HR 1078) prohibits the purchasing or selling of 
any individual’s social security account number or social security number in a way that 
violates the provisions of the Federal Trade Commissions’ regulations.313 This law would 
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prevent fraud, crime, and deception, undue risk of bodily, financial and emotional harm to 
consumers.314 
6.6.23. Secure and Fortify Electronic Data Act of 2011 
Secure and Fortify Electronic Data Act (SAFE Data Act) is the Act that is responsible for 
securing people’s data from private intrusion.315  
6.7. Conclusion 
In the USA, the same privacy laws that apply where the goods and or services are supplied 
physically also apply where goods and or services are exclusively supplied on-line.316 This 
means that the sale of services and goods over the internet are treated very much the same as 
the sale of tangible offline services and goods.317  
In the USA, the electronic commerce industry as discussed above is now technologically 
managed and State self-regulated, with very little Federal legislation.318 Despite the increase 
in technology mechanisms to manage e-commerce in the USA as well as the increase in 
legislation, the U.S. Privacy Protection Study Commission in 1977, reported to Congress 
that:  
"Neither law nor technology now gives an individual the tools he needs to 
protect his legitimate interests in the records organizations keep about 
him."319  
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The USA e-commerce is not raising new data and information privacy concerns, as these 
have always been there since time immemorial. 320  E-commerce is only increasing the 
complexity level of the electronic commerce industry between personal information and the 
commercial goals set by the transacting parties.321 
On the issue of information trafficking, the USA information policy is still lagging behind 
despite the fact that it received public attention after the 09 September 2011 bombings (also 
known as the 9/11 bombings.322 As the USA technical capabilities are advancing, so is the 
commercial pressure, enhancing the tracking of the Federal citizens.323   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
As discussed in the earlier chapters, South Africa has a myriad of legislation that deals 
directly and indirectly with the protection of privacy. This chapter considers the adequacy, 
satisfactoriness, acceptability, reasonableness and the loopholes of legislation governing 
electronic transactions and e-commerce in South Africa as well as the improvements that may 
be made by developing new legislation and or focusing on the effective implementation of 
existing law. 
7.1. Analysis of the Regulatory Context of E-Commerce: Research Questions 
Due to the unprecedented movement of the world to information technology, there has been a 
significant change from an industrial age to an informational age.1  This dissertation has 
asked several questions on whether or not the development of information technology in 
business fits well into the current e-commerce legislation. To answer the crucial questions 
raised in chapter one of this dissertation, this chapter will seek to:  
a) Establish whether there has been legislation designed or put forward by the South 
African legislature to address information security concerns in e-commerce 
transactions?  
b) To determine to what extend the South African e-commerce legislation impacts on the 
legislature’s endeavour to curb privacy protection problems in e-commerce 
transactions? 
c) To establish how South African organizations and companies are employing policy 
and legal prescriptions for the purposes of enhancing identifiable private information 
through information security?  
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d) To determine the extend to which companies (both public and private) or 
organizations (both public and private) in South Africa, are integrating e-commerce 
privacy protection legal requirements in their policy formulation as well as their 
policy implementation? and lastly 
e) To establish whether there are intermissions in the legislation that have been enacted 
to address information security problems especially privacy concerns in e-commerce? 
7.2. Efforts Made by South Africa in Dealing with Information Protection Issues: 
Privacy as a Fundamental Human Right and the Challenges Involved 
7.2.1. Information Technology Security Policy Formulation 
Although South Africa has a considerable amount of legislation that deals with electronic 
commerce transactions and with the privacy of data and its protection in electronic 
transactions, it is noteworthy that according to the study discussed at the 8th Annual 
Information Security South Africa Conference, only a handful of organizations apply the 
requirements stipulated by legislation in their organizational policy formulation.2 This means 
that even if South Africa continues to draft and implement specific legislation on privacy 
protection in e-commerce, it may not improve the situation any better than it is now since 
organizations may still choose not to consider the legislation in their information security 
policy formulation. 
7.2.2. Lack of Education 
Among other South African statutes dealing with electronic commerce transactions (as 
discussed in the chapters above) is the ECTA.3 Even though the ECTA removes legal barriers 
                                                          
2 R Dagada … et al ‘Too many laws but very little progress! Is South African highly acclaimed information 
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and also provides security information in electronic transactions for buyers and merchants, a 
large number of branches of engineering dealing with the use of computer IT security in any 
organization are not aware of this legislation.4  
These practitioners and these experts are not familiar with the ECTA and they are unaware of 
the sections in it dealing with information technology security.5 This makes it hard for them 
to even include the information technology security requirements provided by the ECTA and 
other related legislation when forming organizational information security policies.6 
7.2.3. Lack of Necessary Expertise 
Besides being unaware of information technology legislation dealing with e-commerce 
transactions and privacy protection, a considerable number of organizations still lack the 
necessary expertise to actually formulate policies to deal with e-commerce transactions and 
privacy protection in the workplace.7 They buy and apply broadly generated information 
technology security policies of which may be irrelevant to their organization or their 
customers.8 The organizations that operate in such a way are best described and characterised 
as not assiduous, incompetent and uncommitted in executing security mandates given them 
by the South African e-commerce legislation.9 
7.2.4. Ambiguous Legislation 
The 8th Annual Information Security South Africa Conference also discussed that some of 
the legislation used in the country to deal with e-commerce are ambiguous.10 As was also 
observed in this dissertation, some legislation that is being used to date to deal with privacy 
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issues in e-commerce is very old and out of date. This is evidenced by the fact that the 
Copyright Act of 197811 and Merchandise Marks Act of 194112 are still in use despite the fact 
that when they were enacted, the internet was not being used for electronic commerce 
purposes.13 To avoid this ambiguity, all legislation dealing with electronic transactions should 
be amended or repealed and replaced by new ones, since the internet is now being used for 
electronic commerce purposes. 
7.2.5. Encryption Laws Not Effective 
The capabilities that are provided by encryption in the e-commerce world are vast, especially 
in securing electronic transmission of personal identifiable information over the internet in 
transactions conducted between a retailer and a consumer.14 The capabilities of encryption in 
South African e-commerce are being realised slowly because there are not many encryption 
laws as seen in the earlier chapters of this dissertation. Lack of encryption laws affects 
consumer confidence. In the British and Irish Law Education and Technology Association 
(BILETA) Annual Conference, it was pointed out that: 
“Fears associated with credit card detail interception over the internet 
coupled by the anonymity haven that the internet provides to unscrupulous 
merchants have done much in hampering consumer confidence. To this, the 
popularity that the existing payment cards have gained over the years, even 
before the development of electronic commerce along with the success of 
the card companies in managing to have their product effectively sunk in to 
common commercial practices have somehow played a deterrent role in 
simply discarding their use altogether…  
                                                          
11 Copyright Act 98 of 1978. 
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By the use of public and private key encryption, Secure Socket Layers 
(SSL) technology has been used effectively in transmitting card payment 
details effectively and safely over the internet, becoming in this way the 
norm for secure communication of payment.”15 
7.3. Evaluation of the Success of E-Commerce Legislation: Intermissions in Existing 
Information Protection legislation 
7.3.1. Secure Protocol Loopholes in the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act of 
2002 
The redundant provisions in the ECTA pose a great challenge. There are quite a few 
provisions in this piece of legislation, introduced for the purposes of combatting cybercrime 
by protecting privacy, which have been implemented since being formulated. 16  These 
provisions are found in chapter 8 of the ECTA and they include issues of hacking, spamming, 
espionage, viruses and all related cybercrimes that are supposed to be handled by cyber 
inspectors.17 
Cryptography as provided by chapter 10 of the ECTA provides for information protection by 
hiding it through encryption which makes it impossible for an intruder to read such 
information.18 This has not been implemented by most organizations dealing with personal 
identifiable information in e-commerce, rendering the provision useless by this lack of 
implementation. 19  There has not been a register provision by the director-general of 
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communications for cryptography providers to facilitate encryption in organizations involved 
in e-commerce.20  
Section 45 of the ECTA dealing with ‘unsolicited commercial communications’, has serious 
loopholes as consumers in e-commerce are still receiving unsolicited messages from the 
sellers of services, goods, and or products.21 The ECTA provides that the seller of services, 
goods and or products must provide an option to opt-out and since the consumers ignore the 
first message, they then continue to receive other messages even though they are still 
unsolicited.22  
The definition of ‘commercial’ found in section 45 of the ECTA is communications that form 
an offer to contract.23 Just because a communication does not form an offer to contract, does 
not mean it is not a commercial communication because in many instances it will contain 
‘vague commercial features’ in it that may render it an unsolicited commercial 
communication.24 This shows that according to section 45 of the ECTA, spamming is not 
altogether illegal as the ECTA regulates rather than prohibits spamming. Spamming 
encourages the accessing of private personal online identifiable information available through 
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7.4. Proposed Law Reforms to Improve the Existing Legal Framework 
7.4.1. E-commerce Across International Borders  
E-commerce takes place, not just in South Africa, but across international borders.26  E-
commerce transactions taking place across international boundaries are difficult to regulate.27 
One of the challenges that emanates from this is the fact that different countries use different 
ways to regulate electronic commerce transactions between a buyer and a seller of services, 
goods and or products.28 Although this might not be an intrinsic factor, the lack of clear 
regulation dealing with e-commerce taking place across international boundaries fails in 
creating an environment conducive for cross border online trading.29 This is because, what 
may be a crime in one country may not necessarily be a crime in another country. 
According to the paper released in December 2003 by the State Law Commission on the 
‘Privacy and Data Protection’:  
“Comprehensive legislation may negatively impact on the ability of South 
Africa and foreign companies and to receive and send trans-border flow of 
personally identifiable information thereby weakening cross-border 
commerce and services between South Africa and its trading partners.”30 
According to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), trans-boundary e-commerce consumer 
protection must be incorporated at a global level to avoid it endangering consumer 
confidence.31 The organization even encouraged its signatory members to come up with data 
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privacy legislation that is non-discriminatory to promote compatibility between different 
regimes.32 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership stated that trans-boundary e-commerce laws will serve this 
purpose: 
“…adopt or maintain consumer protection laws to proscribe fraudulent and 
deceptive commercial activities that cause harm or potential harm to 
consumers engaged in online commercial activities.”33 
7.4.2. Is There a Need for More Government Legislation on E-Commerce Transactions? 
There is a risk that the e-commerce industry maybe over-regulated, since South Africa has a 
myriad of legislation already dealing with online business transactions and seem to be 
passing more legislation.34 For policy makers, technology is a moving target.35 Problems 
emanating from the use of technology in online business transactions must be addressed 
using flexible but effective technological solutions. The South African e-commerce 
legislation is out of date with the latest technology being used to do business and is thereby 
rendered irrelevant to the e-commerce industry. 36  On the other hand, these electronic 
commerce transactions should not be left to run unguarded by a policy framework.37 
While some privacy advocates are demanding additional online privacy legislation, it has also 
been observed through the discussion above that these calls by the privacy advocates have 
been overstated as more legislation does not always progenerate better online information 
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privacy protection.38 Other e-commerce sector players are of the view that before jumping to 
the conclusion that there is a greater need for new consumer protection laws to protect 
privacy in e-commerce transactions, the legislature should consider other alternatives and 
maybe give those alternatives a chance.39 The BILETA Annual Conference also stated that: 
“Enhanced consumer protection legislation would on the one hand foster 
consumers’ confidence in ecommerce, on the other hand however, it might 
lead to a ‘knee-jerk’ legislative reaction that would probably inhibit the 
growth of new technologies and hamper further developments. 
 The reverse maybe true as well. Lax consumer protection legislation may 
have the advantage of encouraging e-payment systems’ innovation allowing 
thus the market to develop, however, insufficient consumer protection 
legislation would inhibit consumers’ confidence in new e-payment systems 
prohibiting thus this new market from reaching a critical mass of 
acceptance hampering thus the development of e-commerce.”40 
7.4.3. Technology-Neutral Approach 
When developing rules or when regulating e-commerce activities, such regulations should not 
be a hindrance to the use and development of information technology in the future.41 The 
technology that is developed for the purposes of dealing with privacy issues in e-commerce 
transactions should not in any way assume specific technology as e-commerce technology 
seems to be ever changing.42  




41 M D Tuba ‘The technology-neutral approach and electronic money regulation in the EU: Identifying the 
promises and challenges for future regulation in South Africa’ (2014) 47 (1) Computer and International Law 
Journal of South Africa 382.  
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A technology-neutral approach avoids e-commerce regulations from being outdated, from 
losing the meaning and authority as soon as they are passed due to the ever-changing 
technology. 43  The technology-neutral approach avoids discrimination against particular 
informational technology as the regulations are not specific and are framed based on values 
and functions.44 In the USA case of Diamond v Chakrabarty, the court pointed out that an e-
commerce regulatory framework must be wide-ranging and inclusive of possible 
technological changes that may take place.45 The USA court in the same case also mentioned 
that: “law must encompass anything under the sun made by man”46 
7.5. The Challenge Facing the South African Legislature: Comparative Legal Analysis 
When accessing the efficacy of the various statutes from the three countries under review in 
this dissertation (that is South Africa, UK and the USA), it is apposite to note that although e-
commerce legislation has developed supremely, it still needs to transform to meet the 
requirements of the ever-changing technology. E-commerce in the three countries mentioned 
above operates under different domains, as noted in this dissertation.  
South African e-commerce laws as they have been discussed in this dissertation take after the 
UK e-commerce laws. This creates a problem for South Africa since these two countries 
operate under two different regimes. What works for the UK might not necessarily work for 
South Africa since UK is a first world country, while South Africa is a second world country.  
South Africa however, has constitutional protection of privacy and informational security, 
unlike the UK and the USA. The UK does not have a Constitution and the USA has no 
express provision for the protection of privacy in its Constitution. While the USA relies on 
privacy protection implied in the word ‘liberty’ as found in its Federal Constitution, South 
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Africa relies on section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996, which 
provides for privacy as a fundamental human right as found in the Bill of Rights  
This makes it easier for South Africa to cater for the protection of privacy in e-commerce, 
since information security is regarded as a fundamental human right by its Constitution. 
However, although South Africa has privacy provided for as a fundamental human right in its 
Constitution, at a global level, there is still a lack of a systematic regulation of e-commerce 
transactions.47 This makes it very difficult if not impossible for the courts to enforce privacy 
rights and other rights in e-commerce transactions that are conducted by South Africans with 
other foreign subjects.48  
7.6. Summary and Conclusion of Findings: The Way Forward  
The world is witnessing a huge revolution and rapid development in the sphere of 
information and communications technology. Abdulrahman Abdullah Alajaji stated that: 
“At the forefront of that revolution is the internet, which has become 
indispensable for providing information and communication amongst 
people throughout the world. It has removed geographical boundaries and 
even temporal differences, transforming the world into a small village as 
one of the main features of the era of globalisation.  
E-commerce is still a new phenomenon that is attracting increasing 
attention from many countries, which is likely to continue growing as 
numbers of those with access to the internet rise. As e-commerce becomes 
increasingly internationalised, the need to produce new well-drafted 
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legislation governing online transactions becomes an issue of global 
significance. 
Constant advances in information and communications technology will 
continue to provoke international debate and discussion regarding the rules 
and principles that should govern the virtual world of e-commerce, 
challenging many aspects of existing legislation in areas such as contractual 
law. The emerging field of e-commerce law will need to receive increasing 
attention in order to maintain consumer confidence and minimise the 
existence of legal loopholes.”49 
7.6.1. Recommendation One: Policy Formulation by Information Technology Security 
Organizations 
I recommend that the government should design some mechanisms to coerce IT security 
organizations to formulate policies that are designed to implement the requirements of 
legislation dealing with informational privacy protection in electronic commerce transactions. 
Legislation created by the South African government must address all the technological 
changes that have taken place over the years in e-business. The same legislation must also 
cater for the ever-changing electronic means of doing business. Legislation must also seek to 
address cross border online trading.  
7.6.2. Recommendation Two: Self-regulated Industry 
I recommend that the South African legislature introduce, like in the USA, technology such 
as the Platform for Privacy Preferences Project. The Platform for Privacy Preferences Project 
in the USA is an industry-led effort that enables particular websites to give e-commerce 
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customers their privacy practices in machine readable standardised format, which can be 
retrieved and interpreted by a consumer's computer automatically.50 If the site's policy that is 
found on that particular website is not in line with what the consumer wishes, a warning is 
issued automatically and the consumer is warned and can decide on whether to visit the site 
or not.51 
Again, as shown by the American 1998 annual Federal Trade Commission (FTC) studies, 
self-regulation through privacy policies was evident in 14% of all the commercial websites 
which had a privacy notice or a privacy statement.52 The percentage rose from 14% in 1998 
to 66% in 1999 and ultimately to 88% in 2000.53 Self-regulation-plus-administration-pressure 
approach led to this increase as well as to internet privacy technology innovations.54 
7.6.3. Recommendation Three: Coded E-Commerce Legislation  
I also recommend that the South African government introduce coded legislation to deal only 
with e-commerce matters in order to avoid over-regulating the industry instead of the 
scattered system of threat-and-industry-specific privacy protection. This will also enable 
information technology security practitioners and experts to find it easy to incorporate the 
requirements of these legislation when making organizational IT policies. 
The South African government must not just write e-commerce policy objectives into 
legislation, but must also ensure the legal framework so enacted is providing adequate 
incentives. This requires the government not only pass e-commerce regulations but also to 
supervise the implementation of such. It should ensure that the existing e-commerce laws and 
                                                          
50 R W Hahn & A Layne-Farrar ‘Is more government regulation needed to promote e-commerce?’ (2002) 35 (1) 
Connecticut Law Review 201.  
51 J R Reidenberg ‘Restoring American’s privacy in e-commerce’ (1999) 17 (1) Berkeley Technology Law 
Journal 787.    
52 P P Swire ‘Trustwrap: The importance of legal rules to electronic commerce and internet privacy’ (2003) 54 
(1) Hastings Law Journal 863. 
53 ibid 863 and 864. 
54 Ibid 864. 
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industry practices are followed. There must be a balance between the very need to combat 
crime through transaction reporting of consumer identification and the consumer’s right of 
privacy and data protection. 
7.6.4. Recommendation Four: Extra Privacy Protection Mechanisms 
The government can also come up with measures to strengthen its monitoring systems to 
ensure compliance with the rules/laws enacted to deal with privacy protection, especially in 
electronic commerce transactions. 
7.6.5. Recommendation Four: Creating Awareness 
This dissertation would not be complete, if it did not address the issue of awareness. Finally, I 
recommend that the South African government devise more ways to enhance their awareness 
campaigns. In addition to the legislation that has been implemented, those that are yet to be 
implemented and those that will need to be amended to address privacy concerns in e-
commerce in South Africa, should be communicated to the general public who should also be 
educated on how to handle their private online personal identifiable information when doing 
online doing online transactions. 
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